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ABSTRACT 
This study analyses the relationship between the manner of citizens’ engagement with the state and 
the level of service delivery they experience in their everyday lives, as residents of Khayelitsha. The 
phenomena of so-called ‘service delivery’ protests across South Africa have now become a fixture of 
South African politics.  Khayelitsha is one of the sites with frequent protests in Cape Town and is 
inhabited by poor people, 70 percent of whom live in informal settlements. While the lack of 
municipal services is undoubtedly a major problem for many poor people in South Africa, thus far, 
few studies have been dedicated to investigate empirically this alleged link between service delivery 
and protest activity.  The study utilizes mostly quantitative analysis techniques such as regression 
analysis and path analysis to discover the form and strength of linkages between the service delivery 
and participation forms. While residents of informal settlements and therefore poorer services were 
more prone to engage in protests and thus reinforcing the service delivery hypothesis, this 
relationship was relatively weak in regression analysis. What is more important than the service 
delivery variables such as water services was the level of cognitive awareness exemplified by the 
level of political engagement and awareness on the one hand and level of community engagement 
in terms of attendance of community meetings and membership of different organizations. In 
summary the study found relatively weak evidence to support the service delivery hypothesis and 
stronger evidence for the importance of cognitive awareness and resource mobilization theories in 
Khayelitsha as the key determinant of protest activity. 
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C h a p t e r  1  
INTRODUCTION  
1.1 INTRODUCING THE CONUNDRUM OF SERVICE DELIVERY AND CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION IN KHAYELITSHA  
This study presents an assessment of the connections between service delivery – water 
services, in particular – and the participatory strategies adopted by different communities. 
The study was conceptualised within the context of heightened militancy in local 
government exemplified by the widespread (and so-called) ‘service delivery’ protests in 
2005 and 2006. A large body of literature (e.g. Benit-Gbaffou, 2008a; 2008b; Piper & 
Nadvi, 2010; Tapscott, 2005; 2010; Ballard et al, 2006; Miraftab, 2006; Zuern, 2001) 
already exists on the state-civil society nexus in the post-apartheid era. The majority of 
these studies point to the malfunctioning of the institutionalised participatory system of 
governance, examples of which are ward committees and integrated development 
planning. These faults in mainstream participatory channels are said to have led to the 
shifts observed towards unconventional methods of participation such as protests and 
court action, which have been (relatively) more successful in attracting an audience and 
making voices heard.  
 
Protest per se is not a novel phenomenon in South Africa, as it formed a key part of the 
anti-apartheid struggle. But there is a crucial distinction: in the colonial and apartheid 
eras, black
1
 peoples’ participation in governance was circumscribed through a host of 
                                                 
1 The continuing usage of race classification in South Africa is a double-edged sword – for while it allows for an 
historically underpinned analysis of the South African political economy, it has been criticised for reinforcing the social 
construct and undermining the reintegration of the post-apartheid society. It is noted that race classification is still used 
by various government bodies such as in identity books (by the Home Affairs department) and by Statistics South 
Africa for ‘statistical’ purposes. My use of race classification throughout this thesis does not assume the validity of these 
colonial and apartheid constructs; instead, it is merely an instrument for highlighting persisting inequities. The terms 
‘Black’ or ‘African’, when used to denote South African peoples, refer to ‘indigenous’ black African people. The term 
‘white(s)’ refers to descendants of European settlers. ‘Asian’ denotes people of south Asian descent, mainly from India 
and Pakistan, while ‘Coloured’ refers to people of mixed descent, mostly European, African and Asian parentage. The 
term ‘black’ refers to the so-called Africans, Coloured and Asians together as a group.  
 
 
 
 
 2 
laws directed at negating their South African citizenship.
2
 This obsessive desire to 
subjugate black Africans and relegate them to a permanent underclass did not dissuade 
Africans from migrating into ‘white’ urban South Africa. Migration in search of job 
opportunities (mainly in urban areas and mining compounds) was a means of diversifying 
income, away from the unproductive subsistence economy. In earlier times, the colonial 
authority had managed to moderate agricultural surpluses in rural areas to a level just 
high enough to maintain the reproduction of migrant workers – Wolpe (1995) argues – to 
keep a steady flow of labour into mines and urban centres.  
 
One of the most paradoxical elements of the colonial and apartheid systems was the 
simultaneous necessity for the flow of Africans into the urban centres, and the desire of 
the state to restrict this flow. While destroying the African agricultural economy had 
achieved the former, attempts at achieving the latter were made through influx control 
laws and through limiting the availability of housing stock for Africans. This resulted in 
slums growing both within and at the edges of urban centres, as Africans increasingly 
came to see migrant work as their key source of income. It is fair to argue that the 
envisaged restrictions failed; notwithstanding the measures adopted by successive 
governments to deal with informal settlements, such as demolitions, prosecution and 
evictions – all of which failed to stem rural-urban migration.  
 
Cape Town was the site of probably the most determined influx control measures, 
epitomised by the coloured labour preference policy and the Eiselan Plan, which sought 
to limit the population of Africans in the Western Cape ‘with almost fanatical fervour’ 
(Van Heerden & Evans, 1985). Despite this fervent commitment to influx control, 
involving mass ‘deportations’, the population of Africans in the Cape Peninsula more 
than doubled in the 20 years between 1961 and 1981, from 85 512 to 187 216 (Van 
Heerden & Evans, 1985). When it became clear that influx control had failed to limit 
                                                 
2 Through the enactment of an assemblage of laws: the Native Authorities Act of 1951 and the Promotion of Bantu Self 
Government Act of 1959 and the Bantu Homelands Act of 1971, the apartheid government created an ‘artificial’ system 
of ethnically defined and nominally independent ‘states’ as decanting sites for unwanted African people from the ‘white 
South Africa’ (Reed, 2003). These Bantustans were created in what had been (under the Native Reserves Act of 1913) 
the native reserves, consisting of only 7% of the total land mass of South Africa. The system received wide 
condemnation internationally, and these Bantustans failed to obtain international recognition.  
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migration into the Cape Peninsula, and that the constant raids had galvanised 
communities – especially in Crossroads – to resist forced removals, government yielded 
to an extent; by announcing the development of New Crossroads, which was superseded 
in 1983 by the announcement of plans for a new site to house all Africans in the Cape 
Peninsula, and to be known as Khayelitsha. As will become clear in the discussion (in 
Section 1.5.4) of the history of the area, Khayelitsha represented merely a continuation of 
regulatory planning.  
 
Huchzermeyer (2004) argues that the state’s action was based on the futile regulatory 
planning model that assumes urbanisation can be controlled. She sees land occupations as 
inevitable, as long as the urban poor’s access to land remains regulated and release rates 
stay below demand levels – regardless of the amount of force used against them. This is 
aptly demonstrated by the mushrooming of informal settlements well into the post-
apartheid era.   
 
The present problems in service delivery cannot be separated from this historical account 
of African urbanity in South Africa. However, a history of South African service delivery 
problems does not prevent the analysis of continuities found in contemporary policy 
formulations, which – as Huchzermeyer (2004) argues – are still fixated on “orderly”, 
regulatory urbanisation. But this historical context should explain why it has become 
critical for government to address this issue. 
 
Many have fallen into the trap of rebuffing a historical analysis of contemporary South 
African problems. Any analysis of contemporary problems that deliberately ignores 
historical events inevitably fails to reveal underlying and persisting forces (David & 
Thomas 2003). Many critiques on the failings of the post-apartheid administration, led by 
the African National Congress (ANC), struggle to find the balance between the ANC’s 
own failures, and structural impediments inherited from apartheid. This thesis is not 
about how colonialism and apartheid bequeathed to the nation such a highly 
differentiated geography of services – but rather, how the present service delivery 
realities, historically derived as they are, constrain citizens in poor urban settings.  
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The impact of colonialism and apartheid in South Africa continues to be felt, exemplified 
by high black unemployment, poverty, sharp inequalities in income, property ownership 
and opportunities, and high levels of crime and violence, at the receiving end of which 
are mainly the black Africans (Terreblanche 2002). In recognition of the desperate state 
of poverty afflicting the majority of the population, the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme or RDP (ANC, 1994), on the back of which the ANC won the 1994 elections, 
placed its emphasis on satisfying basic human needs. 
 
The first priority is to begin to meet the basic needs of the people – jobs, 
land, housing, water, electricity, telecommunications, transport, a clean and 
healthy environment, nutrition, health care, and social welfare. (ANC, 
1994:7) 
 
Yet RDP was effectively
3
 decommissioned as government policy in 1996, as a 
consequence of a shift in government thinking towards the unpopular neoliberal policy of 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). Seventeen years into the democratic 
era, many of these ‘basic needs’ remain inaccessible to many people. Terreblanche 
(2002) suggests that this failure to fulfil the high expectations of poor people for dramatic 
improvement in living conditions after 1994 has grave implications for social stability. 
Government failures notwithstanding, it would be misleading to say the state has not 
made efforts to supply these basic needs. Notable accomplishments include those in 
electrification, water supply, supplementary feeding in schools, and the construction of 
schools and clinics. In its 2009 ‘January 8 Statement’,4 the ANC trumpets its 
achievements to date as follows:  
 
                                                 
3 RDP continues to be posited as government policy, despite its dramatic sidelining and the introduction of alternative 
development framework GEAR in 1996. This is not surprising, as RDP carries with it immense political utility as the 
document on which the 1994 ANC election campaign was premised. Moreover, RDP enjoys widespread support from 
both the SACP and COSATU, the ANC partners in the so called ‘Tripartite Alliance’. 
4 January 8 marks the anniversary of the formation of ANC. The party uses this date to trumpet its achievements and set its 
programme for the year. Given that 2009 was an election year, the statement had a double instrumentality – celebrating 
achievements and forming part of the election manifesto. 
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Access to social grants has increased massively from 3 million people in 
1997 to 12.5 million in 2008. The ANC government has provided 18.7 
million more people with access to clean water 10.9 million more with 
access to sanitation. From 1994 to 2008, 3.1 million housing subsidies were 
approved, and 2.3 million units completed This brought housing to 9.9 
million more citizens… We have made significant progress in providing 
access to education to South Africans, with a total of 98% of our children 
between 7 to 15 years being enrolled in schools. (ANC, 2009:2-3.) 
 
Performance in housing provision and sanitation has been less than spectacular, despite 
these claims. The triumphalism of these bold statements cannot obscure the key issues of 
unemployment and crime, which remain stubbornly widespread. It emerges that the 
poverty traps of the old order remain in place; government is hamstrung, prevented from 
implementing a radical programme of social transformation by the compromises it 
entered into during the transition negotiations (May, 2000; Terreblanche, 2002). In 
addition, GEAR (RSA, 1996b) was adopted by the ANC in 1996 at the behest of the 
Bretton Woods institutions, diverting the ANC from its struggle ideals (Macozoma, 2003; 
Peet, 2002; Marais, 2001; Bond, 1999; Padayachee, 1998). The policy shift resulted in a 
fierce political backlash, chiefly from the ANCs alliance partners, COSATU and the 
SACP. Veteran ANC leader Ben Turok (2008) confirms that the GEAR document was 
never genuinely
5
 canvassed within the ANC, let alone by the alliance.  
 
So far, this historical account of material deprivation in South Africa illustrates the 
deprivation of the black population of South Africa. The post-apartheid order, in the 
meantime, has adopted a piecemeal approach to socio-economic transformation. It may 
be asked: How have these citizens responded to this material deprivation? What 
participatory mechanisms have they used in their struggle for material up-liftment? Pillay 
(2005) in Oldfield (2008:487) ably answers these two questions:  
 
                                                 
5 Commenting on claims by the former finance minister Trevor Manuel that GEAR was discussed by the ANC National 
Executive Committee and the Alliance, Turok comments that Manuel ‘was being disingenuous’ (Turok, 2008:116). 
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We can speak. There are more channels than ever to do so. But the language 
of technocratic liberal constitutionalism both enables and disables us. It 
enables us by making talking, listening and being heard a right in a 
democracy. But it disables us by telling us how, where and when we should 
speak and in what conceptual language we can speak if we want our sounds 
to be heard and comprehended and not reduced to noise lost in the south-
easter and swept out to sea. (Pillay 2005:7) 
 
So far, the codification of participatory citizenship in the constitution as a means of 
transforming the exclusionary state has failed to yield tangible change. Within the liberal 
democratic model, government is promoting the intrinsic benefits of participation as a 
way of achieving full citizenship. For many citizens, the poor especially, material redress 
forms the cornerstone of citizenship, in the light of colonial- and apartheid-induced socio-
economic inequities. Access to socio-economic opportunities is instrumental in 
determining patterns of citizenship (Lalloo, 1998; Tapscott, 2007). Adversely 
incorporated into the system, the poor are often outwitted by elites in formal participatory 
channels (Tapscott, 2007). Meanwhile, well-to-do communities are able to extract 
compromises from the state through their ability to harness the resources required to 
engage in intricate disputes, by using various spaces such as the mass media and the 
internet, and by enlisting the help of the courts.  
 
While the ongoing transformation has resulted in the legal exclusion of the foundations of 
apartheid, and the emergence of class as the central cleavage, the quality of urban 
services and socio-economic access arguably retains the roots of the old system. In urban 
areas, transformation of citizenship requires the removal of race as the central basis of 
planning. For many of the poor, the huge inequality between their lot and that of the rich 
and overwhelmingly white population (of which population the ‘Boers’6 are seen as the 
main adversaries of the poor) centres on the quality of houses and associated services at 
the disposal of the privileged class, which forms the basis by which full citizenship may 
be measured. 
                                                 
6 Categorisation of white people as amabhunu, i.e. the Boers or the Afrikaners, and amangisi, i.e. the English, was 
encountered throughout the interviews. Repeated reference was made to the ‘Boer’ rather than to white people in 
general. This stems from the general belief that the apartheid system was solely an Afrikaner policy; a point that has 
received critical attention. 
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1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
This study analyses the relationship between the manner of citizens’ engagement with the 
state and the level of service delivery they experience in their everyday lives, as residents 
of Khayelitsha. Incessant so-called ‘service delivery’ protests across South Africa have 
been a fixture of South African politics since 2005. Anecdotal explanations for this 
phenomenon abound, yet few answers have been derived from the empirical analysis of 
data. In the 2004 election won a resounding majority of nearly 70% of the votes cast, 
which dropped to below 66% in 2009. Though lacking a formal pact, protestors across 
the country have united in anger against what they say is slow or inefficient service 
delivery, and a lack of state accountability to citizens. Meanwhile government has 
pointed to the existence of a third force
7
 bent on undermining the state and the stability of 
the young democracy. Fearful of this growing sense of instability, government swiftly 
activated its intelligence agencies to track this third force. Seeking a third force was 
perhaps rash, given the enormity of the unmet needs of the majority of South Africans, 
who continue to live in squalor. 
 
Thabo Mbeki, president at the time, commented that while these demonstrations did not 
pose an immediate danger, there was a possibility that ‘if they took root, gaining popular 
support, [they] would pose a threat to the stability of democratic South Africa’ (my 
emphasis) (SALRC, 2005:37). The anxiety of government expressed here by the 
President is an acknowledgement – at least in part – of the role that protests played in 
undermining the apartheid state, and now the young democracy, just 11 years after the 
end of apartheid rule. For Benit-Gbaffou (2008b:27) the issue is that institutionalised 
participation has been a failure, and people’s voices are more likely to be heard if they 
bypass these formal channels:  
No matter how important the local democracy discourses and how various the 
participatory platforms, the most efficient forms of communities’ involvement 
                                                 
7 Historically, the term was used by ANC leaders in the anti-apartheid struggle to refer to the existence of a covert group of 
apartheid forces allegedly responsible for violence in the townships, and later confirmed in the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) as a loose alliance of security operatives and right-wing groups (TRC, 2003). For Tapela (2009) this 
re-insertion of the Third Force into the post-apartheid discourse, is telling, and ‘implies covert white manipulation 
towards evil ends’. It would emerge that in fact ‘the third force is all the pain and suffering that the poor are subjected to 
every second of their lives’. as S’bu Zikode (2006), the Chairperson of Abahlali BaseMjondolo, a shack dweller 
movement, argues. 
 
 
 
 
 8 
into the management of their own environment are definitely not the institutional 
participatory channels, be it in the high- or low-income areas. The ward system, 
for instance, has proved inefficient, compared to marches, riots and lawsuits.... 
Peoples voices are taken into account only when they resort to exceptional means 
of expression, outside more regular institutionalised and routine participatory 
structure. 
 
Poorer communities resort to protest, but the more well-to-do communities are able to use 
the courts to have their voices heard (Tapscott, 2010; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008a; 2008b). 
These are both forms of expression outside of regular, institutionalised channels. In 
Tapscott (2010) and Benit-Gbaffou (2008a; 2008b), there are essential differences 
between those issues affecting affluent communities and those affecting poorer 
communities. While the well-to-do neighbourhoods seem to be engaged in issues 
concerning the aesthetic appeal of their neighbourhoods, urban densification, and 
property values, the poorer areas are affected by more basic issues of service delivery – 
housing, water and electricity, in most instances.  
  
Though a number of papers have emerged that are centred on understanding the protests 
and forms of citizen participation to do with service delivery, these have largely assumed 
the link between service delivery and such forms of participation; or have used 
qualitative methods and newspaper article analysis to arrive at their conclusions. In this 
dissertation, quantitative methods have been employed to discover the link between 
access to services and participation. In addition, the study describes other factors that are 
essential in the generation of different forms of participation. 
 
The 2001 census statistics detail the service delivery predicament of Khayelitsha: up to 
70% of the residents live in informal settlements without access to proper housing, 
proximal water supplies, functioning toilets, electricity, drainage infrastructure, roads and 
electricity. This is in spite of the ‘priority’ status supposedly given to Khayelitsha under 
the Presidential Urban Renewal Programme with neighbouring Mitchell’s Plain (CCT, 
2005). Hence, it is understandable that reportedly, many of Khayelitsha’s recurrent 
protests are premised on service delivery issues. I attempt to isolate the relationship and 
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to develop a model of the generation of such protests and of attendance at public 
meetings. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
The following specific objectives inform the research:  
 
 To describe the relationship between service delivery (for water services in 
particular) and the form and intensity of participation in community meetings and 
protests 
 To describe the level of service delivery, in the selected study sites and relate this 
to the dominant forms of participation and protest 
 To identify the key determinants for attendance of community meetings and 
protests, and determine the location of service delivery (if applicable) within such 
a matrix of variables  
  To derive a causal path depicting the interaction of the key determinants of 
participation, and in particular how service delivery variables interact to produce 
different forms of citizen participation 
 To describe the politics of water service delivery in Cape Town in general, and 
Khayelitsha in particular, in relation to participation dynamics. 
 
A brief analytical review of the broader literature on water services delivery is provided 
to contextualise these objectives and government policy on water services delivery in 
South Africa.  
 
1.4 SOME PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS ON WATER SERVICES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
1.4.1 Why the emphasis on water?  
As already indicated in sections 1.1 and 1.2 above, service delivery occupies an important 
position in societal debates in the post-apartheid dispensation, especially for the 
historically disfranchised black population. ‘Service delivery’, in this context, 
encompasses a broad range of municipal services, such as housing, water supply, 
sanitation, refuse removal, electricity, and drainage, among other services. A study 
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covering such breadth in detail would have been unfeasibly large. In order to circumvent 
that problem, but avoid superficial engagement, I chose to detail water services (water 
supply and sanitation) – and to a lesser extent, housing – to highlight how different 
service delivery forms generate various forms of participation.  
 
It has been argued that water is one of the ‘most compelling issues to have captured the 
world community in recent years’ (Salman & McInerney-Lankford, 2004). The United 
Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) 2006 sequel to its Human Development 
Reports was subtitled  Beyond  Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis, 
and summarises the global water crisis. The report boldly declares that:  
 
Water, the stuff of life and a basic human right, is at the heart of a daily 
crisis faced by countless millions of the world’s most vulnerable people – a 
crisis that threatens life and destroys livelihoods on a devastating 
scale.(UNDP, 2006:1) 
 
In this view, water cannot and should not be viewed in isolation to other components of 
human life; it is established fact that there exists a nexus of water, development and 
human rights (UNDP, 2006; Salman & McInerney-Lankford, 2004). In addition, the link 
between water and poverty is also well established – the majority of water-short people 
are also poor. This triad of water, development and human rights is clearly described in 
the citation below: 
 
Clean water and sanitation are among the most powerful drivers for human 
development. They extend opportunity, enhance dignity and help create a 
virtuous cycle of improving health and rising wealth… “Not having access” 
to water and sanitation is a polite euphemism for a form of deprivation that 
threatens life, destroys opportunity and undermines human dignity. Being 
without access to water means that people resort to ditches, rivers and lakes 
polluted with human or animal excrement or used by animals. It also means 
not having sufficient water to meet even the most basic human needs. 
(Salman & Mcnerney-Lankford, 2004:5) 
 
It is important to disentangle the water/human rights linkage further. Defining human 
rights is very difficult; they are generally thought to be entitlements – freedoms and basic 
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needs inherent in humans. While it is generally accepted that water is indispensable to 
human life, there is still no consensus on whether water is a basic human need or right 
(Salman & McInerney-Lankford, 2004). The United Nations Water Conference held in 
Mar del Plata in 1977 (hereafter the Mar del Plata Conference) stated that all people have 
the right to access to water in quantities and quality equal to their basic needs. In 1992 the 
International Conference on Water and Environment held in Dublin (ICWE, 1992) 
(hereafter the Dublin Conference) asserted in principle 4 that ‘water has an economic 
value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good’ qualified 
by the caveat that ‘it is vital to recognize first the basic right of all human beings to have 
access to clean water at an affordable price.’ In 1999 the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, in the resolution ‘The Right to Development’, affirmed that ‘the right to food 
and clean water are fundamental human rights and their promotion constitutes a moral 
imperative both for national governments and for the international community.’  
 
Although water is not included explicitly in international human rights law, it can be 
inferred under provisions of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
and the two 1966 covenants on human rights: the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). The right to water is integral to rights such as the right to life, 
and to an adequate standard of living, health, housing, and food, as illustrated in Box 1.1 
below. 
 
General Comment No. 15 (2002) of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (hereafter General Comment No. 15) explicitly recognises the right 
to water and the duty of the state to ensure sufficient and continuous availability of water,  
as well as equity of access, both physically and economically. Although General 
Comment No. 15 carries less weight than the UDHR and the 1966 covenants, it still 
forms part of international law which can be relied upon, as did Justice Jacoob in the 
matter Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 
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2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), to ‘be a guide to interpretation… However, where the relevant 
principle of international law binds
8
 South Africa, it may be directly applicable.’ 
 
 Box 1.1 Dimensions of human rights to water  
 
Source: Vidar & Mekouar, 2002 (no pagination) 
 
1.4.2 Water Law in South Africa  
Although consideration for international law is ‘imperative and instructive as Justice 
Tsoka remarked in her judgment in the matter Mazibuko, L & Others v the City of 
Johannesburg & Others Case No. 06/13865, domestic law – in particular, the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 (RSA, 1996a) (hereafter the 
Constitution) – remains the primary source of law in the republic. The Constitution is one 
of a few in the world that specifically enshrine the right to water, alongside the 
constitutions of Ethiopia, Uganda, Gambia, Uruguay, Panama and Zambia (COHRE, 
2006, in Anand, 2007 and Gowlland-Gualtieri, 2007; Mehta et al, 2010). Accordingly, 
section 27 (1) (b) stipulates that everyone has the right to access to ‘sufficient food and 
water’. Both these rights are qualified in section 27(2): ‘the state must take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realization of each of these rights’. Given the peripheral status often accorded to socio-
economic rights (Francis, 2005; Mehta, 2005; Mehta et al, 2009, forthcoming), the 
                                                 
8 South Africa has ratified General Comment No. 15. 
 Right to water for life and survival; 
 Right to clean drinking water; 
 Right to water and sanitation for health; 
 Right to water for adequate standard of living; 
 Right to food and nutrition; 
 Right to water and sanitation as part of right to housing; 
 Right to water for food preparation; 
 Right to water for food production; 
 Right to water as part of right to development; 
 Right to water as part of right to natural resources; 
 Right to water as part of right to environment; 
 Right to water as element of right to environment; 
 Right to water as element of right to property; 
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inclusion of these rights in the Constitution signified bold
9
 determination by the drafters 
of the Constitution to challenge established jurisprudential norm (see also Francis, 2005). 
Although the courts are generally inaccessible to the poor, the superior courts
10
 in South 
Africa have played an active role in enjoining the state to fulfil its constitutional 
obligations through a number of progressive rulings; although some important rulings 
have entrenched the status quo, to the detriment of those fighting for access to different 
rights supposedly protected by the Constitution – a matter that receives further attention 
in Chapter 2. 
 
Water management in South Africa falls largely under the ambit of two Acts of 
Parliament, the Water Services Act of 1997 (RSA, 1997) and the National Water Act of 
1998 (RSA, 1998). However, a host of other laws (notably the National Environmental 
Management Act of 1998, the Environmental Conservation Act, the Conservation of 
Agricultural Resources Act of 1983, the National Health Act, the Municipal Systems Act, 
the Municipal Structures Act, and the National Housing Act) all have sections that deal 
with one aspect of water management or another, a situation that continues to hamper the 
harmonising of policy and implementation (Nleya, 2005; Nleya & Jonker, 2006; Jonker 
& Nleya, 2008).  
 
Section 2 of the Water Services Act of 1997 (RSA, 1997) outlines the main objectives of 
the Act, which include the fulfilment of the rights to basic water supply and sanitation, 
setting the standards for tariffs for water services, guiding the preparation of Water 
Service Development Plans, providing a regulatory framework for water service 
institutions, the establishment of water boards, providing for ministerial monitoring and 
intervention, providing a framework for financial assistance to water service institutions, 
providing a framework for the accountability of water service institutions and the 
provision of effective water resources management in South Africa.  
                                                 
9 Although civic and political rights have long been recognised as justiciable in international jurisprudence, socio-
economic rights have been argued to be non-justiciable, as they entail budgetary allocation, which courts are ill-
equipped to perform. The counter-argument (and one that the Constitutional Court used in the certification of the 
Constitution) was that civil and political rights at a minimum require budgetary allocations themselves.  
10 These are the High Courts, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court, in progressive level of 
importance. 
 
 
 
 
 14 
 
The Department of Water Affairs (DWAF) has developed the Strategic Framework for 
Water Services (RSA, 2003) to inform the development of detailed strategies for the 
water services sector. In essence, it is the operational manual for the realisation of the 
intent of both the Water Services Act and the Constitution. The detailed strategies 
deriving from the Strategic Framework on Water Services are finalised in collaboration 
with other role players – particularly municipalities, as water service providers (RSA, 
2003). 
 
1.4.3 Water services in South Africa – an overview of key trends11 
Given the importance of water in all human endeavour, and given the ANC government’s 
assertions that the water services provision is one of its key success stories in the 15 years 
of democratic rule, the water sector forms a critical point for scrutinising the claims of 
progress by government. As shown in section 1 above, the government trumpets water 
services delivery progress – one of the cornerstones of the RDP policy – as one of its 
major successes. But despite the rapid delivery of basic water supply services, sanitation 
has lagged behind. Moreover, even in the case of the more successful water supply 
services, and although 89% of the population was receiving clean water by 2007 (Stats 
SA, 2007), the basic service installed frequently performs well below the desired level.  
 
As with many attributes of South African political society, water services mirror income 
distribution and race (RSA, 1994).
12
 For example, Khosa (2002) demonstrates that 99% 
of people without piped water access, or who use piped water from an outside yard, are in 
Living Standards Measure (LSM)
13
 categories 1 to 4, while 75% of those with internal 
connections are found in LSM 5 to 8. This has important implications for the perception 
                                                 
11 This section also draws heavily from my earlier paper, Nleya N, 2008 
12One of the key results of social engineering under both colonialism and apartheid has been the virtual conflation of race 
and class; yet there is a small but expanding black middle class arising out of the formal dismantling of repressive laws 
enforcing race segregation, because of various affirmative action policies, among other institutional reforms.  
13 The Living Standards Measure (LSM) is a unique means of segmenting the South African market, designed by 
the South African Advertising Foundation. It categorises people according to their living standards using criteria such as 
degree of urbanisation and ownership of cars and major appliances, among others. (SAARF website) See 
http://www.saarf.co.za/LSM/lsms.htm for more comprehensive information. 
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of service delivery: it reflects people’s social status. Looking beyond the triumphalism of 
government reports on water service delivery, it emerges that the upper classes are the 
biggest beneficiaries of municipal water services delivery, while the poor are expected to 
celebrate second-rate services. A study by Cullis and Van Koppen (2008), using the Gini 
Coefficient, reaches a similar conclusion – that water services in South Africa are skewed 
towards the (historically) white upper classes.  
 
Water service providers also grapple with the problem of non-payment of services – the 
product of an intricate web of cause and effect relationships, which are often naively 
reduced to the notion of a ‘culture of non-payment’. The ensuing water cuts exacerbate 
tensions between water services providers
14
 and ratepayers. This wrangle manifests in 
multiple ways and places – it is often played out in memorandums and deputations to 
providers, service charge boycotts, and protests, dealt with in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. A 
crucial question posed by Allen et al (2006) is whether water users should be perceived 
as citizens or consumers. In the context of Khayelitsha it is important to understand that 
water rights are accorded to and claimed by the residents. It is important to qualify how 
socio-economic rights in South Africa are claimable from the state. Socio-economic 
rights are qualified, as exemplified by the clause in 27(2) of the Constitution (RSA, 1996) 
that requires that the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.’ Since 
these rights are only protected within the limits of “available” resources, the quality of 
the rights so received depends on the available budget. It is no longer the mere fulfilment 
of such rights that is at stake, but the quality of the resources used to fulfil them.  
  
                                                 
14 According to the Strategic Framework on Water Services (RSA, 2003) a water service provider is: 
– any person who has a contract with a water services authority or another water services provider to sell water to, and/or 
accept wastewater for the purposes of treatment from, that authority or provider (bulk water services provider); and/or  
– any person who has a contract with a water services authority to assume operational responsibility for providing water 
services to one or more consumers(end users) within a specific geographic area (retail water services provider); or 
– any water services authority which provides either or both of the above services itself. 
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1.5 METHODOLOGY  
1.5.1 Choice of Method 
Service delivery protests are commonplace in South Africa, particularly in urban areas.  
As already stated, this study was intended to discover the links between service delivery 
and the different participatory strategies used by citizens to effect changes in delivery 
implementation and policy processes. The core issue therefore becomes how different 
levels of service delivery, though all allowable under section 27(2) of the Constitution 
(RSA, 1996), impact on individuals’ choices of engagement with the local state. This 
study relies on the empirical testing of the relationship between service delivery and 
forms of political engagement, if such a relationship exists. In this section I explain some 
of the key methodological choices made in the study.  
 
A number of methods are usually available to researchers undertaking empirical studies, 
which for convenience can be summarised under two major categories, i.e. qualitative 
and quantitative methods. For social movement research, Klandermans and Staggenborg 
(2002) point out that quantitative study choice is often between the areas of survey 
research, event analysis and mathematical modelling. Qualitative studies predominantly 
use participant observation, in-depth interviews and focus groups. Some methods straddle 
the two methodological paradigms: network analysis, archival and historical research, 
macro-organisational analysis, case studies, and comparative research.  
 
While there is no ‘best’ method for research, with persuasive arguments for most 
methods in both the quantitative and the qualitative paradigms, it is more important to 
note that certain methods may be better able to elicit more data in certain contexts than 
others. The level and unit of analysis are key determinants of the eventual method of 
choice (Klandermans & Staggenborg, 2002). If the focus of study is on the individual 
level, survey and in-depth interviews are the most appropriate, while in-depth interviews 
are also suited to building theoretical insights. If the researcher wants to generalise about 
the entire population, surveys are the most appropriate method (Klandermans & 
Staggenborg, 2002; Mouton, 2001). Typically, surveys report intended or reported 
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behaviour, attitudes, and grievances; while in-depth interviews reveal feelings and 
emotions, life histories, and interpretations of phenomena.  
 
Surveys have emerged as the most important format for studying social movement 
phenomena (Klandermans & Staggenborg, 2002). The choice of survey method is largely 
determined by the openness of participation research to the survey type of study, since it 
relates to understanding individual choice. This was an important consideration given the 
high measurements for reliability and generalisability attributed to survey results. 
 
 A number of problems potentially make surveys less effective. For example, Durrheim 
and Dixon (2004) argue that qualitative methods, by placing fewer constraints on the 
expression of attitudes, are more able to capture underlying trends that cannot be captured 
by the attitude scales. Attitudes also cannot be ranked unambiguously, although the 
interpretation assumes such consistency (Deichmann & Lall, 2007). Moreover, attitudes 
as a measure of degree of satisfaction are influenced by various factors, such as 
comparisons with reference groups (Frank, 1997), income and education, expectations 
and aspirations (see Deichmann & Lall, 2007). The following remark by Frank (1997) 
illustrates how frames of reference operate in generating attitudes: [t]he things we feel we 
'need' depend on the kinds of things that others have, and our needs thus grow when we 
find ourselves in the presence of others who have more than we do. Similarly, 
expectations serve as a standard of reference against which performance is measured, 
with positive differences meaning satisfaction while negative differences imply 
dissatisfaction.  
 
Although the discussion above casts some aspersions on the relationship between 
performance and attitudes, Deichmann’s (2007) model was assumed to hold. 
‘Performance’ in this instance relates to the actual, quantifiable level of service delivery 
received by the household, while ‘voice’ relates to pressure that can be exerted on service 
providers by citizens, as illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1.1 Theoretical Linkages between Service Delivery and Participation  
 
 
Equally important is to discover if such ‘voice’ results have any bearing on policy 
processes and project implementation; if citizen participation is allowed only as a 
superficial buy-in mechanism, it inevitably leads to demobilisation. There is a strong case 
to be made that citizen participation is a method for promoting acquiescence by citizens 
to political regimes.  
 
The survey questionnaire in appendix 1 was constituted by adapting the Afrobarometer 
Round 3 questionnaire, used in 2005 in a number of African countries. An initial 
questionnaire had been constructed earlier with assistance from senior colleagues in the 
African Centre for Citizenship and Democracy (ACCEDE) – a constituent unit of the 
School of Government at which I am registered for my doctoral thesis. After consulting 
an expert in survey design, who suggested that the survey could be adapted from the 
Afrobarometer survey, the instrument was remodelled around a ‘tried and tested’ 
questionnaire, by changing a number of questions to the new format and including 
questions from the Afrobarometer.  
 
1.5.2 Choice of Study Site and Sampling 
In order to understand social phenomena – in this case, how different forms of political 
participation are related to service delivery – it is essential that the study sites are able to 
provide the information required to arrive at a useful description and analysis of the 
phenomena. However, study site selection is not a science; the researcher starts with 
some prior knowledge, based on factors such as hearsay, observation, and information 
from the mass media and from the literature. Khayelitsha is a popular study site for both 
students and academic researchers. It appears that health sciences, with a special focus on 
HIV/AIDS treatment, is the most active discipline – in all likelihood as a result of the 
Service delivery 
Performance  
Attitudes and perceptions Voice 
/participation 
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relatively high incidence of the condition in Khayelitsha. At the beginning of my study, 
my supervisor was already involved in a number of projects in Khayelitsha, which we 
both envisioned could facilitate even greater information exchange.  
 
But there are other important reasons for Khayelitsha being such a ‘fashionable’ research 
site in Cape Town. Firstly, Khayelitsha had a population of 406 779 in 2005 (PGWC, 
2005), meaning one in eight people in Cape Town lives there. Secondly, as one of the 
mega-suburbs of urban South Africa (which all house black Africans), Khayelitsha is 
reminiscent of apartheid neglect and characterised by poor municipal infrastructure, large 
informal settlements and high levels of poverty. Thirdly, Khayelitsha occupies a unique 
position in the history of Cape Town, as will become apparent below. Khayelitsha 
exhibits and distils many issues pertinent to poor urban areas, relating to poverty, social 
structures, and public health.  
 
The research on which this dissertation is based forms part of the ongoing research on 
perceptions of governance and service delivery undertaken by the African Centre on 
Citizenship and Democracy (ACCEDE) at UWC. This thesis draws on that research and 
draws conclusions about service delivery issues in general, and about water and 
sanitation in particular. It highlights the ways in which citizens engage concerning water 
issues as part of a package of service delivery issues, while contributing to the larger 
study on perceptions of governance and participation.  
 
Khayelitsha, though a 20-minute drive from my university, is difficult to reach using 
public transport, since there is no direct rail service link between the two places, and most 
taxis and buses also service other areas, meaning the journey can take up to two hours. In 
addition, as the research unfolded I found that undertaking fieldwork in Khayelitsha 
required me to come to grips with the violence and poverty which characterise life in 
many parts of the suburb (see Nleya & Thompson, 2009). Fear of violent crime – 
possibly a subjective feeling – had to be factored in to how the interview process was 
customised to maintain validity while minimising the chance of violent encounters.  
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The survey on which this study is based was carried out between June and November 
2007. I carried out 150 interviews and another 150 were done by five research assistants 
employed through ACCEDE. The sample size of 300 was chosen for two main reasons: 
firstly, to maximise the ease of use and minimise the logistical costs involved in carrying 
out the survey; and secondly, to minimise the range of error. Although it is virtually 
impossible to determine exact proportions of behaviours from a sample of a population, it 
is possible to predetermine the limits of each result. For example, in the chosen sample 
size of 300, if a result of 45% is found, the true result would lie between 39.3% and 
50.7% in 95 out of 100 cases.  
 
Table 1.1 Margin of Error at 95% Confidence Level 
 Response Rate 
Sample Size 95% 90% 85% 80% 75% 70% 65% 60% 55% 50% 
50 6.2 8.5 10.1 11.3 12.2 13.0 13.5 13.9 14.1 14.1 
100 4.4 6.0 7.1 8.0 8.7 9.2 9.5 9.8 9.9 10.0 
150 3.6 4.9 5.8 6.5 7.1 7.5 7.8 8.0 8.1 8.2 
200 3.1 4.2 5.1 5.7 6.1 6.5 6.7 6.9 7.0 7.1 
300 2.5 3.5 4.1 4.6 5.0 5.3 5.5 5.7 5.7 5.8 
600 1.7 2.4 3.0 3.2 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
1000 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.6 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.2 
1500 1.1 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 
2000 1.0 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 
2500 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 
 
The sampling method selected for the study was stratified random sampling, which is 
when a heterogeneous population is divided into homogenous subgroups or strata, and 
random sampling is carried out on each of these strata. The intention of stratified random 
sampling is to ensure that a sample reflects the diversity of the population, which thus 
reduces sampling error. There are two main methods of allocating sample sizes for each 
stratum – proportional and optimal.  In the former, the size of each stratum is expressed 
as a proportion of the entire population, while in the latter, size allocation is dependent on 
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the variability of the distribution variable – with higher variability attracting larger sizes. 
Stratified random sampling requires that some information about the population is 
available before the study, with the most frequent sources of such information being 
previous surveys and censuses (Sniff & Skoog, 1964).  
 
Since the main aim of the study was to analyse the link between levels of service delivery 
and participation in Khayelitsha, the key stratifying variable was ‘type of housing’. 
Housing is linked to water services in obvious ways. Two distinct forms of housing can 
be found in Khayelitsha: formal housing and informal housing. The relative proportions 
of these two settlement types are as follows: 70% of residents of Khayelitsha live in 
informal settlements, while the other 30% live in formal brick housing. Understandably, 
those in informal settlements have poorer access to water. GIS maps provided by the City 
of Cape Town show a high correlation between socio-economic class and settlement 
type, as indicated in Table 1.2 below, though no statistics were given on socio-economic 
status.  
 
The second level of stratification was socio-economic status, based on an analysis of the 
2001 census (CCT 2005) which led to the choice of settlements shown in the table. 
However, since data was not available on the relative sizes of these strata, they were 
estimated, using type of housing as a proxy for socio-economic status. Thus the 70% 
living in informal settlements were allocated a low socio-economic status, with 15% each 
for medium socio-economic status and high socio-economic status. The third level of 
stratification was gender. 
 
Table 1.2 Stratification of Selected Sites by Socio-Economic Status (SES) 
 Informal  Mixed use Formal settlement 
Low SES Site C, Endlovini Site B  
Medium SES   Khaya 
High SES   Ilitha Park 
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In section 1.5.3 below I examine the history of Khayelitsha and describe some of the key 
characteristics of each of these study areas.  
 
1.5.3 Khayelitsha – a history, and selected study sites  
Khayelitsha is a sprawling township
15
 located some 35 kilometres southeast of Cape 
Town, between the northern shoreline of False Bay and the N2 highway (see Figure 1.2 
below). The construction of Khayelitsha was unveiled in Parliament in March 1983 
against a background of strict influx control legislation
16
and the coloured labour 
preference policy,
17
 applied in Cape Town and large parts of the Western Cape. The 
announcement of the plans to develop a consolidated settlement for the African 
community in the Cape Metropolitan Area on the Drift Sands/Swartklip site departed 
from the official freeze on building new housing for Africans in the Cape. Although 
signalling signs of government capitulation over their failure to control African 
urbanisation, the announcement reaffirmed the policy of influx control and coloured 
labour preference policies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 I use the term ‘township’ here only to reflect the popular parlance of places outside the ‘suburbs’, and mindful of its 
pejorative and racist connotations. The South African Oxford Dictionary defines township as ‘a suburb or city of 
predominantly black occupation, formerly officially designated for black occupation by apartheid legislation’. 
Henceforth I use the term ‘suburb’ instead for both predominantly black and predominantly white occupied areas of 
residence.  
16 This entailed a plethora of legislation, the primary goal of which was to restrict the numbers of Africans in urban 
centres. Given the nature of demand for African labour in urban areas, this was one of the most obvious of 
contradictions embedded in the policies of apartheid and earlier segregation.  
17 As part of the grand apartheid spatial planning strategy, the Western Cape was designated the ‘traditional’ place of 
residence of the white and coloured communities in 1955 by the Secretary of Native Affairs, W.H. Eiselen. According 
to the policy, proof was needed that coloured labour was unavailable before an African could be employed. Moreover, 
Africans were gradually to be removed from the Western Cape. 
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Figure 1.2: Location of Khayelitsha in Cape Town 
 
 
The history of Khayelitsha is entwined with the struggle for urban permanence of 
Africans in Cape Town, and as Conradie (1992) points out, this historical struggle 
epitomises the lot of African people in the Western Cape. As highlighted in the 
introduction in section 1.1, poverty and service delivery issues cannot be fully interpreted 
outside a framework that explains Khayelisha’s integration and incorporation into Cape 
Town (Du Toit & Neves, 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 24 
Partly because of the government’s haste to move squatter families from Crossroads and 
KTC
18
, and the enormous number of people requiring resettlement (Van Niekerk et al, 
1985), but perhaps more importantly because of the authorities’ desire to exercise state 
surveillance over the hitherto largely unmonitored population, the initial structure plan 
was amended to incorporate the development of Site C in the 150-hectare site originally 
proposed as the commercial and cultural district (see Figure 1.3 below). A total of 3 468 
residential plots with an average size of 160 m
2
 were demarcated, and provided with 
rudimentary services for two families settled on each plot (CCT, 2004). However, the 
take-up of residence in Site C was slow. This was mainly due to resistance to longer 
travel-distance to work and the fear of losing settlement rights in New Crossroads. This 
resistance collapsed when vigilante warfare in Crossroads and KTC left many homes 
destroyed (Burman & Scharf, 1986). Although Site C was conceived as a transit camp, 
the municipal authorities’ failure to move its residents when new houses were built 
contributed to its durability. During the 1990s, the City Council upgraded services to a 
site-and-service standard (CCT, 2004). Because of the double occupancy of plots, neither 
of the two families on each plot could take ownership of the plot, an issue with far-
reaching implications for social interaction between the families, payment for municipal 
services, and the possibility of settlement upgrading. 
 
A report compiled by the City of Cape Town based on the results of the 2001 census 
indicates that overall, Site C has the worst socio-economic profile of all the sections of 
Khayelitsha (CCT, 2005). It lags behind on formal education achievement, employment 
indicators, and the service delivery indicators of housing, water, sanitation and electricity, 
among others. A number of initiatives are currently under way to upgrade Site C to a 
standard settlement. With decongestion largely complete by the end of 2007, the suburb 
is currently a building site, as the remaining households use various alternatives (such as 
the housing subsidy, and savings) to construct standard houses. The ‘alternate’ 
                                                 
18 KTC informal settlement was formed in January 1983 when landless squatter families invaded the vacant land bordered 
by the N2 Highway, Klipfontein Road and Borcherds Quarry, near the Cape Town International Airport. The name 
KTC derives from the KTC Bazaars shop located on the corner of NY78 and NY3 in Gugulethu, where a decision to 
invade the land was taken (Ngcokoto, 1990). KTC is said to have been an acronym for Kakasa Trading Centre. 
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households were largely decanted into houses in Kuyasa, a project specifically conceived 
to resolve the housing crisis in Site C (CCT, 2007a; 2007b). 
 
In some ways, Sites C and B are similar. When first settled, Site B consisted of larger, 
160m
2
 yards, with individual toilets adjacent and water points for each of the 
neighbouring yards. As in Site C, uncontrolled squatting occurred on open areas in Site 
B. However, given that each household now has its own yard, upgrading has accelerated 
in recent years, with many residents applying for government housing grants for that 
purpose. Excluding the uncontrolled informal areas, Site B saw rapid change in the years 
after 1994. Much of the uncontrolled squatting occurred along Mew Way, Pama Road 
and the railway line where it runs through Site B, as shown in Figure 1.3 below. 
 
Endlovini is very different to Site C and B, in that it is an uncontrolled informal 
settlement located just outside Ilitha Park and Harare, along Mew Way. Services here are 
generally less than adequate, and the area is known for its high levels of crime. It is worth 
noting that Endlovini is not a recent informal settlement; though it has been there for 
some time, as a result of its location on the outskirts of Khayelitsha it has not received 
basic services as rapidly as other, newer informal settlements. The local government view 
on Khayelitsha services (including informal areas) is that they already have basic services 
(Thompson, 2008). 
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Figure 1.3 Locations of Study Areas in Khayelitsha 
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In direct contrast to Endlovini, Ilitha Park is a relatively new and middle-class area of 
Khayelitsha, located between Harare and Khaya. A distinguishing factor is that most houses have 
tiled roofing, as opposed to asbestos roofs; another is that yards are larger, and lack any visible 
squatting within their boundaries.  In terms of services, all houses are connected (or potentially 
connectable) to the electricity, sewerage and water distribution systems. The owners are mostly 
in the active/working population group. 
 
Finally, Khaya is the original settlement in Khayelitsha. While many of the houses have been 
extended, the majority remain unchanged. In terms of services, all houses are connected (or 
potentially connectable) to the electricity, sewerage and water distribution systems. A major 
proportion of heads of household are pensioners, consistent with the fact that these houses were 
acquired over twenty years ago; the supposition (backed by anecdotal evidence) is that at the 
time these people were already well into their working lives, perhaps in their thirties, forties and 
fifties. Ilitha Park and Khaya together constitute the ‘middle-class’ segment of Khayelitsha.  
 
1.5.4 Data Analysis  
The choice of data analysis method, especially when applied to quantitative data, is often posited 
as an exact science; that is, choice is derived from the type of data available, and the information 
the researcher wishes to extract. In reality, a number of qualitative decisions often have to be 
made about quantitative data. Data from questionnaires was captured in SPSS
®
. On completion 
of data entry and cleaning, the first step in the data analysis stage was descriptive analysis, 
mainly using frequency statistics and cross-tabulation. Frequency statistics allow data captured to 
be viewed in the form of tables and graphs, giving a convenient ‘feel’ of the distribution of 
responses for each question. The data presented in Chapter 4 is mainly in this format.  
 
In Chapter 5, I was interested in testing for the explanatory power of independent variables in 
accounting for two different forms of participation: attendance at meetings, and protests – the 
two dependent variables. A number of methods were available for this purpose, for example 
correlations, regression and analysis of variance (ANOVA). While the exploratory analysis 
involved bivariate correlations between the different forms of participation, the final choice of 
method excluded the use of bivariate correlations on their own. Correlations have two key 
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disadvantages – correlation implies causation, and correlations are meaningless if variables are 
not related linearly (Lachenicht, 2006). To circumvent these problems (at least partially), I 
represented the data as mean plots for each of the categories of independent variable chosen 
against each of the dependent variables. This meant that the profile of the relationship could 
immediately be viewed. Unlike the ordinary bivariate correlation, in which only the correlation 
coefficients are displayed from the analysis, the means plot allowed for viewing and analysis of 
the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Consequently, the bivariate 
relationships in Chapter 5 are illustrated graphically, in addition to showing the correlation 
coefficients. Additionally, in order to discover the explanatory power of selected variables in 
accounting for the level of participation in protests and meetings, multiple linear regression was 
employed.  
 
In Chapter 6 I have used path analysis to explain the link between service delivery and 
participation – a convenient method of causal analysis, especially for concretising the rational for 
conventional regression calculations (Duncan, 1966; Alwin & Houser, 1975). However, given its 
focus on interpretation, path analysis is not ideally suited for discovering causes (Duncan, 1966). 
Although diagrammatic representations of the paths are not intrinsic to the method, they are of 
great value in representing the system (Duncan, 1966). Figure 1.4 below is an example of a path 
diagram, similar to that describing the relationships investigated in Chapter 6. In path diagrams, 
one-way arrows lead from the determining variable to the dependent variable, while the 
quantities are indicated on the diagram. For example, in Figure 1.4, a1 to an  are  path 
coefficients. To obtain each of the path coefficients, the independent variables preceding the 
dependent variables are regressed. This is illustrated using two examples on the path diagram in 
Figure 1.4.  
 
Perception of service delivery = a2 * service delivery      (1) 
Forms of participation = a2 * service delivery + a3 * personal factors a7 * service delivery 
perceptions          (2) 
 
Tredoux (2006) identifies the aim of multiple linear regression as finding a linear combination of 
independent variables that predicts a dependent variable. When variables are regressed the 
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resulting output has two forms of regression coefficients: unstandardised and standardised. 
Unstandardised regression coefficients are expressed in terms of original measurement scale, 
which makes it impossible to compare them. But standardised coefficients are based on 
standardised variables, i.e. the same unit of measure, which makes comparison possible 
(Tredoux, 2006; see also Greenland et al, 1991; Kim & Mueller, 1976). Although there is 
considerable debate on what coefficients should be reported, I have chosen to adapt the 
standardised coefficients for the purposes of reporting regression coefficients in this study.  
 
Figure 1.4 Simplified path diagram for service delivery and participation  
 
 
Descriptive statistics (frequency statistics, percentages, means, and standard deviations) are 
fairly straightforward; the choice of inferential statistical methods less so. In this study, an 
iterative process was employed in the choice of independent variables in the bivariate analysis of 
different and the dependent variables: the forms of participation. 
 
1.6 CHAPTER OVERVIEW  
I have introduced the conundrum of service delivery and participation against the historical 
background of colonialism and apartheid. I do not claim originality in using history to account 
for contemporary challenges in South Africa. For example, Terreblanche (2002) slates ‘many 
whites [who] become indignant when, confronted with their collective culpability for the 
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systematic exploitation of black people.’ I have also explained the reasons for my focus on 
water, and for my fieldwork and methodology. The rest of my thesis is summarised as follows:  
 
Chapter 2: ‘The Political Economy of Water in South Africa’ traces the development of water 
services in South Africa, firstly from the point of view of the dominant global politico-economic 
ideologies, and secondly from within the dynamics of the transition negotiations that separated 
the ANC from the ideals enshrined in the Freedom Charter. I argue that the rise of a neoliberal 
political economy in the past 20 to 30 years has had a profound impact on water management. 
Adverse incorporation of developing countries into the global financial system restrains 
autonomous development paths outside neoliberal orthodoxy. The South African government’s 
choice to comply with this model is thus comprehensible. Yet the government has found space to 
develop a responsive water policy, underpinned by a constitutional provision entitling citizens to 
the right of access to water. The Free Basic Water policy, when fully implemented, could be the 
vehicle to ensure such a guarantee. Yet the policy itself has been the subject of a court battle in 
which one side argued that its provisions are inadequate for guaranteeing a basic standard of 
living.  
 
Chapter 3: ‘Citizen Participation and Protest in the South African Context’ interrogates the 
dominant view that promotes citizen participation as the panacea for all development problems. I 
draw on lessons of citizen mobilisation from both within and outside the borders of South Africa. 
In exploring citizen participation, it is also useful to discover the forms of participation that find 
favour with different communities, regardless of whether they are conventional or not. Spaces of 
participation created by the state and other powerful institutions – the so-called ‘invited spaces’ – 
have been widely criticised for their vulnerability to elite capture and to the reproduction of 
existing power relations. In response, citizens often find that there are ways in which they can 
organise themselves to challenge such elite domination disguised as participation, although such 
spaces in themselves do not guarantee voice. Inevitably, this is a key reason for the 
mushrooming of protests.  
 
Chapter 4: ‘Geography of Exclusion in Khayelitsha: A situational assessment of service delivery’ 
provides a description of the character of service delivery in Khayelitsha, and shows how 
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different levels of delivery yield different levels of satisfaction. Degrees of satisfaction are 
hypothesised to be an important link between delivery and participation strategies.  
 
Chapter 5: ‘Determinants of Citizen Mobilisation in Khayelitsha’ attempts to bring about a better 
understanding of how service delivery failures form part of the nexus of variables at the centre of 
increased militancy in the citizens’ participatory interface with the state. Concomitant with that 
broader aim, this chapter identifies the aspects that incline individuals towards participation in 
community meetings and protests. 
 
Chapter 6: ‘Path Linkages of Service Delivery and Participation in Khayelitsha’ puts together a 
model explaining the links between participation and different forms of service delivery. The 
chapter uses path analysis to explain how different variables interact to produce different forms 
of citizen engagement with different spheres of government. Path analysis is a key method for 
determining causality through finding dependencies between variables. 
 
Chapter 7: ‘Conclusion’ draws the study to a close by summarising each of the chapters and the 
highlights of the study. 
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C h a p t e r  2  
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WATER SERVICES PROVISION IN SOUTH 
AFRICA  
 2.1 INTRODUCTION  
In this chapter I locate the development of water services in the transition negotiations leading up 
to the first democratic elections in 1994. Such an analysis would not be complete without an 
acknowledgement of the dramatic events leading up to the collapse of the Soviet empire, what 
Fukuyama (1989) called the ‘end of history’. In short, the reorganisation of the global 
geopolitical economy necessitated realignment towards a new orthodoxy of neoliberal 
economics. The release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of liberation movements (the 
ANC, SACP and PAC, in particular) coincided with the demise of the Soviet Union, which – 
together with its satellite states in eastern Europe – had been the key financial and ideological 
backer of the liberation movement. I argue that these two processes have prevented the ANC 
government from pursuing its ideals, particularly those in the much-fêted Freedom Charter. The 
water sector did not escape these developments.  
 
By the end of the 1980s, the apartheid state was suffocating; from international isolation, two 
decades of economic malaise, and the deterioration of state security. Moreover, ‘the NP 
government was in power, but not legitimate, whereas the ANC was legitimate but not in 
power’(Van Wyk, 2007:8). The collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern 
Europe meant that the communist threat – so long used as justification for defending minority 
rule and apartheid – was suddenly taken away. The quote below describes the popular view 
among white people at the time, particularly the Afrikaners:  
 
In South Africa the communists, it was claimed, aimed at destroying religion, 
confiscating private property, overthrowing the state and creating a black republic where 
blacks and Coloureds “would be boss and govern”. (Visser 2007:4) 
 
Thus, the collapse of the Soviet empire was helpful in facilitating the demise of apartheid, for at 
least two reasons. Firstly, it provided the perfect cover for the state to pull down the apartheid 
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machinery, on the pretext of the end of the communist threat. Secondly, drawing from the above, 
it weakened the bargaining power of the liberation movement, blunting their demands for 
fundamental changes to the political economy. The constellation of forces at the negotiating table 
extracted compromises from the ANC, and forced through the framework as the guiding 
philosophy of the future South Africa. Inevitably this alienated the ANC from some of its 
constituencies, such as COSATU and the SACP, who continued to raise concerns over what was 
labelled the 1996 class project’19 I situate developments in the water sector within that historical 
nexus. 
 
The history of water in South Africa, whether water services or water resources, is inseparable 
from the history of the country in general, but especially ‘…the history of housing, migration, 
land, social engineering and development’ (RSA, 1994:4). For example, in 1994 approximately 
43% of black Africans had access to water distribution, compared to 95% of coloureds and 100% 
of Indians and whites (SALRU, 1994 in RSA, 1994). Not surprisingly, water has emerged as one 
of the key issues that the post-apartheid government has focused on as a means of fighting 
poverty and improving living conditions. The periodic announcements of successes in improving 
water services (especially during election campaigns), ironically, only serve to highlight the 
reality: large numbers of people lack access to water services, electricity and decent housing, 
especially in urban informal settlements. Service delivery remains the government’s Achilles’ 
heel. It is key
20
 to the complex cause-and-effect relationships at the centre of the waves of protest 
witnessed in South Africa (to which I turn my attention in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, in which the role 
of service delivery in citizen participation in Khayelitsha is analysed). 
 
The rest of this chapter is divided into the following sections: Section 2.2 traces the genesis of 
the post-apartheid South African political economy, Section 2.3 explores the emerging global 
                                                 
19 The ‘1996 Class Project’ is a euphemism within the ANC Tripartite Alliance, used mostly by the SACP and COSATU to refer to 
the capture of the state by a compact of white capital and a strata of black capital, resulting in an overbearing dominance of such 
capital in ANC policy-making processes – to the exclusion of SACP and COSATU – since at least the time of the introduction of 
GEAR in 1996. The SACP and COSATU argue that the 1996 class project has replaced the values of the National Democratic 
Revolution (NDR), oriented towards building a socialist state driven by the working classes, with a capitalist-oriented National 
Democratic State, driven by and benefiting black and white petty bourgeoisie and capitalists (Nzimande, 2006a; 2006b; 2009). 
20 There is emerging evidence that although service delivery is often mentioned as the key reason for protests, so-called ‘service 
delivery protests’, other grievances such as lack of income, deplorable living conditions and poverty, and crime, among others, are 
all associated with such protests (see Thompson & Nleya, 2010a; Thompson & Nleya, 2010b; Hart 2009).  
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water agenda, and Section 2.4 outlines key aspects of water law in South Africa, while Section 
2.5 deals with water service delivery progress in South Africa. In Section 2.6 I explore the 
seemingly dissonant policies of cost recovery and free basic water, and end the chapter with a 
conclusion in Section 2.7. 
 
2.2 FROM FREEDOM CHARTER TO GEAR 
In this section I briefly analyse the development of economic policy in the aftermath of the 
unbanning of the ANC. I use the Freedom Charter as the base document from which to track 
developments. In spite of a series of initiatives in the 1980s to develop an economic policy for 
the ANC, the focus remained on gaining state power. When transition negotiations began, the 
ANC found that its economic framework was woefully inadequate. Partly as a result of this and 
other complexities, the ANC made concessions during negotiations that derailed its radical 
programme of social transformation of South African society. Mike Morris aptly summarises:  
 
Instead of revolution, negotiation; instead of uncompromising transformation, 
compromising concession; instead of violent struggle for the seizure of power, 
negotiation of the distribution of power, instead of sweeping aside of the old order 
and all who had implemented it, dismantling the old order with its old architects; 
instead of radical exclusion of the old to benefit of the new, inclusion of both old 
and new in a newly created framework. (Morris, 1993, in Marais, 2001:94) 
 
This citation (in which Morris describes the mildness of the ANC’s ascent to power) is 
enlightening, for while the negotiated nature of the settlement yielded a compromise, it may have 
inadvertently provided legitimacy for the status quo, something Albie Sachs decries: 
 
What a painful paradox it would be if, after decades of struggle and sacrifice, we 
succeeded in doing what apartheid could never do – legitimizing inequality. It 
would continue as before but would be regarded as natural, or, worse still, as the 
fault of the disadvantaged. (Sachs, 1992:103) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35 
2.2.1 The Freedom Charter  
The Freedom Charter, one of the most important
21
 documents ever produced in South Africa, 
was formally adopted on 26 June 1955 in Kliptown at the Congress of the People, by a group of 
anti-apartheid forces under the banner of the Congress Alliance
22
 (Macozoma, 2003; Marais, 
2001). For the ANC, the Freedom Charter would later assume immense utility. Its programme of 
action was sufficiently ambiguous to maintain unity between the disparate groups within the 
ANC. Predictably, debates on the document during the struggle were strictly controlled (Habib & 
Padayachee, 2000; Marais 2001). In large part, the Freedom Charter was a response to repressive 
legislation from both the apartheid and the colonial states.  
 
One of the most important tenets of the charter is the declaration that South Africa belongs to all 
who live in it, ‘black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is 
based on the will of all the people’. This would form the cornerstone of the ANC policy of non-
racialism. Regarding wealth, the charter envisaged a wholesale nationalisation of productive 
assets as a means to restoring heritage to the people. Drawing from this clause of the Freedom 
Charter, Nelson Mandela, upon his release, declared that: 
 
The nationalisation of mines, banks and monopoly industry is the policy of the 
ANC and the change or modification of our views in this regard is inconceivable. 
(Mandela, cited in Davies, 2003:32) 
 
In practice, the ANC government has virtually repudiated this section of the Freedom Charter, 
opting instead to privatise state assets – to the chagrin of its alliance partners, COSATU and the 
SACP, and in contrast to the vocal ANCYL’s call for the nationalisation of mines.  
 
 
 
                                                 
21 In the matter of ANC vs. COPE & Others heard in the then-Transvaal Division of the South African High Court, Judge du Plessis 
notes in paragraph 5 (for example) that ‘[t]he Freedom Charter is one of the most important documents in the history of this 
country. For some it is the most important document in the history of this country. In it are embodied principles for which those 
who took part in the liberation of the country fought and suffered. Principles of the Freedom Charter underlie the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996.’ ANC vs. COPE & Others. (55235/08)[2009] (12 December 2008). 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/411.pdf 
22 The participating organisations were the African National Congress, the South African Indian Congress, the Coloured People’s 
Congress, the Congress of Democrats, the Communist Party of South Africa and the South African People’s Congress. 
 
 
 
 
 36 
2.2.2 The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (ANC, 1994) was formulated through a 
widely participatory process, involving intellectuals within the democratic movement and the 
labour unions (Padayachee, 1998; Peet, 2002). Underpinning the RDP were six principles, of 
which the fifth informed economic policy-making: the linking of reconstruction with 
development. Gelb (1990) had already written of two key concerns that the future development 
path of South Africa needed to take into consideration: redistribution and growth. He argued that 
redistribution in South Africa is necessary to redress extreme and racially-defined disparities in 
income, wealth, and living standards. Gelb envisaged that growth would be necessary to reverse 
the long decline in economic growth experienced in South Africa since the 1970s. 
 
The RDP document would later be endorsed by the ANC as a campaign tool for the 1994 
elections. Although its commitment to the RDP would later be revealed to have been token 
(Marais, 2001; Padayachee, 1998), the ANC – lacking a ready development framework – 
published a watered-down version as a government White Paper in November 1994 
(Padayachee, 1998). 
 
Predictably, criticism of the RDP document came swiftly, not least from those in academia. 
Bethlehem (1994) says that ‘the RDP makes the mistake of blaming nearly everything on 
apartheid’ and neglects other causes, which leads to ‘the reaching of wrong policy conclusions’. 
De Wet is even more unambiguous in his criticism of the RDP:  
 
The RDP document is in a certain sense a documentation of the needs of the 
people of South Africa. In time, all these needs, renamed objectives of the RDP, 
may be satisfied or achieved. However, any economist will be able to tell that 
they cannot, by the best stretch of imagination, all be achieved at the same time or 
even within five years. We simply do not have the resources, natural and human, 
to do so and we can confidently say this even without calculating the quantitative 
dimensions of implementing the programme. (De Wet, 1994:194)  
 
The views of Bethlehem and De Wet represent some of the major opinions about the RDP 
outside the ruling ANC alliance, especially those of Afrikaans-medium universities. De Wet 
(1994) and Bethlehem (1994) identify cyclical and structural factors as being behind the 
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shrinking of the South African economy, and advise that both restructuring and structural 
adjustment would be required to put the economy back on a growth track. Echoing this popular 
line of thinking, Truu (1994, in De Wet, 1994) advises that the RDP needed to rid itself of 
socialist rhetoric, given the failures of various brands of that ideology, for example Yugoslav 
market socialism, and the British and Swedish social democracies: 
 
It would be the height of folly for South Africa to rush in where these old hands at 
socialism have failed. South Africa already has a market-related economy, and 
what is needed is to make the existing system work better, not to replace it with a 
proven failure. (Truu, 1994, cited in De Wet, 1994:195) 
 
2.2.3 Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
Though Nelson Mandela had quoted from the Freedom Charter regarding nationalisation upon 
his release in February 1990, he had made an about-turn by the time he attended the World 
Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in 1992 (Peet, 2002); while ANC policy 
pronouncements had become ‘interchangeable’ with those of business by 1993 (Marais, 2001). 
For Habib and Padayachee (2000) these policy shifts represented the ANC’s interpretation of 
shifts in political and economic power, at both local and global levels. For its part, big business 
openly lobbied ANC officials to reject macro-economic populism (redistributive policies), 
through a major blitz using multiple media campaigns, high-profile workshops, and briefings 
(Marais, 2001; Macozoma, 2003). It is clear that when the ANC assumed power it was under 
immense pressure from both internal and external forces.  
 
The Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macro-economic strategy was unveiled on 
14 June 1996 by Finance Minister Trevor Manuel, following what has been posited as a secretive 
process (Padayachee, 1998; Mhone, 2003). 
 
 The introduction of GEAR should not have surprised even the most gullible of pundits, since it 
had become clear from about 1993 that the ANC had been forced to revise its position on the 
future democratic South Africa. A rather convoluted explanation for the adoption of GEAR is to 
be found in the 1996 ANC discussion document, The State and Social Transformation (ANC, 
1996). The document articulates the constraints that the ANC faces in developing a home-grown 
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economic development framework, warning members of the ANC alliance that global realities 
could not be wished away. The ANC implored the democratic movement to move away from its 
resistance to this policy decision:  
 
The democratic movement must resist the illusion that a democratic South Africa 
can be insulated from the processes which characterise world development. It 
must resist the thinking that this gives South Africa a possibility to elaborate 
solutions which are in discord with the rest of the world, but which can be 
sustained by virtue of a voluntarist South African experiment of a special type, a 
world of anti-apartheid campaigners, who, out of loyalty to us, would support and 
sustain such voluntarism. (ANC, 1996) 
 
If the state was to succeed in its role of social transformation and create better material 
conditions for the people, the ANC asserted, there was a need for the state to create the 
conditions necessary for attracting and retaining capital in a world where capital flight is 
prevalent (ANC, 1996). In translation: the sovereign powers of the state are now subject to 
control by the business sector. However, the ANC was reluctant to endorse market forces 
unconditionally, which perhaps explains the slow privatisation of state assets. 
  
For the ANC, South Africa’s insertion into the globalisation agenda was as neither ‘slaves nor 
free agents but as both; their decisions were constrained, but not thrust upon them, by 
globalisation forces. This gives the impression that the ANC negotiated South Africa into 
globalisation with only one arm tied behind its back – a relatively privileged position compared 
to that of many third-world countries. Yet one of the most striking features of GEAR is its 
similarity to structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) that had been or were being implemented 
across Africa and Latin America. The performance of GEAR has already been the subject of 
immense academic criticism (see for example Padayachee, 1998; Habib & Padayachee, 2000; 
Mhone, 2003; Davies, 2003); suffice it to mention that most of its targets were not met.  
 
For Nattrass (2001) GEAR was a mixed success. While GEAR was able to reduce fiscal deficit 
and inflationary financing it failed to produce the desired increases in investment and consequent 
reduction in unemployment. This Natrass argues, stems from the failure by the architects of 
GEAR to estimate the negative impact of a constrained demand on investment. In fact in an 
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earlier paper, Natrass (1996) cautions policy makers on the two sides of the ideological spectrum 
for being selective in their analysis of economic history cases and one sided criticism of either 
state led development and structural adjustment.  Heintz (2003) argues that while GEAR did not 
deliver social envisaged benefits, the economy was able withstand a global economic downturn 
and increases in social expenditure.   
 
In summary, the early government initiatives of RDP and GEAR were judged to have been 
unsuccessful in transforming South Africa’s economy in terms of reducing the vast inequalities 
and high levels of unemployment in the country (RSA, 2010). The economy was volatile in the 
1990s, and enjoyed relatively superior growth in the 2000s. In 2004, government set itself the 
objective of halving poverty by 2014, and in 2005 embarked on a new programme of economic 
transformation – Accelerated and Shared Growth - South Africa, or ASGISA – which aimed at 
achieving GDP growth of 4.5% per annum or higher in its first phase, between 2005 and 2009. In 
the second phase, between 2010 and 2014, the GDP would be expected to grow at 6 to 10% per 
annum (RSA, 2005). In October 2010 government released another economic policy document 
titled ‘The New Growth Path’, which created a framework for government to tackle 
unemployment as the core target variable. The new policy acknowledges that the period of fast 
growth in the economy of 2004 to 2008 did not translate to a significant reduction in 
unemployment, as President Zuma declared in his address to the 2010 ANC General Council: 
 
The new growth path must start with the recognition that on the one hand, we have had 
economic growth for a sustained period since the advent of democracy, with particularly 
high growth since the early 2000s and net job creation. On the other hand, poverty 
remains high, inequalities have remained the same or even grown worse, while some of 
the jobs created often brought low wages and poor conditions. (Zuma 2010) 
 
This statement largely summarises the condition of the South African economy, which is robust 
by African standards but has failed to be an engine in the fight against poverty and 
marginalisation of the poor. COSATU, the ANC’s trade union ally, has criticised the document 
as failing to anchor itself within historical ANC documents such as the Freedom Charter and the 
RDP, and for naturalising trade-offs, rather than sticking to ideology while still being informed by 
existing power relations (Cosatu, 2010).  
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2.3 EMERGING WATER AGENDAS  
Throughout modern history, water supply policy has evolved to reflect the dominant economic 
thinking in different periods (Bakker, 2003; Budds & McGranahan, 2003). Thus water provision 
has ranged from being supplied by the private sector, on the one extreme, to public provision on 
the other. For example, in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries the rapidly industrialising cities of Europe 
and North America were characterised by private sector water provision (UNDP, 2006; Bakker, 
2003; Budds & McGranahan, 2003). Even in the global South, private water vendors selling 
water in tanks or jerry cans have long been the means of obtaining water in some urban areas. 
But in tandem with changes in development thinking, private sector provision gradually made 
way for strong government involvement in the early twentieth century (Bakker, 2003; Budds & 
McGranahan, 2003). 
By its very nature, water lends itself to monopolistic tendencies: it has a high bulk-to-value ratio, 
meaning it is expensive to transport and needs specialised pipeline networks, which effectively 
act as a barrier to entry. However, water exhibits special characteristics, such as non-
substitutability and essentiality for human survival. Access to water has positive externalities on 
societal health, which private providers often fail to capture in models that exclude non-
profitable provision to poor communities. This is the key reason used to justify state intervention 
in water supply (Bakker, 2003).  
 
The adoption of a set of four principles at the 1992 International Conference on Water and the 
Environment held in Dublin (the so-called Dublin Principles) heralded the coming of age of a 
new water development paradigm. The fourth principle in particular articulated the shift towards 
market approaches: 
 
Principle No. 4 - Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and 
should be recognized as an economic good 
 
Within this principle, it is vital to recognize first the basic right of all human 
beings to have access to clean water and sanitation at an affordable price. Past 
failure to recognize the economic value of water has led to wasteful and 
environmentally damaging uses of the resource. Managing water as an economic 
good is an important way of achieving efficient and equitable use, and of 
encouraging conservation and protection of water resources. (ICWE, 1992)  
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It has become customary for the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other 
allied creditor institutions to use their lending leverage to force countries to privatise their water 
services sectors as part of a policy of structural adjustment and trade liberalisation that they 
promote aggressively as solutions to development problems (Budds, 2004; Budds & 
McGranahan, 2003). Bond (1999; 2003) demonstrates how the World Bank ‘muscled its policy 
prescriptions into municipal service policies in South Africa, with profound effects on the poor. 
Through the influence of a host of World Bank consultants, the water policy created (as with the 
new economic policy, two years later), drowned any hope of the massive infrastructural outlays 
originally envisaged.  
 
Private sector water participation has been on the rise in the past twenty years, through various 
types of arrangements: service contract, management contract, lease, built operate and transfer, 
concessions, and outright divesture (Bakker, 2003). However, the water supply industry has 
come to be dominated by a few multinational companies, notably the French companies 
ONDEO/Suez Lynonnaise des Eaux and Vivendi/Générale des Eaux, which control 70% of 
market on all five continents between themselves (Bakker, 2003) and the British-owned Thames 
Water (UNDP, 2006).  
 
The main argument for private sector involvement in water supply relies on the notion of ‘state 
failure’ in public-sector provision of water (Bakker, 2003). The state is often unable to recover 
the costs of water provision, due to low tariff policies (Cross & Morel, 2005; Bekker, 2003). 
Consequently, water provision may be characterised by under-maintenance and under-
investment in new infrastructure, with resultant inefficient operation and under-servicing of the 
population (UNDP, 2006; Cross & Morel, 2005; Bakker, 2003). Cross and Morel (2005) suggest 
that subsidised services are often only accessible to those already supplied through the network, 
to the exclusion of those existing outside, especially the poor. In addition, the Human 
Development Report 2006 identifies the issue of governance: state providers often operate in 
models characterised by non-accountability to communities being served, and have the tendency 
to serve the interests of narrow political elites (UNDP, 2006). The report acknowledges that the 
weaknesses of public sector provision do not in themselves translate to a need for privatisation, 
since many successful public utilities exist in developing countries.  
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The report lists four key attributes of successful utilities: 1) ring-fencing and financial autonomy, 
to guard against political interference; 2) participatory and transparent policy-making, to support 
accountability; 3) separation of the regulator and the service provider, with the regulator 
overseeing and publishing well-defined performance standards; and 4) adequate public financing 
for the expansion of the network, along with a national strategy for progressing towards water for 
all. (UNDP, 2006:91). Private sector participation in water supply takes a myriad of forms, as 
shown in Table 2.1 below.  
 
 
Table 2.1 Private sector participation in water supply 
Option Owner- 
Ship 
Management Investment  Risk  Duration Examples 
Service 
Contract  
Public Shared  Public 
  
Public 1–2 
 
Finland, Maharashtra 
(India) 
 
Management 
Contract 
Public Private Public Public 3–5 
 
Johannesburg (South 
Africa), 
 
Lease Public Private Public shared 8–15 
 
Abidjan (Côte 
d’Ivoire),  
BOO, BOT Public & 
Private 
Public-Private Private Private 20-30 Sidney (Australia) 
Concession  Public Private Private Private 20–30 
 
Manila (Philippines),  
 
Divesture Private Private Private Private Unlimited 
 
Chile, UK 
 
Adapted from Bakker, 2003; UNDP, 2006 
 
In their analysis of water privatisation in Buenos Aires, which has been hailed as a success by 
proponents of neoliberalism, Loftus and McDonald (2001) argue that this view needs revision. 
Both ONDEO/Suez Lynonnaise des Eaux and Vivendi/Générale des Eaux have substantial 
shareholdings in Aguas Argentinas, the 30-year concession winner; which has failed to meet its 
five-yearly targets. Moreover, the role of the regulatory agency was undermined by central 
government in many instances. The following citation provides a good summation of the debate 
concerning private and public sector participation in water services:  
  
Perhaps the most obvious lesson from any review of public and private provision is that 
there are no hard and fast cross-country blueprints for success. Some publicly owned 
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providers (Porto Alegre) are world class performers, as are some privatized companies in 
Chile. Many publicly owned utilities are, by any reasonable criteria, failing the poor—
and that failure is linked to underfinancing and poor governance. But the idea that public 
sector failures can be swiftly corrected through the presumed efficiency, accountability 
and financing advantages of the private concessions is flawed, as witnessed by 
developments in Cochabamba, Buenos Aires and West Manila.(UNDP, 2006:96). 
 
Given that the solution for water service provision is now acknowledged to be neither public nor 
private provision, it is crucial to identify the ingredients for policy success regardless of whether 
provision is public or private. In this regard the UNDP (2006) recommends the development of a 
coherent national plan, in which the following imperatives are emphasised: 1) clear goals and 
benchmarks, for measuring progress through a national water policy; 2) secure financing 
provisions, to back up the policies; 3) clear strategies for overcoming structural inequalities 
based on wealth, location and other markers for disadvantage; and 4) governance systems that 
make governments and water providers accountable for achieving the goals set under national 
policies. 
 
2.4 SOUTH AFRICAN WATER POLICY AND LAW  
As mentioned in Chapter 1 and Section 2.1 above, South Africa is rife with extreme inequalities, 
most of which follow its racial contours. The provision of water services is no exception. The 
daunting task of transforming South African society was the immediate priority of the new 
government upon assuming office in 1994. The ANC had emerged victorious in the historic all-
race elections in 1994, on the back of an ambitious programme of redistribution, the RDP (ANC, 
1994). One of the major tenets of the RDP was meeting the basic needs of the marginalised black 
population. Symbolically – and more importantly, to avoid being hamstrung by apartheid 
policies which were still in force – government embarked on an extensive policy and legislative 
review, culminating in major shifts across the board. In this section I summarise some key 
aspects of the new policies that relate to water management in South Africa. 
 
2.4.1 The Right to Water and the Constitution  
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 (RSA, 1996) is one of a few in the 
world that specifically provide for the right to water (Mehta et al, 2010). Section 27 (1) (b) states 
that everyone has the right to have access to ‘sufficient food and water’. These rights are 
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subsequently qualified through a provision in section 27(2) stating: ‘the state must take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realization of each of these rights’ (my emphasis).  
 
Even though the right to water is qualified, it has been argued that the insertion of socio-
economic rights as part of the Bill of Rights was a bold move by the drafters of the Constitution, 
as the socio-economic rights have often been referred to as ‘non-justiciable’ (Francis 2005). This 
insertion of the right to water in the South African Constitution (RSA, 1996) reflects an 
emerging thread in international law
23
 that affirms the right to water as a basic human right. 
Although international law treaties and conventions do not explicitly
24
 mention the right to 
water, many legal scholars argue persuasively that the right to water is implied in explicitly 
stated rights such as the rights to health, food and life, which include the rights to an appropriate 
means of subsistence and a reasonable standard of living. The framers of modern treaties (passed 
in the 1950s and 1960s) did not envisage water being a scarce resource, seeing it as being much 
like air; thus, its exclusion is due to a lack of foresight rather than deliberate intention. In 
recognition of this, in 2002 the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR) passed the water-specific General Comment (No. 15), which specifically states 
and clarifies the right to water, and outlines state responsibility towards its fulfilment. Francis 
(2005) observes that it can be difficult to show that government has failed to abide by the 
constitutional provisions, in light of the limiting clause.  
 
The case of L. Mazibuko and Others v. City of Johannesburg and Others provided the first real 
opportunity to define the content of the right to water. Lindiwe Mazibuko and four other 
similarly-placed residents of Phiri claimed, firstly, that the 6 000 litres of water provided in the 
City of Johannesburg Free Basic Water policies failed to fulfil their right of access to sufficient 
                                                 
23 In his judgment in the matter L. Mazibuko & Others v. City of Johannesburg & Others, Judge Tsoka cited Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights Article 25; the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Articles 11 and 12 
(though it must be stated that South Africa has not ratified this treaty; see Dugard, 2008), the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child Article 24 on states’ obligation to help children attain the highest standard of health and to combat disease through adequate 
food and drinking water; and its counterpart in the African Convention on the Rights of the Child, and The African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights Article 16, General Comment 15 of the United Nation’s Committee on Economic and Social Rights.  
24
 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), for example, does not list water explicitly, 
although it can be argued that all the other rights would be meaningless without access to water. Moreover, the rights to ‘an 
adequate standard of living’, and ‘the highest attainable standard of living’ in articles 11 and 12 would be meaningless without 
access to water.  
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water. Secondly, they contested the lawfulness of the installation of prepaid meters. For many 
years prior to 2004, the residents (who are mainly very poor) had accessed an unlimited supply 
of water on credit as with other townships within the city’s jurisdiction, which was charged at the 
deemed consumption of 20kl per month. In 2004 this deemed consumption was discontinued, 
and replaced with prepaid meters allowing 6kl free per stand per month, with additional water to 
be paid for. 
 
The case was initially heard in South Gauteng High Court,
25
 after which it was appealed at both 
the Supreme Court and then the Constitutional Court, the final court of appeal on constitutional 
matters. Judge Tsoka in the High Court accepted the applicants argument that the installation of 
prepaid meters was unfair and unlawful, and that the City of Johannesburg’s 6 000 litres was 
inadequate, and that the city ought to increase the water supply to 50 litres per person per day. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal
26
 varied this order, lowering the amount of sufficient 
water to 42 litres of water per day, and ruling also that installation of the prepayment water 
meters was unlawful; although the City was given two years to rectify its by-laws to permit their 
installation.  
 
After a cross appeal against the Supreme Court judgment at the Constitutional Court, the matter 
was finally settled. The Constitutional Court ruled that it was inappropriate for the courts to 
quantify the amount that constituted sufficient water. The court also concluded that given the fact 
that over 100 000 residents in Johannesburg still lack basic water supplies within 200 metres of  
their residences, it could not be said the 6 000 litres provided free was unreasonable. Further, the 
court ruled that the national legislation and the City’s by-laws were allowed to authorise the 
installation of prepaid meters. 
 
                                                 
25 This was formerly the Witwatersrand Local Division of the Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court of South Africa. The 
names were changed at the beginning of March 2009, after President Motlanthe’s assenting of the Renaming of Superior Courts 
Bill. However, in the reference lists the former name is used so as to avoid confusion, and to promote uniformity with the text of 
the judgement. 
26 City of Johannesburg v. L Mazibuko. (489/08)[2009] ZASCA 20 (25 March 2009). 
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It is of interest that both the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court relied on 
section 27(2) of the Constitution (RSA, 1996) to come up with their verdicts. At the Supreme 
Court, Judge Streicher pointed out that section 27(2) is: 
 
…not intended to cover the field and to deprive anyone of the right to rely on the 
provisions of s 27(1). On the contrary it simply recognizes that it may, in certain 
circumstances, not be possible for the state to give immediate effect to provisions of 
s 27(1)  
 
Furthermore Judge Streicher ruled that sufficiency of water was fundamental to the meaning of the 
right itself: 
 
A commitment to address a lack of access to clean water and to transform society 
into one in which there will be human dignity and equality, lying at the heart of our 
Constitution, it follows that a right of access to sufficient water cannot be anything 
less than a right of access to that quantity of water that is required for dignified 
human existence. 
 
At the Constitutional Court, Judge K. O’Regan ruled, of section 27(2):  
 
Government must disclose what it has done to formulate the policy: its 
investigation and research, the alternatives considered, and the reasons why the 
option underlying the policy was selected. The Constitution does not require 
government to be held to an impossible standard of perfection. Nor does it require 
courts to take over the tasks that in a democracy should properly be reserved for the 
democratic arms of government.  
 
The arguments of Judges Streicher and O’Regan above need deeper reflection, which perhaps 
calls for analysis of other judgements by the Constitutional Court.  
 
2.4.2 Justiciability of socio-economic rights  
The Constitutional Court broke away from traditional human rights jurisprudence, which deems 
socio-economic rights non-justiciable (Gabru, 2005; Francis, 2005). It has been argued that 
ruling on socio-economic rights requires the courts to direct the distribution of state resources, 
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something which is beyond judicial duty. In its very first judgement, the certification 
judgement,
27
 the Constitutional Court ruled that these rights were in some measure justiciable: 
 
Nevertheless, we are of the view that these rights are, at least to some extent, 
justiciable. As we have stated in the previous paragraph many civil and political 
rights entrenched in the New Constitution will give rise to similar budgetary 
implications without compromising their justiciability. At the very minimum, socio-
economic rights can be negatively protected from improper invasion  
 
Although the courts have shown considerable reluctance to interfere in the fiscal responsibilities 
of the executive, they have on occasion directed the state to meet these obligations. In the TAC 
judgement, for example, the Constitutional Court ruled that:  
  
The primary duty of the courts is to the Constitution and the law… Where state 
policy is challenged as inconsistent with Constitution, courts have to consider 
whether in formulating and implementing such policy the state has given effect to 
its constitutional obligations. If it should hold in any given case that the state has 
failed to do so, it is obliged by the Constitution to do so. 
 
In the TAC judgement, the court held that the state ought to institute reasonable measures to 
eliminate or reduce suffering: 
 
The state is obliged to take reasonable measures to eliminate or reduce the large 
areas of severe deprivation that afflict our society… As the Bill of Rights indicates, 
their function in respect of socio-economic rights is directed towards ensuring that 
legislative and other measures taken by the state are reasonable. 
 
Thus, for an infringement of the constitutional provisions to occur, government policy must be 
judged to be unreasonable: for example, failing to demonstrate a coherent programme of action 
directed at those in extreme need and the general populace. In its findings the Constitutional 
Court pointed that while the water policy of the City of Johannesburg had weaknesses, the city 
had continued to revise the policy, indicating the existence of a reasonable programme. The 
programme is measured in terms of scope and pace in terms of the available budgetary resources. 
One very important aspect is that this requirement ought to be read in conjunction with Section 
                                                 
27 Certification of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) 
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7(2) of the Constitution, which spells out the obligations of the state in respect of the Bill of 
Rights (HRC 2004). It states that ‘[the] state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights 
in the Bill of Rights’ (RSA 1996, my emphasis). 
 
2.4.3 Water Policy and Law in South Africa 
Water management in South Africa largely falls under the ambit of two Acts of Parliament, the 
Water Services Act and the National Water Act. While the Water Services Act focuses (as the 
name implies) on water services, while the National Water Act are dedicated to water resources 
management.  
 
The main objectives the Water Services Act are (among others) to fulfil the rights to basic water 
supply and sanitation, setting the standards for tariffs for water services. In pursuance of the 
aforementioned, the Department of Water Affairs developed the Strategic Framework for Water 
Services (RSA, 2003) to inform the development of detailed strategies for the water services 
sector. In essence, the Strategic Framework for Water Services is the operational manual for the 
fulfilment of both the Water Services Act and the Constitution as it pertains to water services. 
The Strategic Framework on Water Services sets the following targets: the attainment of 
universal access to basic water supply by 2008, universal access to basic sanitation by 2010, all 
schools to have adequate water supply and sanitation by 2005, clinics by 2007, all bucket toilets 
eliminated by 2006, free basic water available in all areas by 2005 and free basic sanitation by 
2010. None of these targets has been achieved, or was ever likely to be achieved by the target 
dates, as highlighted in Table 2.2 below. 
 
Table 2.2: Water Services Delivery Targets*  
Objective Target Year  Revised Target 
Universal access to basic water supply   2008 (78%) 2010+ 
Universal access to basic sanitation   2010 2010+ 
All schools have adequate water supply and sanitation   2005 (60%) 2008/09 
All clinics have adequate water supply and sanitation  2007  
All bucket toilets eliminated   2006 2008/09 
Free basic water available in all areas   2005 (78%) 2010+ 
Free basic sanitation   2010 2010+ 
Sources: Targets from RSA (2003), Revised Targets from RSA (2006), with targets up to 2010/11 
*Note: Percentages in brackets reflect revised anticipated achievements by end of 2006/7 financial year (RSA, 2006) 
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The revision of targets shown in the above table is an acknowledgment of government’s failure 
to reduce backlogs (and the complexity involved therein), in spite of their large infrastructural 
outlays since 1994. In many instances, service delivery has barely managed to keep up with 
increasing demand. The analysis of the water delivery progress statistics in Section 2.3 below 
will help in judging long-term government performance in the sector more accurately. Later an 
analysis of two important facets of the water policy (the cost recovery principle and the free 
basic water policy) will be interrogated, to highlight the link between water policy and economic 
policy.  
 
2.5 WATER SERVICE DELIVERY PROGRESS 
The provision of a safe water supply service in South Africa has been hailed as one of the 
greatest achievements of the ANC government (Hemson & Owusu-Ampomah, 2005; ANC, 
2009). Table 2.3 below shows that the percentage of people with access to clean water has 
indeed increased, from 76.7% in 1996 to 88.6% in 2007 – an increase of 12.1% in 14 years. 
Although the general trend is quite similar across the figures provided by different sources, the 
figures themselves tend to vary widely (as can be noticed from the targets given above). 
 
Table 2.3 Water Supply Delivery 
Year  1993 2007 
Clean water 76.7 88.6 
Borehole/rain water 10.4 3.2 
Stream/dam/well/spring 13.0 8.2 
Sources: Hemson & Owusu-Ampomah, 2005; and StatsSA, 2007 
 
Table 2.4 below shows that access to flush or chemical toilets increased from 49.8% in 1993 to 
60.8% in 2007, a modest rise of 11%.  
 
Table 2.4 Sanitation Delivery 
Year  1993 2007 
Flush/chemical toilet 49.8 60.8 
Pit Latrine 32.2 28.3 
Bucket 5.3 2.3 
Other 12.5 8.6 
Sources: Hemson & Owusu-Ampomah, 2005; and StatsSA, 2007 
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2.6 POLICY DISCORD OR PRAGMATISM? COST RECOVERY AND THE FREE BASIC WATER 
POLICIES  
In Sections 2.1, 2.4 and 2.5 I alluded to the successes of the ANC government in rolling out 
water services infrastructure, in particular water supplies. In Section 2.1 in particular I pointed 
out that the successes in this regard have not escaped the ruling ANCs political machinery, which 
understandably has been quick to latch on them and use them in political campaigns. In addition, 
South Africa’s water policy has been lauded as progressive. In this section, I interrogate these 
‘successes’ in policy and delivery, based on two aspects of water services: the Free Basic Water 
policy, and cost recovery. 
 
2.6.1 Free Basic Water 
South Africa’s free basic services policy was conceptualised by the ANC in the run-up to the 
2000 local government elections and was subsequently endorsed by both the ANC and the DA as 
part of their campaigns (McDonald, 2002; Muller, 2008). As part of the policy the ANC 
promised 6 000 litres of water and 50kWh of electricity, the so-called free basic water (FBW) 
and free basic electricity (FBE) respectively. For Muller (2007:40), this policy represented a 
fundamental shift in ANC policy; from the RDP, which in his analogy ‘had avoided promising “a 
pie in the sky”. Mehta (2005) points out that the announcement of the free basic water policy 
took even senior bureaucrats at the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) by 
surprise, and they had to work out the details of the policy afterwards. McDonald (2002a; 2002b) 
explains that the free basic policy is only a variation of the block tariff which has the first step 
provided free of charge, with subsequent steps at gradually increasing tariffs.  
 
The Strategic Framework on Water Services (RSA, 2003) defines the aim of the free basic water 
policy as ‘to assist in promoting sustainable access to a basic water supply by subsidising the 
ongoing operating and maintenance costs of a basic water supply service’ (RSA, 2003:29). The 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry sees this policy as a reasonable measure within the 
available resources
28
 towards the fulfilment of the constitutional imperative of providing access 
to sufficient water. DWAF contends that South Africa’s economy is large enough to finance the 
fulfilment of the FBW policy (RSA, 2003). 
                                                 
28 Section 27(2) of the Constitution. 
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The execution of the FBW policy has proved a challenge for many municipalities many of which 
lack financial and institutional resources, Mehta (2005) reports. In addition, Mehta (2005) 
observes, municipal bureaucrats have argued that the free basic water policy has impeded 
consumers’ willingness to pay for services. However, the FBW policy has been reinforced by the 
courts as a means of concretising the right to access to sufficient water enshrined in the 
Constitution. In fact, as L Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg  indicates, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal revised the 6 000 litres free water per household per month upwards, to 10 080 litres per 
household per month.  
 
But Mehta (2005) points out more deep-seated arguments that must be considered in the 
implementation of the FBW policy. She argues that rights-based approaches undermine the 
people they are supposed to empower, by fostering a dependency syndrome. She argues that by 
failing to fulfil the financial obligation necessary to provide them with water, citizens are 
abrogating on their responsibility. In response to this criticism, Mvula Trust, the water and 
sanitation NGO slated by Mehta,  states that although indigent cases deserve special treatment, 
they still require some form of input (such as labour or participation in water user associations) 
by the poor in order to foster a strong sense of citizenship (Mehta, 2005). McDonald (2002a) 
argues that such voluntarism obviates proper analysis of health and social costs related to 
‘picking refuse off the street, cleaning sewers, digging ditches… [all of which have] gender, race 
and class dimensions…’ Such a model, although seemingly dealing with the issue of 
dependency, may suffer from its creation of a bifurcated citizenship – full citizens paying 
financially, and partial citizens who offer manual labour. I am inclined to believe this bifurcation 
stems from the tendency to overvalue monetary payments, the conditions under which the poor 
must work in menial jobs, and the mere consideration of needing alternative access to 
citizenship.  
 
For the pro-FBW group, the policy does not go deep enough to uproot poverty and inequality. 
McDonald (2002a; 2002b), for example, argues that the 6 000 litres offers little respite for low-
income households, which are generally larger households than those of affluent families. This 
suggests a possible, unintended subsidisation of the affluent households. Furthermore, McDonald 
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argues that implementation delays in some municipalities have denied many poor people the free 
services.  
 
2.6.2 Cost Recovery 
Although General Comment No. 15 explicitly states that water is a public good fundamental for 
life and health’ (paragraph 1), it does not exclude cost recovery for water services or public 
ownership of water supply. Ownership of water services has oscillated between public and 
private ownership throughout modern history (Bakker, 2003; Budds & McGranahan, 2003; 
UNDP, 2006), but the adoption of a set of four principles at the 1992 International Conference 
on Water and the Environment held in Dublin (the so-called Dublin Principles) heralded the 
coming of age of a new water development paradigm. The fourth principle in particular 
articulated the shift towards market approaches: ‘[w]ater has an economic value in all its 
competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good (ICWE, 1992). 
 
In South Africa, the Strategic Framework on Water Services states that the vision of water 
services is to provide ‘all people living in South Africa with adequate, safe, appropriate and 
affordable water and sanitation services’ (RSA, 2003:9). Aware of the fourth Dublin principle, 
then-Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry Mr Ronnie Kasrils pointed out that:  
 
In South Africa, we treat water as both a social and economic good. Once our social 
needs have been met, we manage water as an economic good, as is appropriate for a 
scarce natural resource. (Kasrils, 2003; cited in RSA, 2003) 
 
In line with the above, the Strategic Framework on Water Services asserts that tariffs should 
generate enough funds for maintenance, operations and investment needed for water provision, 
with due consideration for the affordability of water to the poor; and that water services should 
operate on sound business principles (RSA, 2003). The implementation of this cost recovery 
policy has been widely condemned as being detrimental to the poor. In one example, cost 
recovery policies were linked to a cholera outbreak in part of KwaZulu-Natal, when poor people 
were forced to rely on water from contaminated sources. (Deedat & Cottle, 2003). Similarly, 
Smith (2004) illustrates how water cut-offs for non-payment in Cape Town were invariably 
experienced by poor people, whose multiple-family plot occupancies inflate the bill for the 
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shared water point. Service providers place a premium on compliance, without regard to the 
hardships experienced by poor households. On that note, it is important to explore the debate on 
non-payment of municipal services in South Africa.  
 
Many explanations have been proposed to account for the non-payment of municipal services in 
South Africa, the most prominent being the ‘culture of non-payment’ argument (see McDonald, 
2002a; Alence, 2002; Goldblatt, 1999; Chipkin, 1995). While rent and services payment boycotts 
formed a potent political weapon in the anti-apartheid struggle, the substantial mandates given to 
the ANC in all elections since 1994 make it inconceivable that the state lacks popular support 
(Chipkin, 1995); although Tapscott (2005) notes that many South Africans have little faith in the 
workings of local government. In addition, it has been suggested that inefficiencies in tariff 
collection mechanisms and the poor quality of services promote resistance towards meeting 
service payments (Goldblatt 1999; Alence 2002).  
 
In a study to determine willingness to pay in informal settlements in Johannesburg, Goldblatt 
(1999) found that poor payment levels were not due to a sense of entitlement to free services; 
there were broader political and economic issues. Employing contingency valuation techniques, 
he was able to demonstrate that 97% of the residents were willing to pay the equivalent of 
operation costs, demonstrating that income was in fact the constraint on willingness to pay.  
 
McDonald (2002a; 2002b) argues that post-apartheid cost recovery in South Africa is historically 
unfair, since during apartheid, white South Africans and the industrial sector benefited from 
subsidised municipal services while blacks were denied the same privilege. He underscores that 
point by adding that there is further evidence indicating that current municipal spending is 
skewed in favour of white and industrial areas to the detriment of the black population. But it 
must be pointed that the cost recovery policy in water services has operated in tandem with 
privatisation of water services, a complex phenomenon chronicled in Section 2.5 below.  
 
2.6.3 Free basic water  
The free basic water policy – a progressive policy step to aid the poor by providing free lifeline 
water supplies – has not been without problems. A large number of deserving citizens still have 
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no access to free basic water. In addition, it has been argued that the 6 000 litres per household 
per month is inadequate. In Section 2.4 I reported that L. Mazibuko and Others v. City of 
Johannesburg and Others provided the first real opportunity to define the content of the right to 
water. The end result was that the Constitutional Court endorsed cost recovery as a key element 
of the financial sustainability of water service providers. It must be reiterated that the source of 
funds for free basic water is envisaged to be cross-subsidisation of ‘low volume’ consumers 
(presumably poor households) by ‘high volume’ consumers (presumably rich households). In 
their study of household water demand in Cape Town, Jansen and Schultz (2006) report negative 
price elasticities and a large difference between low and high income groups, as shown in Table 
2.5 below.  
 
Table 2.5 Estimated Price Elasticities for Different Income Groups 
Income Group (Monthly Income) 
 
XTPCSE Model Price Elasticities 
 
R0-1000 -0.324 
R1001-5000 -0.306 
R5001-10000 -0.391 
R10001-20000 -0.452 
R20001 -0.967 
Source Jansen and Schultz (2006:604) 
 
Since low income groups can be assumed to use water largely for basic use categories while rich 
consumers also tend to have recreational water uses, this finding is in keeping with expectations. 
However, this means that increases in water prices need to take into cognisance the vulnerability 
of the lower income user groups, for instance by using a stepped price structure as included in 
the design of the Free Basic Water policy. But in essence, free basic water is an extension of cost 
recovery. 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION  
South Africa boasts what many laud as some of the most progressive water legislation in the 
world, backed by an equally acclaimed Constitution. But while the country has made strides in 
providing water services to the underprivileged sections of the population, a great deal more 
remains to be done to achieve the constitutional objective of access to water for every citizen. 
Much as the policies reflect considerable effort on the part of the drafters, many poor people in 
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South Africa are still to benefit from improved water services. Even for those who have been 
supplied with water services, many suffer water cut-offs and frequent breakdowns of the 
network. South African economic and water policies resemble the neoliberal frameworks thrust 
upon many Third World countries by the World Bank, the IMF and their partners. The design of 
the water policy reflects a compromise between neoliberal policy and a redistributive framework. 
 
While South African water policy and water law have been widely praised as being progressive, 
there is tension over privatisation (variously defined) of water services, water cut-offs, and the 
slow pace and quality of delivery. This is impacting on the nature of relations between the state, 
its citizens and the private sector, all of whom have an interest in capturing concessions from 
each other. I have discussed studies dealing with water price elasticities, which indicate the non-
elastic nature of water consumption by the poor (an indication of the essential nature of their 
consumption), and the relatively elastic consumption by the relatively affluent (indicating that 
they use large volumes of water for non-essential purposes). High elasticities were associated 
with non-residential water use, showing great scope for reduction in usage if targeted with water 
demand-management initiatives. 
 
Perhaps the most important aspect of this chapter has been the documenting of the insertion of 
water services management into the mainstream political-economic debate, not only in South 
Africa but in the entire world. As with other resources, water usage and allocation are highly 
contested issues that shape and are shaped by politics and economics. Thus, water management 
cannot be seen as a neutral technocratic field; it is inherently contested. No less so in South 
Africa, with its history of dispossession, oppression, segregation and apartheid, all which bring 
to the fore the need for deliberate societal transformation processes. I argue that – especially in 
urban areas – water services are a highly politicised service delivery area, much like housing. In 
the next chapter, I explore the question of how citizens, both as groups and as individuals, 
attempt to solve the problems they encounter in South Africa, at both local and national levels.   
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C h a p t e r  3  
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND PROTEST POLITICS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
CONTEXT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I explore how citizens participate in local and national governance and input their 
views on issues that they consider important to them. Participation alongside contestation forms 
the pillars on which democracy rests (Huntington, 1991). Participation is indispensable to 
ensuring responsive, locally-driven development (Ostrom, 1990; Cornwall, 2002; Gaventa, 
2002). So it is predictable that citizen participation has been promoted by some as a panacea for 
all development problems. As Williams (1976) notes, participation seems never to be used 
unfavourably’. Such affirmative incorporation of the ‘citizen participation’ agenda into the centre 
of development debate calls for scrutiny. Its currency in the 1980s and 1990s cannot be divorced 
from the imposition of policy driven by such development institutions as the World Bank and the 
IMF – for instance, structural adjustment programmes (Narayanan, 2003).  
 
But despite the fetishisation of participatory approaches, they have also been subject to critical 
commentary; notably by Cooke and Kothari (2001), and Kapoor (2002), at both theoretical and 
empirical levels. For these writers the participation rhetoric lacks authenticity, since it seldom 
delivers intended outcomes; instead it is associated with the entrenchment of existing power 
structures, as will be explained in Section 3.2.2.  
 
Participation has both intrinsic and instrumental value in enabling citizens to make both political 
and economic claims (Sen, 1999). Since human beings are social beings, any denial of 
participation is fundamentally negative to human life experience. But because South Africa is a 
democracy, the essential problem is not so much one of denial of participation per se – the 
instrumental, as it were – but one of the substantive meanings of participation. Bratton and 
Mattes (2000), for example, report that South Africans (and Africans in general, given their 
historical lack of privilege) put a lot of emphasis on materialistic interpretations of democracy; 
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they expect higher levels of economic gain from the political transition, and they expect 
government to deliver the desired services. 
 
Since 2004, South Africa has experienced an upsurge in protests, the so-called ‘service delivery’ 
protests – many which have been violent. Excluded from exercising a voice in conventional 
participatory arenas, communities have elected to utilise unconventional forms of participation 
such as protest as a means of asserting their citizenship, entrenching accountability and 
countervailing the power of elites. While the service delivery failure hypothesis has dominated 
protest analyses in South Africa, dysfunctional citizen participation systems have emerged as 
another issue that perpetuates these protest cycles. In fact, a plethora of other grievances have 
been identified in the literature; among others, high levels of poverty, unemployment, crime and 
corruption (Thompson & Nleya, 2010a; 2010b; Hart, 2008; Atkinson, 2007; Johnston & 
Bernstein, 2007; Botes et al, 2007; Booysen, 2007). Hart (2008:692) in particular posits that 
these issues form part of a greater struggle over the definition and meaning of liberation and 
freedom, and simultaneously reflect the ‘expressions of betrayal – intensified and sharpened by 
obscene and escalating material inequalities, and the crisis of livelihood confronting many in 
South Africa today’.  
 
In Chapters 4 to 7, I detail the interface of service delivery (water in particular) and citizen 
participation in Khayelitsha. I will seek to develop a conceptual and theoretical framework that 
delimits citizenship, citizen participation and protest, and begin to synthesise a theory that may 
be useful in explaining events in that area. In pursuance of the above, the rest of this chapter is as 
follows: Section 3.2 analyses the concept of ‘participation’, in relation to its contribution to 
understanding democracy, while Section 3.3 explains the key trends in public participation in 
South Africa. Section 3.4 delves into the area of the state/civil society relationship, while Section 
3.5 locates protest participation in South Africa within a framework of theory developed mainly 
by Northern scholars. In Section 3.6 I begin to synthesise the literature in the chapter towards a 
framework for the analysis of results presented Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
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3.2 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN CONTEXT  
A key component of understanding citizen participation is to explore the notion of political 
participation as being intrinsic to democratisation processes. Political participation has been 
described as existing in a continuum of conventional and unconventional behaviour, following 
on the work of Muller (1972) and Marsh (1974) (both in Dalton, 2002). Figure 3.1 shows the 
participation thresholds in the continuum. On the left-hand side of the model are conventional 
forms of representative and direct participation: voting, lobbying and formal interests groups, 
while on the right-hand side are unconventional forms of participation. The forms of 
participation are graded from orthodox to unorthodox, legal to illegal, and nonviolent to violent 
forms of action.  
 
Conventional participation thus involves orthodox forms of participation that are permissible 
under the regime culture, whereas unconventional behaviours involve forms of action that are 
outside the confines of the regime culture of the country (Fernández Prados et al, 2003; Dalton, 
2002). Seen this way, participation encompasses a wide variety of different forms of action 
which are both distinct from and related to others’ (Bean, 1991:253). In fact, Berelson et al 
(1964) in Verba et al (1987a:44) argue that all forms of participation ‘are highly correlated with 
one another and can otherwise be thought of as interchangeable’. Yet Verba et al (1971) found 
that people do not use different forms of participation interchangeably; they tend to specialise in 
activities that match their goals. Figure 3.1 shows this continuum of participation. As Tilly 
(2008:14) observes, people who participate continuously make choices on what form their 
participation will take within this wide array of forms of participation: 
 
Claim-making resembles jazz and commedia dell’arte rather than ritual reading of 
scripture. Like a jazz trio or an improvising theater group, people who participate in 
contentious politics normally have several pieces they can play, but not infinity ... Within 
that limited array, the players choose which pieces they will perform here and now, and 
in what order. 
 
Two views emerge from this discussion: that citizens specialise in different forms of 
participation, and that they continuously make choices as to what forms of participation to 
engage in, and when. These two views are not as antagonistic as they seem at first; citizens select 
from previous experiences only those repertoires that they believe will achieve their aims.  
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Figure 3.1 Participation Thresholds 
 
Redrawn from Dalton, 2002:61 
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 As highlighted in the introductory section, participation has come to be viewed as an 
indispensable element of development (UNESC, 2007; World Bank, 2002; DFID, 2002). In 
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complexity of the ongoing dialogue on participation.  
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or agreed-upon meaning. It is often argued that participation enables the poor to exert greater 
influence on government and other institutions (Gaventa, 2002). For Gaventa (2002), 
participation is the way in which the poor people exercise voice through new forms of 
deliberation, consultation and/or mobilisation designed to inform and to influence larger 
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poor’ into the participation debate clouds more that it reveals; for as Dill (2009) observes, even 
the large-scale, community-driven initiatives advocated by development institutions such as the 
World Bank are vulnerable to elite capture, notwithstanding the complicity of such institutions, 
the ‘democratic deficit’ and flawed global governance (Stiglitz, 2007:18).  
 
In her seminal article ‘A ladder of participation’ Arnstein (1969:216) is unequivocal about the 
meaning of participation:  
 
[C]itizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power. It is the 
redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from 
the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future. It is 
the strategy by which the have-nots join in determining how information is 
shared, goals and policies are set, tax resources are allocated, programs are 
operated, and benefits like contracts and patronage are parceled out. In short, it is 
the means by which they can induce significant social reform which enables them 
to share in the benefits of the affluent society. 
 
In Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation, a vertical, stepwise hierarchy of degrees of 
participation is a useful starting point for understanding the concept, notwithstanding the 
difficulties caused by overlaps between otherwise disjoint ‘rungs’. For her, participation is a 
means of self- and collective empowerment for individuals and groups. In the ladder (shown in 
Figure 3.2 below) the level and consequence of citizen input varies from non-participation 
(manipulation and therapy) through informing, consultation and placation, which allow for 
tokenistic citizen input but still fall shy of effective citizen control. Citizen power is only present 
when participation involves partnerships, delegated power and citizen control.  
 
Seemingly, Arnstein is preoccupied by the distribution and attainment of power by the hitherto 
powerless. Her central hypothesis, therefore, is that participation is a central feature of power, as 
well as a means of access to power. This hypothesis assumes implicitly that power is based on 
level of participation; therefore, the reconfiguration of citizen participation would be an effective 
method of realigning power relations. Moreover, the stepwise ladder fails to nuance the 
complexity of participation being an end in itself beyond its instrumental utility as a means. In 
fact, as Tritter and McCallum (2006) stress, more emphasis should be placed on the complexity 
of the user-defined optimality and meaning of engagement and empowerment.  
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Figure 3.2 Arnstein’s citizen ladder of participation 
 
 
Redrawn from Arnstein, 1969:217 
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3.3.2 Criticism of public participation  
In Section 3.1 I noted that some of the fiercest criticism of ‘participation’ has come from Cooke 
and Kothari’s edited volume Participation: The New Tyranny, published in 2001, and Kapoor’s 
(2002) assessment of Robert Chambers' work, to which I now turn. Cooke and Kothari (2001) 
conclude that their volume is able to identify more serious problems of participation: 
 
[T]he naivety of assumptions about the authenticity of motivations and behaviour 
in participatory processes; how the language of empowerment masks the real 
concern for managerial effectiveness; the quasi-religious association of 
participatory rhetoric and practice, and how an emphasis on the micro level of 
intervention can obscure, and indeed sustain, broader level macro-level 
inequalities and injustice. (Cooke & Kothari, 2002:13 
 
 
Before engaging in debate on these criticisms, I must point out that Kapoor (2002) also identifies 
a number of weaknesses in Robert Chambers’ principal articulation, the participatory rural 
appraisal (PRA), by comparing it with Habermas’ articulation of deliberative democracy. Many 
criticisms of participation relate to its theoretical coherence and practice. Kapoor (2002), for 
example, points to Chambers’ overreliance on empiricism, which privileges the status quo in the 
political economy and in social relations. Moreover, the oversimplification of social relations to 
‘uppers’ and ‘lowers’ creates the impression of concentration and institutionalisation of power 
among the elites, while the subjugated exist at local levels.  
 
Interestingly, it is Chambers’ view that elites can be trained to listen and learn from the 
marginalised, although he does not envisage a role for the latter in this process (Parfitt, 2004; 
Kapoor, 2002). Narayanan calls for the dismantling of the power structure before participatory 
approaches can deliver intended outcomes (Narayanan, 2003). In the absence of such 
transformation, participation can only serve to reproduce and authenticate oppressive discourses 
and practices (Narayanan, 2003; Kapoor, 2002; Cleaver, 2001; Mosse, 2001).  
 
Another key problem with participation is identified by Cooke (2001), who reflects on the socio-
psychological dimension of participation. He identifies four forms of group dysfunction which, 
he argues, can distort individuals’ thoughts, feelings and behaviour, and thus impact negatively 
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on participatory outcomes: ‘risky shift’, the ‘Abelene paradox’, ‘group think’ and ‘coercive 
persuasion’. ‘Risky shift’ refers to group dynamics emboldening people to take decisions they 
would not take individually. In the ‘Abilene paradox’, people tend to second-guess what others 
would want when the opposite is the case. ‘Group think’ refers to false consensus based on a 
form of esprit de corps that exaggerates the morality of the effort and generates self-censorship. 
‘Coercive persuasion’ is a form of brainwashing, the maligning of self-consciousness and ones 
world view (Parfitt, 2004; Cooke, 2001).  
 
Kapoor (2002) also finds Chambers’ articulation of power problematic in its dualisms. By 
establishing dualisms, ‘in which the first term is made primary and the second is beholden to it or 
ignored’ (Kapoor, 2002:112), power is inserted into the participatory rural appraisal, despite 
Chambers attempting to expunge its influence. The romanticisation of the local against 
centralisation, and of local knowledge over non-local, fundamentally ignores inherent problems 
such as patriarchy and other parochialisms. Moreover, participation may be a means of justifying 
surveillance hidden behind the facilitation of the empowerment agenda.  
 
To the extent that participation has these inherent problems (and many others not mentioned 
here), it is important to take cognisance of the observation below: 
 
Yet if it is too easy to celebrate ‘participation’ as the cure for social exclusion, it 
is similarly dangerous to dismiss it as ‘tyranny’. If this is true – if we can no 
longer rely on the dichotomy – we need a different basis from which to evaluate 
instances of (non)participation (Bühler, undated:16) 
 
3.3.3 Participation as Citizenship 
In this subsection I undertake to discuss the twin concepts of citizenship and participation. I use 
the term ‘twin’ to indicate their proximity not only in meaning but also in usage. It has almost 
become routine to link these terms, as in participatory citizenship, and citizenship participation. 
As Gaventa (2002:3) observes, a level of convergence of the concepts of participation and good 
governance have spawned ‘the concepts of citizenship participation, good governance and 
participatory citizenship’.  
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Note that Hickey and Mohan (2005:238) suggest that the pursuit of ‘participation as citizenship 
can provide the basis for a conceptual relocation of participation within a radical politics of 
development’ For them, situating participation within citizenship enables a broader range of 
issues at the heart of politics to be tackled, based on the status that citizenship confers:  
 
Relocating ‘participation’ within citizenship situates it in a broader range of 
sociopolitical practices, or expressions of agency, through which people extend 
their status and rights as members of particular political communities, thereby 
increasing their control over socioeconomic resources. (Hickey  Mohan, 
2005:253) 
 
The civic, republican tradition of citizenship, Hickey and Mohan (2005) argue, provides the 
clearest link between participation and citizenship. Within this tradition, citizenship entails a 
commitment to deliberating on issues affecting the community, and an equal commitment to 
taking action to secure them (Hill, 1994). While on the surface this tradition allows for bottom-
up articulation of citizenship from excluded groups such as women and the poor (Lister, 1997, in 
Hickey & Mohan, 2005), it downplays the structural impediments to such bottom-up efforts. 
Kofman (1995) asserts that citizenship is a result of intense struggles by oppressed groups, a 
point that is ably captured by Charles Tilly:  
 
State demands for resources and compliance generate bargaining, resistance, and 
settlements encapsulating both rights and obligations, as when popularly-elected 
parliaments gain power through their role in raising taxes for welfare. But 
segments of the subject population also acquire rights and obligations by 
mobilising to demand state agents’ intervention, reorganisation, or reallocation of 
state-controlled resources… [W]e commonly use names like taxation, 
conscription and regulation… for activities falling into the first category, 
reserving names like parties, pressure groups, and social movements for… the 
second category… (Tilly, 1997:601) 
 
In contrast, the liberal-individualistic tradition asserts that citizenship is a status, imbues rights of 
freedom from interference by others and the state to the individual, and allocates duties to the 
state, such as paying taxes and defending it (Hill, 1994; Kofman, 1995). Critics of the tradition 
focus on the narrowness of its reach – for example, Hickey and Mohan point out that it fails to 
account for the breadth of citizenship beyond formal legal obligations and entitlements, ignoring 
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processes for formulating and claiming of new rights, or the expansion and maintenance of 
current rights.  
 
Within the concept of citizenship has emerged yet another preoccupation of development 
theorists: active citizenship. ‘Active citizenship’ owes its ascendance, perhaps, to former British 
stalwarts Margaret Thatcher and Douglas Hurd. It was the latter who famously called for the free 
acceptance by individuals of voluntary obligations to the community of which they are members 
(Hill, 1994:19). It has been argued that such voluntarism accentuates aspects of materialistic 
individualism, such as the pull of positions of power and the ‘feel good’ effect it bestows on 
volunteers (MacKian, 1995). This is also the group to which Judith Shklar’s definition of 
democratic citizenship refers (cited in Hadenius, 2001:17): 
 
The good democratic citizen is a political agent who takes part regularly in 
politics… Active citizens keep informed and speak out against public measures that 
they regard as unjust… Although they do not refrain from pursuing their own and 
their reference group’s interests, they try to weigh the claims of other people 
impartially… They are public meeting-goers and joiners of voluntary 
organisations… 
 
‘Citizenship participation’ is therefore a strongly feel-good concept, which is easily hijacked by 
powerful elites bent on stirring patriotic fervour and emotion. Additionally, citizenship has been 
used to encourage voluntarism and regular participation as a replacement for regular 
employment. Yet ‘political citizenship’, a commitment to deliberate on issues affecting the 
community and an equal commitment to take action to secure them, as Hill (1994) advises, is the 
bedrock of democracy. 
 
3.4 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
[T]he most efficient forms of communities’ involvement… are definitely not the 
institutional participatory channels… The ward system, for instance, has proved 
inefficient, compared to marches, riots and lawsuits… (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008a:5) 
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I start my analysis with a less critical recent government Report on the Assessment of Public 
Participation Practices in the Public Service, authored by the Public Service Commission (PSC 
2008). The report describes methods through which government departments interact with their 
publics, including the following: izimbizo, citizen satisfaction surveys, ward committees, 
community development workers, integrated development planning forums, the Premier 
excellence awards, and media-related initiatives such as radio talk shows and television 
programmes. In the discussion below I focus on two forms of engagement from this list: izimbizo 
and the ward committees, which at a theoretical level at least (and certainly at the level of official 
rhetoric and academic interest) are two of the most visible institutional innovations of the post-
apartheid governance framework.  
 
As a formal participatory method, izimbizo refers to presidential, ministerial and mayoral 
meetings with citizens. Izimbizo (plural for imbizo) is a Zulu word referring to (traditional) 
community gatherings for engaging communities on pertinent issues under the auspices of a 
chief or elder. Twala (2008) states that such a practice is not unique to the Zulu people, but is 
widespread in African cultures; certainly (in South Africa) among the Sotho, Tswana and Pedi. 
Introduced in 2000, they have become the de facto participation method of choice for 
government departments. 
 
In this discussion, I define izimbizo as public meetings with communities held by political 
leadership at national, provincial and local levels – potentially including the president, ministers, 
premiers, members of executive councils (provincial ministers), mayors and councillors, 
accompanied by senior officials. The most visible form of imbizo, of course, is the Presidential 
imbizo, given the excitement that follows – and the power of the office of President, a point not 
lost on the citizenry. Although there is less focus on lower level izimbizo, for the reason given 
above I argue here that the mechanics of the processes are virtually indistinguishable, save for 
the level of power of the individuals involved.  
 
Izimbizo have clear utility for both government and citizens: the interactions between citizens 
and political principals allow both parties to exchange information and appreciation first-hand; 
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yet the semblance of unanimity generated could heighten expectations of quicker resolution of 
problems, and become the seed beds for future disharmony when such expectations are not 
matched by delivery. Although izimbizo are mostly meticulously planned (sometimes as 
proactive government public relations exercises), often reactive izimbizo are held in restive areas, 
to cool down tempers (PSC, 2008; Twala, 2008). 
 
The imbizo type of meeting has mainly been used by political leadership at national and 
provincial level; it often seems to be more of a public relations exercise than a genuine effort to 
solve problems. The same criticism has been levelled against the presidential hotline established 
by President Jacob Zuma, through which the public are ostensibly able to bypass the bureaucratic 
maze of government and reach the head of state directly. Moreover, given the virtual dominance 
of the ANC in government (local, provincial and national) – with the possible exception of the 
Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal – these izimbizo have often have been criticised for being 
ANC campaigns in disguise (Twala, 2008; Booysen, 2009). For Twala (2008:140), while at face 
value izimbizo promote interaction between the state and its citizens, the ANC also uses them ‘to 
popularise and give practical meaning to its long-held ideological positions.’ In addition, Twala 
(2008) notes, izimbizo more often than not degenerate into platforms for demands and complaints 
to government officials, often on well-known issues such as unemployment, housing, electricity, 
water supply and sanitation. Arguably, izimbizo are merely listening campaigns, to allow citizens 
to vent. 
 
At local government level – supposedly the level ‘closest to the people’ – a participatory 
democracy is centred (legislatively, at least) around the ward councillor, and to a lesser extent 
the integrated development planning (IDP) process. Ward committees are established in terms of 
the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 (RSA, 1998b), consisting of the ward councillor as the 
chairperson and up to ten other members representing the diversity of interests in the ward. The 
other members may be chosen based on either sectoral or geographical spread. Statutorily, the 
function of the ward committees is limited to giving advice to the councillor. Piper and Nadvi 
(2010:219) capture this handicap lucidly: 
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First, ward committees depend on their councillors to operate effectively. Hence, 
the ward councillor is responsible for how often the ward committee meets, what 
it discusses, what information ward committee members acquire, and what 
information the council obtains from the ward committees.  
 
This quote is indicative of the structural problem in the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 (RSA, 
1998b), i.e. its adding on of the ward committee as a peripheral rather than as an authentic body 
involved in actual decision-making processes at local level. The often-repeated recommendation 
about ward committees, therefore, is that they should be institutionalised, in order to enable 
unambiguous input into the decision-making of the municipal council. Moreover, since the ward 
councillor (a politician) is the chair of the ward committee, there is an inherent danger that he or 
she may co-opt political sympathisers into the ward committee, as documented by Piper and 
Nadvi (2010). As detailed below, such politicisation of ward committees can have profound 
effects on their visibility. 
 
A nationally representative survey in 2005 showed that only 43% of South Africans reported 
knowledge of ward committees. Some reasons for this emerge from Piper and Nadvi’s (2010) 
analysis of ward committees in Msunduzi and eThekwini municipalities (consisting largely of 
the cities of Pietermaritzburg and Durban, in KwaZulu-Natal). In historically black areas, ward 
committees draw on political party networks; in historically white areas, they draw on networks 
of rate-payers associations. These well-established residents associations have overshadowed 
ward committees in historically white communities. In predominantly black communities, ward 
committees have become extensions of the dominant political party, thus increasing their 
visibility.  
 
The above discussion of public participation in South Africa focused mainly on the two channels 
of participation: izimbizo and the ward committees. These two forms of engagement were 
selected because they potentially allow for wider engagement with citizens. I opened this 
discussion with a quotation that pointed to the inefficiencies of institutionalised participatory 
channels compared to marches, riots and lawsuits. While izimbizo have proved immensely 
popular, and allow for direct interfacing with high-level political leadership – so that the 
President and his cabinet, premiers and members of executive councils, as well as mayors, 
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councillors and bureaucrats can hear from and respond to issues raised by ordinary people – they 
have been criticised for being ‘talk shops’, for lacking in follow-up, and for potentially being 
abused to advance party agendas, among other criticisms. The most significant criticism of the 
ward committee system is levelled at the central role of the ward councillor in it. The ward 
committee is formed as an advisory body to the ward councillor who chairs it, and is the link 
between the committee and council; the ward councillor can decide on a whim what matters 
should reach council. The assertion below aptly sums up the state of public participation in South 
Africa: 
 
We can speak. There are more channels than ever to do so. But the language of 
technocratic liberal constitutionalism both enables and disables us. It enables us 
by making talking, listening and being heard a right in a democracy. But it 
disables us by telling us how, where and when we should speak and in what 
conceptual language we can speak if we want our sounds to be heard and 
comprehended and not reduced to noise lost in the south-easter and swept out to 
sea. ( Pillay, 2005:7, in Oldfield, 2008:487) 
 
 
3.5 STATE/CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA  
In light of the acrimonious anti-apartheid state/black civil society relations, the development of 
the post-apartheid state/civil society relationship has been the focus of intense study (e.g. 
Oldfield, 2008; Habib, 2005; Ballard et al, 2005; Miraftab & Wills, 2005; Zeurn, 2001; 
Greenstein, 2003; Mayekiso, 2003; Habib & Kotze, 2003; Johnson, 2002; Desai, 2002). Both 
Greenstein (2003) and Habib (2005) postulate that even though the evolving relationship 
between these erstwhile allies benefits from the ownership of the anti-apartheid struggle and 
enabling policy frameworks in the post-apartheid dispensation, the state has often resorted to the 
antics reminiscent of the old apartheid state to get its way. This bold claim of a reproduction of 
historical excesses associated with the apartheid state should worry even the most sanguine of 
ANC government supporters. The state’s response to social protests, for example – the majority 
organised within the ANC’s strongest constituencies – has not been any less harsh or oppressive: 
routine beatings, shootings, arrests, and tear gassings of non-violent demonstrators. 
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In the aftermath of the birth of democracy in 1994, It was inevitable that the role of various 
social movement formations was destined to shift, from subversion to patriotism. As time would 
tell, the complexity of these events lay not in the direction of change, but in its substance. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, the excruciating poverty and non-delivery of basic services, both urban 
townships and in rural South Africa, but especially in the former homelands, was a grim 
reminder to even the most optimistic of the challenges that lay ahead. Similarly, Ramphele 
(2010:9) observes that given the complexity of the problems in this historical legacy, ‘[n]o 
government, however committed, can ‘deliver services’ to a passive citizenry’. Civil society 
needed to respond to this material want in collaboration with (and as monitors of) the state.  
 
However, the monitoring role was fraught with many difficulties, key among these the state’s 
propensity to either co-opt or isolate social movements, in the case of those deemed to be allies 
or foes respectively (Habib, 2005). This tendency to pass judgment on critical social actors 
extends to the media, which Miraftab and Wills (2005) point out is particularly hostile to 
movements it labels ‘ultra left, free riders, radicals and renegades’. Those who participate in 
invited spaces become authentic. Thus, while collaboration leads to assimilation into the state 
agenda, militancy is vigorously opposed and curtailed by the state. Such is the relationship 
between erstwhile allies suddenly forced to turn on one another. In the words of one activist cited 
in Ballard (undated): ‘It’s like marching against your mother: stoning them, forsaking them, and 
decrying them.’  
 
Ballard (undated) argues that civil society opposition to the state from its erstwhile allies can be 
divided into two categories: (1) the counter-hegemonic struggle for the achievement of struggle 
ideals, and (2) responses to the manifestation of particular types of exclusion, marginality and 
poverty, mostly at local level, to achieve some form of relief. Booysen (2009) points out that in 
her research, as in Ballard et al (2006), protests are responses to types of exclusion rather than 
counter-hegemonic struggles.  
 
The epitome of the state/civil society relationship Johnson (2002) advocates is to be found in a 
1996 ANC discussion document titled The State and Social Transformation. This document was 
meant to convince the ANC alliance partners and the broader democratic movement of the 
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rationale behind the government’s economic policy. The authors envisage the state as a neutral 
referee, interested in the establishment of a stable democracy: 
 
To the extent that the democratic state is objectively interested in a stable 
democracy… it cannot avoid the responsibility to ensure the establishment of a 
social order concerned with the genuine interests of the people as a whole, 
regardless of the racial, national, gender and class differentiation. There can be no 
stable democracy unless the democratic state attends to the concerns of the people 
as a whole and takes responsibility for the evolution of a new society. (ANC, 1996) 
 
The democratic state described here is thus the only legitimate expression of the will of the 
people, other demands being only partial. The authors warn that workers’ struggles should be 
subordinate to the wider context of defence of the democratic state, lest they become counter-
revolutionary. The authors saw civil society as existing as a subordinate locus to the state, and 
warned against gullible acceptance of the notion of ‘less government’, propagated with the sole 
aim of weakening the democratic state: 
 
The democratic movement must resist the liberal concept of ‘less government’, 
which, while being presented as a philosophical approach towards the state in 
general, is in fact aimed specifically at weakening the democratic state. The purpose 
of this offensive is precisely to deny people the possibility to use the collective 
strength and the means concentrated in the democratic state to bring about 
transformation in the democratic society. (ANC, 1996) 
 
The new social movements use a mix of tactics in their confrontations with the state. On one 
hand they have opted for militant (and often illegal) methods such as illegal occupation of 
houses, illegal water reconnections and illegal protests. On the other they also use mainstream 
methods such as court action (e.g. the cases of the Treatment Action Campaign) to force 
concessions from government. The TAC has been able to change its tactics from adversarial to 
collaborative at different phases of its confrontation.  
 
The ability of social movements to use the courts is given weight by a Constitution (RSA, 1996) 
that enshrines political, civil and socio-economic rights. Greenstein (2003) argues that the 
constitutional framework of rights legitimises even illegal actions like illegal reconnections and 
illegal occupation; and furthermore, that it may actually be the best mechanism for contesting or 
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changing power in state/citizen relations, given that rights do not require the benevolence of the 
state. 
 
While ruthless state responses to civil society came to be expected of the apartheid government, 
the new state has often justified its responses on the grounds that action against the apartheid 
government was justified, but cannot be condoned in the democratic era. Ballard traces this 
resentment to: 
1) The ANC’s paternalistic tendency to view itself as the only legitimate representative of 
the people; 
2) Greenstein’s (2003) thesis of the ANC’s tendency towards centralism in tension with 
participatory expectations; 
3) Bond’s (2004) thesis that in targeting neoliberalism, social movements are fighting 
powerful vested interests.  
 
It is important to note that while the legislative machinery has been activist, making sweeping 
changes to the statute book, high employment and growing poverty continue to bedevil South 
Africa today as they did during apartheid. The existence of an enabling constitutional framework 
guaranteeing civil and socio-economic rights means that it is extra-difficult for the state to 
bulldoze its agenda over those of other parties. Thus, the media often becomes the battleground – 
the theatre in which widespread protests against government by different groups are played out, 
heated arguments are aired, and in which the state’s sometimes nonchalant (and even arrogant) 
response is argued. Yet this critical account of the state/civil society relationship would be 
incomplete without acknowledging that dialogue – however circumscribed – is occurring, which 
bodes well for the future of democracy in South Africa.  
 
Ramphele (2010) has argued that the quality of a democracy can be measured by the extent to 
which it defends the right of a multiplicity of voices to be heard, and capacity of the country’s 
citizens to control institutions of state for their own purposes; and warns of ‘gathering storm 
clouds on the horizon signalling that all is not well’ with the South African democracy and 
governance. I would add that the frequency of protests indicates that other channels are not 
functioning well. In Section 3.6 below I discuss the protest phenomenon in South Africa. 
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3.6 PROTEST POLITICS 
Dalton (2002:59) postulates that while historically, protests were seen as part of the ‘last 
desperate acts of the public’, usually the socially disadvantaged, repressed minorities, and other 
alienated groups, it has ‘become a regular form of political action.’ The events in Eastern Europe 
in 1989 and 1990, and those in the Middle East and North Africa in early 2011, show that protest 
can sometimes wield revolutionary potential. Western democracies have a long history of 
protest; the most celebrated being the French Revolution in the eighteenth century. In the United 
States, the civil rights demonstrations of the 1960s feature among the some of the major protests 
that have characterised the history of that country. Dalton concludes that the history of western 
democracies has always been punctuated by what he says are “repeated episodes of protest and 
vigorous political dissent” (Dalton 2002:59), a record, he argues, that persists to this day.  
 
In Africa, mobilisation in the twentieth century consisted largely of efforts directed at 
reconfiguration of the state from the colonial hegemony (Taylor, 1997). Overcoming the 
underdevelopment of the oppressed African people and the establishment of a just society based 
on equal citizenship were additional demands that cut across different African states during the 
period of decolonisation. However, Mamdani (1996) points out that failing the detribalisation of 
rural power, de-racialisation could not lead to democracy. He points out that civil society in 
African countries is largely a post-independence phenomenon; except in South Africa, where it 
was both a cause and a consequence of deracialisation.  
  
3.6.1 Theories of Protest Politics  
The literature on protests can largely be divided into two central approaches: the relative 
deprivation approach, and the resource mobilisation approach. Though both of these theories 
have held sway at different times, and many of the proponents of each have gone to great lengths 
to champion their choice as superior to the other, it is important to state at the outset that they are 
not contradictory but complementary, an approach I have adopted throughout this study. 
 
The deprivations approach holds that protest is a result of marginalisation, dissatisfaction with 
existing conditions, and deficiency of societal initiatives to address such grievances. Classical 
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theorists (notably Aristotle, Tocqueville and Marx) stated that anger at material conditions and 
resultant aspirations for a better life by the underclass are the ultimate source of revolt. They 
argued that contradictions between social classes were a historical truth, and inevitable. Marx 
defined collective action as an outcome of social structure rather than individual choice. 
 
Psychology literature posits that frustration leads to aggression. Seminal here is the work of Ted 
Robert Gurr, who theorised that the actualisation of political violence is preceded by the 
politicisation of discontent stemming from the emergence of discontent. Opp (1988) envisions 
that grievances may arise out of critical incidents, after which there will be a sharp increase in 
the level of grievances. In a study on the opposition of the construction of a nuclear power plant 
in Hamburg in Germany, Opp (1988) held that frustration could be a cause for legal forms of 
social movement participation, refuting the widely-held assertion that frustration leads to 
aggression.  
 
Herson and Bolland (1998:167) ask if violence constitutes a method of participation, or if “it is 
the action of hoodlums and hooligans who shoot, loot, and burn for strictly non-political 
motives?”. They present two arguments. On one hand they suggest that violence may be 
stimulating and exciting for the underclass; and on the other hand, that violence is the response 
of a tiny group (1-2%) of “riff-raff”; unattached youth, people with criminal records, and 
migrants disenchanted with city life. Rejecting both arguments above as failing to explain violent 
protest in America, instead they go with more universally-identified societal causes such as 
unemployment and racial discrimination. They note that the typical rioter did not fit the riff-raff 
description. They conclude that violence is a way of venting frustration, but has unpredictable 
outcomes as it sometimes attracts a backlash. Given these results, they argue that violence is 
likely to be spontaneous rather than part of a political strategy. 
 
The fact of non-occurrence of protests in some instances, despite profusion of grievances, led to 
the development of an alternative theory: the resource mobilisation theory (Opp, 1988; see also 
McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Klandermans, 1984). Although conventional wisdom dictates that 
grievances and affinity to a movement’s ideology culminate in collective action, in practice, 
grievances are often held for long periods of time without any collective action erupting. The 
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primary contribution of resource mobilisation theorists, most notably McCarthy & Zald (1977) 
and Tilly (1975) was their postulation that social mobilisation is dependent on the availability of 
material, and intellectual and organisational resources – all of which are embedded in networks.  
 
Over and above the existence of grievances, what is needed therefore is for those who hold 
grievances to be recruited and mobilised. Contact with a recruiting agent has been identified as 
this missing link (McAdam, 1986; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). However, the exact 
mechanism that links collective action and social networks is not clearly understood (McAdam, 
2003, cited in Tindall, 2006). Tindall (2006) notes that the following long list of factors has been 
identified in the literature as being important: (1) communication, (2) recruitment appeals, (3) 
identification, (4) social influence, (5) incentives and sanctions, (6) social support, (7) 
socialisation, (8) knowledge and information, (9) personal efficacy, (10) norms, (11) subjective 
interest, (12) beliefs about others’ willingness to contribute, and (13) trust. McAdam (1986) 
found the key drivers of mobilisation to be the media, the alignment of the individual to the 
movement’s values, and the development of ties with other activists. Similarly, Schusman and 
Soule (2005:1098) found that individuals belonging to many organisations are more likely to get 
involved in protest action.  
 
3.6.2 Protest Politics in South Africa  
Protest politics in South Africa has a long history, and has been deployed in different ways in 
different historical moments. Understandably, protests were an important vehicle during the fight 
against apartheid; but protest has re-emerged as a key form of action in the post-apartheid 
dispensation. The majority of these protests, so-called ‘service delivery’ protests, are reported to 
emanate from dissatisfaction with municipal service delivery, and problems relating to a lack of 
communication between council and councillors on one hand, and citizens on the other. 
Nonetheless, there has been a significant transformation of the state and local government in 
South Africa since 1994: de-racialisation, an overhaul of municipal governance, democratisation 
of national and local governance, and concerted efforts at infrastructure delivery in previously 
neglected areas (Atkinson, 2006). Protest formed the centrepiece of anti-apartheid resistance.  
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For a ‘Rip van Winkel’ who had fallen asleep in 1988 and awoken in 2005, it 
might appear as if the ‘rolling mass action’ of the end-of-apartheid period had 
simply continued into the dawn of democratic government in South Africa. 
Furthermore, in many cases, government responses to such protests have been 
uncompromising and inscrutable as those of the National Party of old. (Atkinson, 
2006:53) 
 
South African literature is replete with the characterisation of the grievances leading to the 
development of the waves of protest experienced since 2004. Broadly, the key hypotheses that 
have been proffered include (i) the service delivery hypothesis, (ii) the governance and 
accountability failures hypothesis, (iii) an anti-globalisation/anti-GEAR agenda, and (iv) the 
unfinished business of liberation. 
 
Before I expand on these issues, I should make the comment that by concentrating on the 
grievances, this literature perhaps denies students of social movements the possibility of debating 
the validity of the resource mobilisation theory in the South African perspective. Tapscott’s 
(2010) work on the two Cape Town communities of Langa and Green Point, however, is an 
exception. He shows that the well-resourced community of Green Point is able to extract 
considerable concessions from the state, whereas the concerns of the less-resourced community 
were more easily subverted. Seemingly, the major difference between the two groups was that 
the Green Point group used its members’ superior financial and educational attainments to 
marshal whatever information was necessary to build a strong legal case for their cause, while 
the Langa group was more easily sidestepped.  
 
My summation of the South African literature yields four primary hypothesis that explain protest 
action, which I repeat here for emphasis: i) the service delivery failure hypothesis, (ii) the 
governance and accountability failures hypothesis, (iii) elite proxy wars and (iv) an anti-
globalisation/anti-GEAR agenda. I present a summary of each of these grievances below: 
 
 Service delivery failure 
A large proportion of the post-2004 protests have related to service delivery failure, or at least 
fronted the issue as the core grievance. Almost repetitively, housing, water services, sanitation, 
and electricity have been cited as the source of anger, in many different communities. And 
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although the grievance is often couched in terms of non-existent or slow service delivery, 
sometimes the issues pertain to the allocation of such delivery, as in the case of the N2 Gateway 
Housing Project discussed above (Tapscott, 2010), and sometimes to the shoddy quality of 
‘delivered’ infrastructure (Botes et al, 2007), to mention but a few of the dimensions of service 
delivery failure. In protests in BT section of Site C and QQ section of Site B, which are informal 
settlements in Khayelitsha located on a road reserve and land owned by the power utility 
ESKOM respectively, the residents complained they did not have houses, toilets, or water; but 
their demand was to be moved to an area with secure tenure, even if no houses were immediately 
built for them (Author’s personal notes 2007).  
 
One of the biggest dilemmas thrown up by the service delivery failure hypothesis is that since 
1994, government has put considerable effort into alleviating the conditions of the poor, both 
urban and rural. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the government has provided access to clean water 
to 18.7 million more people, access to sanitation, provided 3.1 million housing subsidies, and 
completed 2.3 million housing units (ANC, 2009). These statistics underscore the level of 
commitment from government to improving the living conditions of the poor; thus, the 
manifestations of poverty and marginality cannot realistically be ascribed to the lack of 
commitment and delivery, as Thompson and Nleya (2010) observe. In fact, as pointed out by 
myself in Chapter 1 and by several others, notably Atkinson (2006) and Terreblanche (2002), the 
sheer scale of the task at hand is daunting. The service delivery hypothesis can be understood as 
part of an agglomeration of socio-economic problems that afflict the poor in South Africa which 
include poverty, unemployment, inequality and perceived marginalisation.  According to Holdt 
et al (2011) addressing service delivery issues in isolation from the other factors is unlikely to 
reduce protests.  
 
  governance and accountability failures hypothesis 
Atkinson (2006) she posits that the breakdown of the interface between citizens and municipality 
is the single most visible cause of municipal unrest; the problem is not so much in the delivery of 
infrastructure, but in the failure of formal public participation channels to promote interaction 
between those holding the levers of power and the governed. Steven Friedman, a respected 
academic and commentator writing in Business Day Online, laments the over-emphasis of 
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delivery over democratic participation, and makes a striking hypothesis: ‘Township citizens are 
protesting not because they want “service delivery”, but because they want to escape it’. Further 
on, he continues: 
 
[I]n a democracy, the government’s job is not to “deliver” to citizens. It is, rather, 
to listen to them, to do what the majority asks, if that is possible, and, where it is 
not, to work with citizens to ensure that what is done is as close to what they want 
as it can be. It stems from the core democratic idea that government works for 
citizens and that it cannot do this unless it listens to them. 
 
The complexity of public participation in South Africa has been discussed already in Section 
3.2.4 above, while the domain of state/civil society interaction is discussed below in Section 3.4, 
both of which show that although the requisite institutions have been put in place, the actual 
practice of public participation has left the citizen alienated from the state: locally, provincially 
and nationally.  
 
 Elite proxy wars 
Holdt (2011) argues that argues that many protests in South Africa  relate to contestations 
between leadership in the different communities with ‘diverse motivations , with some regarding 
protest as a opportunity to oust their opponents’ and to  ‘reconfigure power relations in the ANC 
so as to gain, regain, positions of power and access to lucrative council business, while others 
appeared to be genuinely concerned to struggle  against corruption and incompetence’ Powerful 
positions  carry with them the  basis to move to higher classes through higher salaries,  a central 
role in patronage networks and power to distribute opportunities. Thus while residents emotions 
are whipped up and mobilised to protest against issues such as service delivery grievances the 
leadership is pursuing a different agenda. Since many of these battles are played out as side 
battles within the ANC, within which most of the protest leaders are drawn, many of the protest 
battles soon fizzle out given the far reaching legitimacy which the ANC enjoys. The ANC, thus 
Holdt argues is simultaneously able to present itself a pressure group that represents the poor in 
battles against the state and as the flag-bearer of the legacy against apartheid.  
 
 Anti-globalisation/ anti-GEAR agenda 
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The incorporation of neoliberal ideology as the core articulation of the ANC government has 
received considerable critical engagement (e.g. Bond 1999; 2000a; 2000b; 2003; Marais, 2001; 
Habib & Padayachee, 2000; Padayachee, 1998; Davies, 2003; Peet, 2002; Macozoma, 2003; 
Mhone, 2003). In Chapter 2, I sketched some of these arguments. One key observation is the 
divisive nature of neoliberal ideology within the ANC tripartite alliance, much of which 
originates from the adoption of GEAR in 1996. Although the RDP had its own macroeconomic 
flaws reflective of the compromises of the ANC (Bond, 2003) the adoption of GEAR installed 
neoliberal rationalities into every facet of life, for example the prepaid water meter (recently 
judged by the Constitutional Court to be perfectly legal) and the prepaid electricity meter.  
 
Since 1994, the ANC has not always articulated a clear ideological position; a point often unduly 
attributed to President Zuma’s multiple and often rival policy positions. As an organisation, the 
ANC has failed to give expression to its guiding policy frameworks, the Freedom Charter and the 
RDP. The ANC’s response to such criticism is that it is a multi-class party and thus cannot 
articulate ideological positions without upsetting the delicate internal balance and its alliance 
partners as President Zuma stated in 2007: 
  
The ANC despite being a multi-class organisation, must still retain that element which 
has made it appealing to the majority of our people, namely, the radical element, the 
element of addressing some, not all of the aspirations of the working class (Zuma, 2007). 
 
Moreover, many external players, the World Bank and IMF in particular, probably hold more 
sway in the government’s macro-economic policies than the ANC would readily admit (Bond, 
2000a; 2000b; 2003; Marais, 2001; Habib & Padayachee, 2000; Padayachee, 1998; Peet, 2002; 
Mhone, 2003). The extent of the poverty in rural (former homeland) South Africa, and urban 
townships (plagued as they are by the need for employment, housing, water, sanitation, 
electricity and better education, to mention but a few) sits uncomfortably with anti-apartheid 
struggle ideals and election campaign promises for a better life.  
 
Moreover, the increasing rumblings within the tripartite alliance of the ANC, the SACP and 
COSATU mean that the ANC’s partners (both located to its left, ideologically) mean that these 
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two may no longer be willing to shore up the ANC when the poor ask for answers. For example, 
COSATU’s General Secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi, has stated that the ANC ‘want us to be a 
lapdog. They say you can make noise during the election campaigns, and now they say keep 
quiet (Marrian, 2010). This is an indication of COSATU’s insistence that as an independent 
organisation it is entitled to hold its own views, informed by its own constituency, regardless of 
what the ANC says. It is significant to note that the ‘crossed-out’ RDP policy was a COSATU 
brainchild (Maree, 1998). 
 
The three condensed hypotheses of service delivery indicate that the grievance structure 
underpinning the current protest action is very complex. These grievances do not operate at the 
same level, but in multiple platforms, whose product is the confinement of the majority of South 
Africans to acute poverty. The much-celebrated service delivery achievements of the ANC 
government (ANC, 2009), governance innovations (PSC, 2008) and the vaunted longest 
uninterrupted growth in South Africa since the 1960s (AfDB/OECD, 2007; O'Flaherty, 2009) all 
failed to appease the increasingly restive South African publics. While all this was happening, 
people took to the streets to demand better service delivery, more inclusive participation, and a 
human macro-economic framework.  
 
3.6 TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN KHAYELITSHA  
In this chapter I have discussed the complexity of citizen participation, both in South Africa and 
abroad. To summarise, it is clear from the debates in the literature that citizen participation now 
occupies a central place in understanding democracy and its link to development, especially in 
contexts such as that of Khayelitsha. According to its proponents, it is a vehicle by which 
citizens can begin to take charge of the governance of their everyday lives; and thus, can be 
viewed as both an enabler of such contribution, but also as an end in it. However, as I have 
shown, participation can be a disempowering exercise when powerful actors use it to dress up 
decisions that have already been made.  
 
In South Africa, after 1994, a number of participatory channels were created to allow hitherto  
excluded black population to play a more meaningful role in matters of governance. This 
opening up of participatory spaces coincided with the euphoria that accompanied the advent of 
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democracy. That euphoria was short-lived, when the poor – by and large, formerly disfranchised 
black South Africans – realised that democracy had not changed their lives in the material sense; 
in fact, expectations of better lives had heightened after that. The institutionalised spaces of 
participation – the invited spaces – were not giving the citizens the voice they wanted. 
Increasingly, citizens became distrustful of election promises regarding service delivery – and 
the construction of houses, electrification, water supply and sanitation (among others) were at the 
top of the agenda. 
 
Thus, while government izimbizo, ward committees, community development workers, and 
integrated development planning (among other initiatives) were designed to bring about an 
improved state/citizen interface, communities came to realise that these efforts were not 
increasing their voice, but merely giving government organs the legitimacy they needed for their 
plans, designed by professionals and bureaucrats. From at least after the 2004 general elections, 
convincingly won by the ANC, protests have become a commonplace; much to the annoyance of 
the governing elites – who, the protestors charge, are deaf to the plight of the poor and routinely 
ignore them. 
 
The above schema fits well into the hazardous scenario of reliance on invited spaces for 
participation. Like most other formal participation channels, invited spaces are predisposed to 
manipulation at the whim of those in their charge. Moreover, they are prone to being used to 
authenticate decisions made by the elites. However, citizens soon learn what methods are useful 
to advance their causes; they will bypass such channels of participation, and use channels they 
know will attract the ear of the authorities. Bracking (2005) alludes to what she terms the 
‘politics of everyday life’, in which the poor contest issues of morality and materiality through 
often spontaneous interruptions after long periods of endurance and latent mobilisation. 
Predictably, such participation often takes those in power by surprise:  
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[T]he poor express agency through informal self-organisation, religious 
organisations, clientelism, populism, authoritarianism, insurrection, criminality, and 
war… Then, while the poor are performing live, unnoticed, at another venue, they 
are identified as “failing” to act in accordance with a script which expects them to 
“join in” the structures of the relatively privileged (feeding elite prejudice that the 
poor are “not trying enough”). The result is an unrealistic, judgemental, and 
ultimately disempowering expectation of how the poor should behave. (Bracking, 
2005)  
 
As already indicated, protest by the poor receives attention from government largely because it is 
played out in the theatre of the media, where the role of the media undergoes a metamorphosis, 
and becomes the lifeblood of these protest. More importantly, protests allow citizens to redefine 
the how, where, and when to speak and in what conceptual language’ (Pillay, 2005:7, in Oldfield 
2008:487).  
 
In proceeding with the rest of the study, and aware of the complexities of participation in South 
Africa, I deliberately concentrate on two forms of participation – protests and public meetings. 
The choice of the term ‘public meetings’ is pertinent. Borrowing from McComas et al 
(2006:673), public meetings may be defined as organised social gatherings with three or more 
people in attendance, and open to anyone to attend. They observe that public meetings can serve 
many purposes, formal and informal, and may be organised by government bodies, religious 
organisations, citizen groups, neighbourhood organisations, or anyone else. This definition of 
public meetings is relatively commonplace. However, it masks the methodological difference 
between formal and informal meetings, and between invited spaces and created spaces. But I am 
less interested in such heterogeneity within each category of participation than in the differences 
between the two categories – meetings and protests. In creating this dichotomy, I am aware of 
the lurking danger of privileging one of the two forms of participation, in much the same way as 
Chambers’ (1997) characterisation of power relationships, for example male/female, old/young , 
teacher/student, and urban/rural.  
 
In Chapter 2, I discussed the fact that the multi-faceted transition negotiations produced a diluted 
version of struggle outcomes – perhaps even legitimising the legacy of apartheid, as Sachs 
(1992) had feared. In light of the material presented in the current chapter, it is logical to 
conclude that the reconfiguration of this perversion of the anti-apartheid struggle, especially in 
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the transition settlement, and the resultant predilection with a neoliberal agenda epitomised by 
the adoption of GEAR, is a fundamental grievance among the poor. To some extent, even the 
Constitutional Court’s decisions seem to buttress the neoliberal state’s agenda; for example, in 
the declaration by the Constitutional Court that prepaid water meters were legal, despite 
provisions in the Constitution for a right to water.  
 
In Chapter 4, I turn to the survey data on service delivery in Khayelitsha. Service delivery, 
including that of water services, is mostly determined by the type of dwelling in which a 
respondent lives, and there are two broad categories of dwelling: formal and informal. Two 
conclusions can be deduced from the data presented in the chapter: the spatial dichotomy 
between informal and formal housing, and the high correlation between different services: type 
of housing, water supply, sanitation, electricity, and storm water drainage. The strong correlation 
between type of dwelling and quantity and quality of service delivery on one hand, and levels of 
service delivery satisfaction on the other, is largely comprehensible. 
 
 
 
 
 84 
C h a p t e r  4  
GEOGRAPHY OF EXCLUSION: WATER SERVICE DELIVERY IN KHAYELITSHA  
To say that everyone needs access to water and sanitation is not enough. No one can live without 
drinking water and defecating, so in a sense 100% of the population has some form of access. 
(Satterthwaite & McGranahan, 2007:28) 
Too often, services fail the poor people – in access, in quantity, in quality. But the fact that there 
are strong examples where services do work means governments and citizens can do better. 
(World Bank, 2003) 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
While the previous chapters have served to contextualise the study and provide a theoretical 
framework, this chapter and Chapters 5 and 6 consider the empirical findings of the study. The 
main aim of the study can be stated as follows: to investigate the linkage between service 
delivery and participation strategies. Such a linkage, if it exists, requires a meticulous 
understanding of the character of service delivery (explored in this chapter) and how awareness 
of service realities impacts on perceptions. In Chapter 5 I explore the relationship between 
service delivery and participation, focusing on the underlying factor of participation. I also point 
to the utility of non-payment for services, as a negotiation strategy for improved services, and as 
feedback for dissatisfaction with services delivered by the municipality. Ultimately, my aim is to 
show how different levels of satisfaction feed into certain forms of citizen action, individual and 
collective. Khayelitsha has a complex mosaic of types of service delivery, ideally suited for 
understanding linkages with participation.  
 
It is imperative to reiterate the importance of service delivery as a vehicle for the improvement of 
human well-being. It has increasingly been concluded that improvements in access to services 
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feed directly into human development
29
 and welfare (Sen, 1982; 1999; Stiglitz, 2006; World 
Bank, 2003; UNDP, 1990; 2004; 2006). The 2004 World Development Report subtitled ‘Making 
Services Work for Poor People’ (World Bank, 2003) asserts that arresting service failures and 
making services work for the poor is essential for the poor to escape the scourge of poverty and 
explains that putting poor people at the centre of service provision is central to arresting such 
service failures. 
 
There have been important changes in the development debate in the past 20 years. For example, 
it is increasingly been acknowledged that improvements in income and economic growth alone 
cannot by themselves lead to achievement of poverty reduction, which has grown the impetus for 
increased financing, provision and regulation of services, especially water supplies, sanitation, 
health and education.
30
 Water supplies and sanitation are increasingly viewed as the focal point 
of human development (UNDP, 2006; Salman & McInerney-Lankford, 2004). The 2006 Human 
Development Report declares that ‘[t]hroughout history human progress has depended on access 
to clean water and on the ability of societies to harness the potential of water as a productive 
resource’ (UNDP, 2006:v). The report continues, saying the world faces a ‘crisis’ with the 
potential to derail progress towards attainment of poverty targets in the Millennium Development 
Goals, traceable to unequal power relationships and flawed water management regimes.  
 
In South Africa, service delivery is more than a development and anti-poverty policy. It is a 
means of redress for black people stripped of livelihood and assets and denied any means of 
accumulation under successive colonial and apartheid governments
31
 (Carter & May, 2001).  
For example, well before apartheid, the Natives Land Act of 1913 confined what was then two-
thirds of the population to eking out a living on a mere 7% of the country (Reed, 2003), creating 
                                                 
29According to the UNDP ‘[h]uman development is a process of enlarging people's choices. The most critical ones are to lead a 
long and healthy life, to be educated and to enjoy a decent standard of living. Additional choices include political freedom, 
guaranteed human rights and self respect… (UNDP, 1990). Consequently, ‘[h]uman development is first and foremost about 
allowing .people to lead a life that they value and enabling them to realize their potential as human beings’ (UNDP, 2006:v). 
The Human Development Reports are based on the capabilities approach, a conceptual framework provided by Amartya Sen 
(Fukuda-Parr, 2003).   
30 Joseph Stiglitz points out that ‘GDP is a handy measure of economic growth, but it is not the be-all and end-all of development… 
Still, because GDP is relatively easy to measure, it has become a fixation of economists… growth has often been accompanied by 
increased poverty and sometimes even lower income for individuals in the middle’ (Stiglitz, 2006:45). 
31 Legassick (1995) and Wolpe (1995) both argue that apartheid did not represent a new policy but a tightening of instruments 
developed under the preceding segregation period.  
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conditions for the brutal destruction of African political economy, to cement earlier military 
conquests. Arising from these conditions were different forms of coerced migrant labour, which 
while forming the mainstay of the mines and the urban economy, denied Africans residence in 
‘white’ urban South Africa. In most of the urban centres, moreover, Africans were denied access 
to the most basic of services, in a vain attempt to control the mix of the urban population and 
(more successfully) to extract the surplus from the black community. For the most part, the 
South African economy since the end of the 19
th
 century was, and arguably still is, a form of 
‘colonial and racial capitalism’ based on: 
 
unfree black labour, systematic exploitation of blacks, and the marginalisation of 
the majority of blacks as an impoverished proletariat without property, proper 
employment opportunities, social support systems, and a reasonable chance to 
break out of the vicious cycle of poverty and backwardness (Terreblanche, 
2002:57)  
 
According to Wolpe (1995), capital was/is able to pay the worker below the cost of his 
reproduction’ based on the assumption that the black African worker’s family is partially 
supported through rural agricultural output. Although this racial, structural crisis was identified 
in the RDP as a key problem of the South African economy, such fundamental restructuring has 
received marginal attention
32
 in post-apartheid economic policy, which focuses instead on neo-
liberalising the economy within the dominant Washington consensus, as discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 2. As an election manifesto (and later, ill-fated government policy) the RDP 
first and foremost sought to deal decisively with this racially variegated service delivery mix:  
 
The first priority is to begin to meet the basic needs of people – jobs, land, housing, 
water, electricity, telecommunications, transport, a clean and healthy environment, 
nutrition, health care and social welfare. (RDP, 1994: s1.4.2) 
                                                 
32 One of the ways that government has sought to equalise opportunities between the race groups, has been through the various 
affirmative action (AA) policies, such as employment equity (EE) and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). However, these 
policies have been criticised as reverse racism for failing to articulate specifically the time periods when such policies will be 
implemented. In case of BEE one of the criticisms often is about the thresholds after which a black person can no longer be 
considered marginalised, a concern expressed as a result of BEE deals often concluded by what has become known by the 
euphemism of ‘the usual suspects’, largely aligned to the ruling ANC (or its offshoot, COPE). The debates by and large seem to be 
about keeping privilege rather than the under classes accessing a share of the resources 
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This discussion has underlined the importance attached to the provision of water services in 
enhancing development and fighting poverty, both at global and at national level. Since no-one can 
live without drinking water, theoretically there is already 100% access as stated in this chapter’s 
opening quote ( Sattertwaite & McGranahan, 2007:28); thus, it is inadequate to speak only of 
access, and important also to highlight the attributes of such access: safety, affordability and 
accessibility.  
 
The rest of the chapter is divided up as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the question of measuring 
water service delivery, which as has already been indicated, pertains to water supplies and 
sanitation. I identify three key measures of service delivery: access, quantity, and quality; and 
grapple with some of the definitional intricacies of measurement. Access and quantity lend 
themselves to ‘objective’ measurement while quality requires a degree of subjectivity. Section 
4.3 presents patterns from the census data to highlight the relationship between service delivery, 
socio-economic circumstances and space – one which effectively spell out whether residents live 
in formal brick housing or in informal settlements. Section 4.4 presents the service delivery 
statistics of the areas surveyed in the study. Section 4.5 discusses the issue of paying for water 
services, and provides data from the survey on how residents of the different areas view the issue 
of commercialisation of water services. Section 4.6 compares service delivery in Khayelitsha and 
in the rest of Cape Town, in order to clarify the relative position of the former. Section 4.7 deals 
with how the City of Cape Town is dealing with the backlogs faced by residents of Khayelitsha 
and other similarly-placed areas. 
 
4.2 MEASURING WATER SERVICES DELIVERY 
Measuring service delivery involves deconstructing delivery into measurable components that 
capture the underlying tendencies, of which three key measures are identifiable: access, quantity, 
and quality. These three measures of service delivery are not as straightforward as they initially 
seem. By way of example, the Strategic Framework of Water Services (RSA, 2003a) provides 
the following definition for a basic water supply service which is generally used in official 
statistics to define access: 
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A basic water supply facility is infrastructure necessary to supply 25 litres of 
potable water per person per day, supplied within 200 metres of a household and 
with a minimum flow of 10 litres per minute (in case of communal water points) or 
6000 litres of potable water supplied per formal connection metered per month (in 
case of yard or house connections). (RSA, 2003a:45) 
 
A basic sanitation facility is the infrastructure necessary to provide a sanitation 
service that is safe, reliable, private, protected from the weather, ventilated, keeps 
smells to the minimum, is easy to keep clean, minimises the risk of the spread of 
sanitation-related diseases by facilitating the appropriate control of disease-carrying 
flies and pests, and enables safe and appropriate treatment and/or removal of human 
waste and waste water in an environmentally sound manner. (RSA, 2003a:45) 
 
The two definitions above regarding basic facilities form the minimum standard of service 
delivery which water service authorities should strive to provide to all citizens, together with 
higher levels of service in the ladder. The Strategic Framework continues by saying these 
definitions are temporary, and ‘will be revised upwards once greater progress has been made in 
addressing the backlog in water services provision…’(RSA 2003) Table 1 below shows the 
ladder of water supply sources from the lowest (least favoured) to the highest (most favoured) 
sources.  
 
Figure 4.1 Ladder of water supply options 
 
 
Communal Unimproved Facilities 
Communal stand pipes 
Yard taps 
Internal taps 
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It is conceivable (and indeed, empirically proven) that quantity of water consumed is a function 
of type of water source and (especially) distance to water point (Horward & Batram, 2003; 
Kennedy, 2006) . Figure 4.2 below shows that water consumption plateaus at about 15 litres per 
person per day, between collection times of 5 minutes and about 40 minutes. Collection times of 
lower than 3 minutes are associated with higher levels of consumption, while for collection times 
of over 40 minutes, water consumption declines significantly. 
Figure 4.2 Water Consumption and Collection Time 
 Adapted from Horward & Batram, 2003:17; and Kennedy, 2006  
The City of Cape Town, for example, provides for the downgrading of a water source to 
‘communal water facilities’ as a measure of restricting water usage for non-payers. 
Access and quantity lend themselves to ‘objective’ measurement, while quality requires a degree 
of ‘subjectivity’. The following presentation of service delivery data relates to access and 
perceived quality of services. Evaluating nominal access to services is essential for capturing the 
efficiency of conversion of monetary investments into infrastructure, yet it fails to ascertain 
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notions of satisfaction – the perceptions of service quality – which invariably fluctuate due to 
psychological, contextual and other subjective factors. Feedback from citizens, if tapped into, 
provides an effective method of evaluating the quality of urban services, which leads to greater 
accountability (Deichman & Lall, 2007; Heikkila & Isett, 2007).  
An important component of ‘making services work for poor people’ is accelerating spending on 
public services, in this case investments in water supply and sanitation infrastructure. Typically, 
however, the bulk of such spending accrues to the non-poor, with the poor suffering the lack of 
access to such services. An evaluation of the proportion of budget spent on water supplies and 
sanitation should also provide an indication of what commitment there is to making the services 
work for the poor. It would be crucial to revealing the split between poor and non-poor, 
especially in the light of skewed access figures. South Africa’s commitments to accelerating 
service delivery provide an example which, if successful, could become an international 
benchmark for best practice.  
 
It is estimated that informal settlements house between 40 and 60% of the urban population 
(Dixon & Ramutsindela, 2006). Tracking budget commitments thus also provides yet another 
practical method of gauging service delivery, which is adopted in this chapter. A key theme of 
the chapter – as suggested by the title – is the spatial connection pattern between different 
services, on one hand, and services and socio-economic variables such as employment and 
educational attainment, on the other.  
 
Section 4.3 presents patterns from the census data that describe the relationship between service 
delivery, socio-economic circumstances and space; one which effectively distinguishes between 
residents’ formal brick housing and informal settlements.  
 
4.3 SERVICE DELIVERY: SPATIAL PATTERNS FROM CENSUS DATA 
In the City of Cape Town area, approximately 44% of households (1.4 million people) live in 
inadequate housing and depressed physical environments, which are havens of poverty, 
unemployment, illiteracy, low health status, crime and other social ills (CCT, 2008a). Although 
the city’s economy has experienced increasing growth rates, its pattern of growth continues to 
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mirror the spatial segregation inherited from apartheid, as a result of increasing population in 
informal settlements, and increasing housing backlogs, unemployment and poverty, among other 
factors. For example, the number of dwellings in informal settlements increased from 23 000 in 
1993 to 117 000 in 2007, a situation that has compounded the challenge of reducing backlogs. 
The city (CCT, 2008b) argues that this is in fact the result of reactive and uncoordinated public 
investment in infrastructure, tracking rapid population growth and economic activity in the city.  
 
For Khayelitsha, the results of the 2001 census reveal a bifurcated picture of service delivery and 
socio-economic circumstances. Even though the study concentrated on water service delivery, 
linkages with related services such as housing, electricity, and stormwater were explored, and 
receive further consideration in Section 5.4. From the analysis of the 2001 census it was clear 
that type of housing was the principal determinant for other services. Figure 4.3 below shows a 
map of Khayelitsha, highlighting location and concentration of informal settlements. Informality 
is largely concentrated in Site C, Site B (T1V4), T1V3, Harare, T3V3 and T3V5. Although by no 
means always the case, a similar spatial distinction permeates the delivery of all services: a lack 
of services is associated with areas lacking formal housing. Mapping access to services is 
absolutely key in developing effective strategies for improving service delivery. An 
understanding of the spatial aspects of livelihood opportunities and provision of services is 
particularly important in a country in which spatial segregation was once a deliberate policy.  
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Figure 4.3 Informal Dwellings in Khayelitsha 
 
 
 
The spatial relationship between water supplies and sanitation delivery identified in the 2001 
census has remained largely unchanged, and follows the same pattern as the informality 
indicated in the map above. It is worthwhile to note that the relationship between the two is 
technical, as formal housing is almost always supplied with reticulated water supply and 
sanitation, while informal settlement services are only provided post-inception.  
 
The analysis of census data (CCT, 2005) shows close correlation between service delivery data 
for Khayelitsha and the socio-economic circumstances of the residents. Formal settlements enjoy 
higher levels of socio-economic well-being, compared to informal areas. Similarly, 
unemployment figures peak in the informal settlements, with formal settlements showing lower 
incidences. Against this backdrop, data from the survey carried out in 2007 should reflect 
changes that have occurred in the interim period. Moreover, the data gives further information to 
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supplement the infrastructural assessment; that is, perceptions of the level of satisfaction with 
delivery.  
 
4.4 SERVICE DELIVERY IN KHAYELITSHA – DELIVERY STATISTICS  
While the maps above show data for the whole of Khayelitsha, the survey data presented here 
reflects interviews carried out in five specific sections of Khayelitsha (refer to map of study area 
in Chapter 1). One of the main goals of doing the survey in the selected areas was to capture the 
broad spatial disparities that exist in service delivery between different sections, and to relate that 
to forms of mobilisation. Although patterns of unevenness were apparent in the 2001 census, the 
current study can only depict these in broad terms. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 indicate that essentially, 
water service delivery infrastructural inadequacies are still largely determined by type of 
dwelling. Broadly speaking, informal dwellings face the least desirable forms of infrastructure: 
communal facilities, or even a complete lack of facilities. It can be deduced that infrastructural 
services in Khayelitsha are inherently spatial in character.  
 
 Table 4.1 Source of Drinking Water and Type of Dwelling 
 
 House  Informal dwelling  Total Sample 
Internal piped 68.8 2.2 20.0 
Yard Piped 31.2 10.5 16.0 
Shared Piped  16.7 16.7 
Communal tap  60.5 44.3 
No access/Other  4.1 3.0 
Total (N=80) 100.0 N=220 100.0 (N=300) 100.0 
Question: “How do you get your drinking water?” 
 
Table 4.2 Type of Toilet and Type of Dwelling 
 House  Informal dwelling Total 
Internal and Yard Flush  100.0 4.1 29.3 
Double shared flush  31.8 23.3 
Communal Flush/ Chemical  13.2 9.7 
Pit latrine  2.7 2.4 
Bucket  12.3 9.0 
No access  35.9 26.3 
Total (N=80) 100.0 (N=220) 100.0       (N=300) 100.0 
Question: “What type of toilet do you use?” 
 
The high level of ‘no access to sanitation’ of 26% is revealing of the level of indignity faced by 
residents of Khayelitsha, a point captured in the transcripts below. For residents of formal 
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houses, access to toilet facilities is either internal or within a yard. In the case of residents of 
informal settlements, a number of intermediate forms of toilets are being used, many of which do 
not provide a hygienic means of disposal of faecal matter. A total of 36% of residents of informal 
settlements have no access to any form of formal toilet, while a further 12% rely on unsanitary 
bucket toilets. Some difficulties of not having access to toilet facilities were highlighted in an 
interview with Lwando (interview 3/08/2007, Site C, Khayelitsha), an unemployed, 28-year-old 
man living in a shack sited less than 5 metres from a stream.  
 
 I do not have access. I relieve myself inside my shack. I just do it into a plastic bag or on 
to a newspaper which I then wrap and throw away over there [pointing to a nearby 
stream], behind my shack.  
 
The stream in question was clogged with dumped waste and faeces, resulting in interlocking 
pools of stagnant water. This can by no means be described as the most severe of the conditions 
observed during the fieldwork. Often shacks were flooded with water, leaving one wondering 
what else formed part of the flood waters. In one interview, a woman below 30 remarked that she 
often relied on toilet facilities at work. “I make sure I use the toilet at work, as I do not have 
toilet access at home.”(Xolelwa, interview 30/07/07, Site B, Khayelitsha) In yet another 
interview, when asked what toilet they used, a woman in her sixties remarked:  
 
We use the bush, because we have no toilets here. It’s very unsafe and it lacks 
privacy. In most instances someone passes when you are still busy. Moreover for 
females it carries a particular risk (of rape). At night we have to keep the night soil 
in the house and dispose of it during the day. 
 
Although these figures are compelling evidence that service delivery problems relate largely to 
the phenomenon of informality, they cannot by themselves be relied upon to present a picture of 
satisfaction (or lack thereof) with post-apartheid service delivery. Higher levels of access to 
services, which go hand in hand with houses rather than informal dwellings, increase the levels 
of satisfaction, as shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, indicating how service delivery perceptions vary 
according to type of domicile: informal or formal housing. While formal brick houses go 
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together with either internal or yard taps, informal settlement dwellers have to make do with 
communal standpipes for water. Similarly with sanitation, while houses are associated with 
internal or yard toilets, a large proportion of informal settlement dwellers do not have access to 
toilets at all, and in the case of those who do, these are mostly communal facilities which are 
often in an unusable state. 
 
Table 4.3 Perceptions of water service provision by the City Cape Town 
 House  Informal dwelling Total 
Very Bad 20.0 35.2 31.1 
Fairly Bad 17.5 15.5 16.1 
Fairly well 27.5 32.9 31.4 
Very well 35.0 16.4 21.4 
Total [N=80] 100.0 [N=219] 100.0 [N=299 ] 100.0 
Question: “How well do you think the City of Cape Town is handling the following matters? [a]...[b] water supply. 
[c]...” 
 
Table 4.4 Perception of sanitation service provision by the City Cape Town 
 House  Informal dwelling Khayelitsha Total 
Very Bad 16.3 63.6 50.8 
Fairly Bad 16.3 19.8 18.9 
Fairly well 31.2 12.0 17.2 
Very well 36.2 4.6 13.1 
Total [N=80] 100.0 [N=217] 100.0 [N=297 ] 100.0 
Question: “How well do you think the City of Cape Town is handling the following matters? [a]...[b]...[c] 
sanitation.” 
 
It is apparent that notions of dissatisfaction with service delivery are largely more favourable for 
occupants of houses than for those in informal structures; and perceptions about sanitation are 
less favourable than those about water supplies. For water supplies, the total negative ranking is 
38% for formal housing and 51% for informal settlements. For sanitation, however, those 
ranking the services negatively total 33% for formal housing and 83% for informal housing. The 
higher levels of dissatisfaction with sanitation than with water supplies can be inferred from the 
level of infrastructural outlay, in the first instance. In addition, though, these results suggest an 
element of variegated notions of citizenship, between those whose service is perceived to be ‘all 
right’ (and perhaps a basis for aspiration, for those with poor service), and those with poor 
service.  
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4.5 TO PAY OR NOT TO PAY FOR WATER?  
In addition to the problem of water service backlogs in informal settlements indicated above, 
residents of Khayelitsha have the disadvantage of a relatively high ratio of water charges to 
income. While water services backlogs in all areas are a problem (especially the lack of access to 
toilets found in most informal settlements), Khayelitsha is also one of the most economically 
depressed areas of Cape Town. It experiences relatively higher rates of unemployment, and 
inferior jobs for those employed, the majority of whom eke out an existence in menial and low-
paying jobs in domestic employment and the retail sector (each of which accounts for 19% of 
employed persons) (DPLG, 2007b), construction and security; and up to 72% live below the 
poverty datum line (DPLG, 2007a; 2007b). As indicated in Table 6.1, the monthly household 
income in Khayelitsha is R1606, much lower than the national average of R4092 for 2004. 
Khayelitsha also has a relatively higher incidence of poverty – although the rate of employment 
is slightly higher than the national average, indicating that the quality of employment is very 
low. These low income figures indicate that residents of Khayelitsha are relatively worse off than 
the rest of the country. It is pertinent therefore to discuss a framework for dealing with cases in 
which residents are not able to pay for water charges due to unemployment and low income.  
 
Table 4.5 Comparative development indicators for Khayelitsha and of South Africa 
Indicator Khayelitsha South Africa 
Average monthly income 
a R1606 R4092 
Poverty incidence 
b 
72% 65% 
Employment rate 
b 35% 34% 
a: based on 2004 figures 
b: based on 2001 census 
 
Municipal authorities are permitted to levy rates in accordance with a number of pieces of 
legislation, i.e. the Local Government Municipal Property Rates Act of 2004
33
 (RSA 2004), and 
the Local Government Municipal Systems Act of 2000 (RSA, 2000).
34
 Section 95 of the 
                                                 
33 Section 27 of the Property Rates Act defines the contents of the accounts payable to the municipality, specifying that rates ought to 
show how they were calculated – a point that would be very difficult for the City of Cape Town to demonstrate if it were to levy 
rates for consumption from a common meter. 
34 Section 95 of the Municipal Systems Act dictates that where consumption ‘by individual users’ is measurable, such consumers 
should receive regular, accurate and verifiable accounts that indicate the basis for calculating the amounts due; thus it can be 
inferred that the billing of multiple users from one and the same meter has no validity in law. 
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Municipal Systems Act dictates that where consumption by individual users’ is measurable, such 
consumers should receive regular, accurate and verifiable accounts that indicate the basis for 
calculating the amounts due; and thus it can be inferred that the billing of multiple users from 
one and the same meter has no basis in law. Moreover, Section 27 of the Property Rates Act 
defines the contents of the accounts payable to the municipality, specifying that rates ought to 
show how they were calculated – which would be very difficult for the City of Cape Town to do 
if it were to levy rates for consumption from a common meter. Local Government Municipal 
Structures Act of 1998 (RSA, 1998b) as well as provisions of the Municipal Finance 
Management Act of 2003 (RSA, 2003b) are also applicable.  
 
Over and above the national framework provided for in the various Acts listed above, the City of 
Cape Town has its own policies and by-laws that enable it to carry out its mandate as a water 
services authority and provider. In addition to the Water Services Development Plan, a number 
of policies are pertinent to the issue of payment for services provided: the Tariff Policy (CCT, 
2008c), and the Credit Control and Debt Collection Policy (CCT, 2008d), both of which are 
usually appended to the annual budget and IDP review.  
 
According to the Tariff Policy, the municipal tariffs in the city are designed to ensure the 
sustainability of services in the city through raising economic tariffs to fund the provision and 
maintenance of services, while maintaining equity considerations. Accordingly, the 
differentiation of tariffs between different categories of users is permitted, as long as this 
differentiation does not amount to unfair discrimination. The differentiation is based on the 
categorisation of customers into the following categories: residential/domestic, commercial, 
industrial, farming, government, and state-owned enterprises. Within the residential /domestic 
category there is further differentiation into sub-categories according to settlement type, property 
value, service consumption level, payment levels, household income, and type of connection. 
Concomitantly, the tariff structure for rates and services permits consumers who meet the criteria 
as defined in the tariffs to obtain free basic services, and those properties which are below a 
specified value to be rates-free. This provision in the tariff policy is concretised in the Credit 
Control and Debt Collection Policy (CCT, 2008d) which stipulates that all properties that have a 
municipal valuation of R88 000 or less are exempt from paying rates. In addition, properties 
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below the value of R199 000 qualify for a R30 rebate on the payment of their rates and services, 
as indigent support. 
 
Thus properties such as those that existed in Site C during the survey phase are exempt from 
paying rates. The legally allocated double occupancy plots in Site C were valued at between 
R3000 and R6000 in the 2006 General Valuation Roll, which is below the R88 000 rates-free 
maximum. For properties valued at between R88 001 and R199 000, the rebate of R30 towards 
rates is applied, in addition to the 10 500 litres free water provided to all residential connections. 
The R30 rand rebate on rates plays an important part in alleviating the plight of these residents.  
 
At the time of writing in 2009, Site C was being transformed from complete informality into a 
largely low-cost brick house suburb. Whole sections of informal housing had been replaced by 
newly built houses, the majority of which have two bedrooms. The properties have still to be 
valued and thus still remain rates-free. However, interviews with the new owners and municipal 
officials indicate that this is a temporary arrangement until all construction in Site C is 
completed, after which the municipality will have to undertake a general valuation for all 
registered properties in Site C with a view to determining their value for the purpose of 
municipal rates, including rates for water. The new valuation notwithstanding, the properties will 
still qualify for the free basic water, which the municipality has set at 10 500 litres per stand.  
 
During the survey it emerged that residents of double occupancy plots in Site C objected to what 
they alleged was billing by the municipality for water consumed from a tap and toilet used 
jointly with the co-occupant of the plot. They queried the method of allocation of usage between 
the two households, pointing out that the method remained a mystery, and many alleging that the 
bills were often different for the two households. It emerged that residents were not in favour of 
any method that failed to meet requirements of transparency, equity and fairness – such as the 
crude division of the total consumption equally between the two households, as the two 
households often varied in size and usage patterns. However, interviews with municipal officials 
indicated that that (at least after 2002, the earliest account available in the municipal system) the 
residents of Khayelitsha had not been billed for any service charges, including water. The 
residents of Site C had been receiving bills related to unpaid debts owed by the residents, and on 
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refuse removal charges pertaining to an earlier period. This was a practical indication that 
residents were conflating different components of municipal bills with water charges, and that 
the municipality was in compliance with its own policy directives, as Site C property values 
averaged between R3 000 and R6 000, and thus were subject to the proviso of zero tariffs for 
properties valued below R88 000 (CCT, 2006).  
 
Human Rights and Water 
So far I have sketched the service delivery situation in Khayelitsha and the relative deprivation 
of the Khayelitsha community, both in terms of water service delivery outcomes and income/ 
employment situation (which, I have indicated, points towards an inability to meet all financial 
commitments consistently, including payment for services. As explained in Chapter 2, the 
introduction of Free Basic Water was meant to ensure access to water, even for the indigent. The 
City of Cape Town currently provides an additional 4 500 litres more water to indigents over and 
above the lower limit of 6 000 litres per household indicated in the FBW policy, which it 
provides to all metered connections. In unpacking the politics of water in Khayelitsha, I found it 
necessary to understand whether its residents considered water a rateable service or not.  
 
 In Khayelitsha, the survey found that a majority of 67% disagreed with the concept of levying 
charges for water. Respondents were asked if they viewed water as a free good or as an 
economic good that should be paid for. If the data is disaggregated in terms of type of dwelling, 
it emerges that residents of informal settlements have a higher propensity to view water as a free 
good, as shown in Figure 4.4. Typical comments were that water is a natural resource and a gift 
from God that should be provided free of charge. It can be discerned that residents of informal 
settlements (who currently do not pay for water) were more likely to view water as a free good 
than those in brick houses (who currently pay). It emerged during the interviews that one of the 
reasons for this was that most residents of informal settlements were unhappy with having to 
share water points communally and consistently referred to this arrangement as an impediment to 
their willingness to pay. In fact, many argued that if they were given a property with exclusive 
use of metered water, they would be willing to pay. While rain water could be viewed as a gift 
from God, they were aware that costs relating to the impounding, treatment and conveyance of 
water need to be funded. 
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Figure 4.4 Perception of levying water charges and type of dwelling 
 
Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Water should be provided for free because it’s 
a right 
 
Figure 4.5 indicates that the responses towards whether water should be a free good varied 
between the sites in Khayelitsha, with residents of the formal settlements of Khaya and Ilitha 
Park least likely to view water as a free good. The poorest of the informal settlements, Endlovini, 
had the highest percentage of respondents advocating that water should be free, indicating a 
direct relationship between income and willingness to pay.  
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 Figure 4.5 Percentage who agree with statement that water is free good 
 
Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Water should be provided for free because it’s 
a right 
 
Conjecturally, it could be assumed that type of water source would play an important role in 
determining the perception of whether water should be a free good or not. Those residents 
drawing their water from metered water points and who already pay for water could be expected 
to see the service as rateable while those currently drawing water from communal water facilities 
would conceivably see it as a free good. As can be seen above in Figure 4.5 residents of formal 
houses are less likely to say water should be free.  
 
Figure 4.6 shows that the most perilously supplied users of water are those who depend on the 
goodwill of neighbours. Moving from left to right, ease of access to reliable potable water 
sources could be seen as qualitatively declining. Generally, there is a gradual increase in 
residents of the opinion that water ought to be provided free. However, the residents with yard 
taps show an ‘unexpectedly’ high expectation of free water provision. The 2001 census indicates 
that Site B, where the yard taps are located, is a relatively economically depressed area of 
Khayelitsha. As already indicated in Chapter 1, Site B originally consisted of site and service 
plots that have gradually been (and continue to be) upgraded into houses. In contrast, areas with 
internal taps, i.e. Khaya and Ilitha Park, were originally planned and constructed as houses.  
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Figure 4.6 Perception of water as free good and type of water source 
 
Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Water should be provided for free because it’s 
a right 
 
The notion of water as a free good has strong resonance in African cultures – I personally was 
socialised to believe that nobody should ever be denied access to water, not even one’s foes. 
When a visitor came into the rural homestead, water to drink was often the first thing to be 
offered to them. The older generations are more likely to have experienced such conditioning 
and would thus be more likely to expect water to be free. Contrary to expectations, however, 
younger age groups showed a higher propensity to view water as a free good, as illustrated in 
Figure 4.7 below. The figure indicates a gradual decline in support for the idea of water as a free 
good as age increases. This can be explained in at least two ways. Firstly, the younger cohorts 
are more militant, and as has been demonstrated in Chapter 5 are thus more likely to demand 
greater concessions from authorities. Secondly, younger residents are more likely to be more 
educated and knowledgeable on government programmes such as Free Basic Water.  
 
In this section I have described how water is differentially understood within the community of 
Khayelitsha, with some groups insisting that it should be available free, while others recognise 
that water services charges must be levied on users. These two views should not necessarily be 
seen as polar opposites, but as overlapping ends of a continuum. The differentiation was often 
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well described by respondents; that water the natural resource, e.g. rain water and water in rivers, 
is a free good (often described as a gift from God), which undergoes processing and conveyance 
that converts it from a pure natural resource to a service which attracts a levy. Moreover, it 
emerged that under certain circumstances, even those who were unwilling to pay could be 
conditioned to pay. 
 
Figure 4.7 Perception of water as free good and age 
 
Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Water should be provided for free because it’s 
a right 
 
Depending on certain circumstances, water services could be an economic good. It was clear that 
water for survival purposes should be viewed as a social good, and provided for free; but usage 
beyond the survival level could be viewed as requiring different treatment. I was also able to test 
a number of hypotheses: the conception of the value of water was different between informal 
settlement dwellers and formal house dwellers, between the different types of water sources, by 
age and by location.  
 
Another important aspect of non-payment of services is how different services are paid for. In 
the following analysis I compare two services, water and electricity, to determine if water 
services are indeed viewed differently to other services. Table 4.6 displays the comparative 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+
Age
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 
 
 
 
 104 
likelihood of non-payment for water and electricity services in each of the surveyed sites. The 
formal settlements of Ilitha and Khaya have 100% payment for electricity, while the informal 
areas would consider skipping paying for electricity.  
 
Table 4.6 Likelihood of Defaulting on Service payments  
 
 Percentage  have skipped or who would consider 
skipping payment 
Research site Electricity Water 
Endlovini 39 44 
Site C 31 42 
Site B 32 55 
Khaya 0 31 
Ilitha Park 0 57 
Total 28 45 
Question: “Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether 
you, personally, have done any of these during the past year? If not, would you do this if you had a chance?” 
 
Overall, 28% would consider skipping electricity payments, compared to 55% for water. A 
crucial difference in the supply of the two services in Khayelitsha is in the scheduling of 
payments; electricity is a prepaid service while water is post-paid. This has important 
implications: the decision not to purchase an electricity coupon leads to an automatic 
disconnection; while in the case of water, consumption occurs before payment, providing 
automatic credit to users, and thus allowing them the possibility of defaulting on payments. This  
has been used to drive the implementation of prepaid meters for service provision in general, and 
for water services in particular. The following section highlights the disparities between service 
delivery in the whole of Cape Town compared to that in Khayelitsha. 
 
 4.6 COMPARING SERVICE DELIVERY IN KHAYELITSHA AND CAPE TOWN 
The Khayelitsha water service delivery figures in section 4.3 provide some background to 
service delivery and participation issues. In order to provide an even better context of the 
environment and aid understanding of overall levels of dissatisfaction, this section presents a 
comparison of indicators of service delivery and perceptions for Khayelitsha, and for the whole 
of the City of Cape Town. Table 4.7 below shows city-wide levels of satisfaction with water 
services. The table indicates that there has been a general decline in satisfaction with water 
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services in informal areas, dropping from as high as 72% in 2003/4 to 37% in 2005/6. However, 
there is a general increase in satisfaction for residents in formal areas, increasing from 82% in 
2003/4 to 89% in 2006/7.  
 
Table 4.7 Cape Town levels of satisfaction with water services 
 2002/3 2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 
%satisfaction formal residential areas 85% 82% 83% 87% 89% 
% satisfaction Khayelitsha formal areas    81% 63% 
%satisfaction informal residential areas  72% 45% 37% 47% 
% satisfaction Khayelitsha informal areas    46% 49% 
Sources: Lethulwazi, 2007; Nielsen, 2002; Nielsen, 2003; Nielsen, 2004; Raganya, 2006; CCT, 2008b 
 
Table 4.7 also shows that levels of satisfaction for informal residents in Khayelitsha are 
comparable to similar areas in the rest of the city, yet those in informal settlements fare less well 
compared to those in formal areas in the rest of the city. 
 
These differences may originate with the residents of Khayelitsha, comparing the general state of 
service delivery in their suburb with that of other areas in the city. It emerged in a number of 
interviews that Khayelitsha, as a settlement for ‘Africans’, in respondents’ opinions, was 
deliberately being marginalised as part of a strategy of dissuading migration from areas outside 
the Western Cape, particularly the Eastern Cape. Moreover, there is a stigma associated with 
living in ‘African’ settlements, which for historical reasons often lack adequate amenities and are 
largely uni-functional ‘dormitories’ which are not well integrated with the economic and social 
hub of the city. Although Khayelitsha contained only 11% of the population of Cape Town in 
2001, it accounted for up to 39% of the shacks in Cape Town (DPLG, 2007b), cementing the 
notion of its marginality in the city. A comparison of Khayelitsha with the City of Cape Town in 
Table 4.8 indicates that Khayelitsha is indeed a refuge for the poor in the city, which only 
strengthens the stigma associated with living in the area.  
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Table 4.8 Infrastructure Service Levels: Khayelitsha and Cape Town  
 1996 2001 2006 
Refuse Removal    
Percentage Households without weekly refuse removal: Cape Town 11.4 5.82 5.8 
Percentage Households without weekly refuse removal: Khayelitsha 24.5 4.9  
Water Supply    
Percentage Households without water on site: Cape Town 10.49 15.59 4.97 
Percentage Households without water on site: Khayelitsha 29.8 34.9  
Toilet Facilities    
Percentage Households without flush toilet: Cape Town 10.73 12.68 7.23 
Percentage Households without flush/chemical toilet: Khayelitsha 29.8 34.9  
Electricity Supply    
Percentage Households without electricity: Cape Town 13.23 11.23 5.62 
Percentage Households without electricity: Khayelitsha 32.9 24  
Source CCT, 2008b:18; CCT, 2005 
 
 
4. 7 ADDRESSING THE WATER SERVICE BACKLOGS 
 
The city considers the rapid growth of informal settlements to be the biggest impediment to 
reducing service backlogs that place strain on the quality of life of residents of Cape Town 
(CCT, 2008a; 2008b). According to the city’s (former) Director of Water Services, the city 
provides a very basic (emergency) level of service as soon as possible to about 95% of all 
informal settlements (Mosai, 2006). In fact, the city has a dedicated informal settlement upgrade 
programme meant to ensure that all residents live in dignified environments, with minimal 
health, environmental, fire, flooding and crime risk (CCT, 2006). Such in situ upgrades of 
informal settlements form part of a two-pronged strategy involving the construction of new 
housing stock on virgin land. Addressing the backlogs must be balanced against the imperative 
of upgrading ageing infrastructure in more established areas of the city. This complexity is 
complicated further by the need to address the lasting legacy of apartheid enclaves. While some 
racial integration has occurred in the past 16 years, it must be pointed out that the profile of 
many suburban areas remains mostly white, while blacks mostly still live in the so-called 
townships. The larger task remains that of reducing the housing backlog, estimated at 400 000 
housing units. Given a growth figure of 18 000 families per annum, the city contends that an 
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effective backlog reduction would entail the construction of at least 20 000 units of housing 
stock per annum, compared to the current average of 4 500 units (CCT, 2008a; 2008b).  
 
Khayelitsha is part of the national Presidential Urban Renewal Programme
35
 (PURP) launched in 
2001. Under the PURP, Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain, which house a third of the city’s 
population (CCT, 2006b), were identified for ‘concerted interventions’ aimed at improving 
informal settlements and housing conditions. This programme links the three spheres of 
government through an intensive alignment of intergovernmental effort between the three 
spheres of governments. As noted above, this strategy has mainly been effective regarding water 
supplies; far less so in terms of sanitation.  
 
The construction of communal toilets forms part of the informal settlement upgrades, which 
include such other amenities as electricity, water supplies and large refuse drop-off equipment. 
Regarding toilets, it must be said that even though the municipality has a stated ratio of five 
families per toilet in informal settlements, many informal settlements lag behind this ratio. 
Moreover, the addition of new toilets is often undermined by existing toilets falling into 
disrepair. I observed many communal toilets in this condition that had become refuse dump sites. 
In areas where the ratio has been maintained at about five households per toilet, the toilets are 
more likely to be better maintained, as households secure their toilets using locks. Such 
‘ownership’ provides an incentive to ensure requisite maintenance programs are in place for each 
of the toilets.  
 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated a direct correlation between dwelling type and access to basic 
services. Yet to some degree at least, dissatisfaction with delivery transcended the two broad 
categories of dwellings: formal houses and informal dwellings. Two conclusions can be reached 
from the data presented in the chapter: the spatial dichotomy of informal and formal housing, and 
                                                 
35
Accoding to CCT (not dated), ‘[t]he Urban Renewal Program is an integrated process targeting the regeneration of certain 
underdeveloped geographic areas to achieve sustainable development by bringing a balance between the social, economic, 
environmental and infrastructural aspects of city life.’ 
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the correlation between different services. There is a strong correlation between type of dwelling, 
and quantity and perception of quality of service delivery. There is also high correlation between 
the service delivery attributes – quality and quantity – and levels of service delivery satisfaction.  
 
The informal settlements – Site B, Site C and Endlovini – showed the greatest deficiency in 
services, in many instances with virtually no sanitation and electricity services. In fact, over a 
quarter of those surveyed in Khayelitsha indicated that they had no access to toilet facilities and 
relied on the ‘bush’ or improvised in some other way. Interestingly, there exist few forested areas 
in Khayelitsha for people to take cover behind while defecating. The reality, as many people 
travelling on the N2 highway will attest, is that many Khayelitshans defecate on the verges of the 
highways, in full view of motorists and passers-by. This indignity is lived out daily in 
Khayelitsha. When one considers that 60% of the half-million strong population of Khayelitsha 
lives in informal settlements, this is a massive problem. Not surprisingly, therefore, 70% of the 
residents of Khayelitsha are unhappy with sanitation services. 
 
The problem of water supplies is also important, though on a less serious scale than the 
sanitation problem. Fifty-three percent (53%) of residents of Khayelitsha are happy with water 
supplies. It is clear, though, that people living in formal brick houses have higher levels of 
satisfaction than those in informal settlements. At one level this relates to the idea of the ladder 
of water service delivery, with higher levels associated with living in a demarcated plot or house 
where a yard tap or internal plumbing is possible. Although these higher levels of service attract 
tariffs, this needs to be balanced against the higher costs attributable to communal facilities. Such 
costs may include labour involved in carrying water, and lower levels of convenience due to the 
lack of water at different points of demand such as bathrooms, toilets and kitchens. 
 
One of the most obvious patterns of disparity in Khayelitsha is that informal settlements lack 
satisfactory services. In fact, informal settlements lack water services, housing, and electricity 
simultaneously, while formal housing brings with it a certain medley of services such as water 
supply, toilets, electricity, refuse collection, and storm water facilities. This has profound 
implications for the analysis of the importance of water services (or any of the other services 
separately, for that matter) in affecting citizen participation. As illustrated in Section 4.7, the 
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perceptions of one service are closely related to the perceptions of the others. This means that 
while purporting to analyse the effect of one service (in this case, water services) on 
participation, one inadvertently includes the other services. This has important bearing on the 
rest of the study – I decided to include the other variables in the rest of the analysis. In fact, as 
will become clear in the next chapter, it is probable that residents do not see these services as 
separate from one another, but as part of the service delivery medley. In recognition of this, I 
have decided in many instances (particularly in Chapter 6) to use the variable ‘type of house’ as 
a proxy for all the service types, drawing on the strong linkage between type of dwelling and 
type of service. 
 
This complexity can be taken further. The 2001 census data pointed to a strong correlation 
between housing and an assortment of measures of socio-economic well-being, such as 
unemployment rates – and service delivery. That allowed the use of housing as a proxy measure 
of difference, and in many cases it was proved that perceptions of services did indeed vary 
according to whether respondents lived in formal houses or informal settlements. However, a 
difficulty arises with such a typology: whether or not the correlations between service delivery 
perceptions and housing are not in themselves indicative of general disenchantment with level of 
socio-economic well-being. Such a proposition cannot be ruled out; in fact, it should be 
incorporated into the model. I maintain that it is still plausible to argue that access to services is 
still the main driver of service delivery disenchantment. 
 
The next chapter, Chapter 5, delves into the linkages of service delivery and forms of 
participation. In a nutshell, it attempts to take the analysis of this chapter further through linking 
service delivery, delivery perceptions, and forms of participation. The variegated level of 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction described in this chapter is conjecturally assumed to feed into a 
similar pattern of participatory involvement by the residents of Khayelitsha, wary of their current 
circumstances. 
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Chapter 5 
DETERMINANTS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN KHAYELITSHA 
“All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.” (Edmund Burke  
  
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in the previous chapter, while protests arise from a general dissatisfaction with poor 
delivery of services, water and sanitation deficiencies are usually linked to housing. This chapter 
attempts to bring about a better understanding of how service delivery failures in Khayelitsha are 
linked to increased militancy in the participatory schema. Concomitant with that broader aim, 
this chapter identifies the aspects that incline individuals towards participating in community 
meetings or protests. This form of dualism in no way presupposes citizen action to be limited to 
binary alternatives, but is merely an analytic construction. McVeigh and Smith (1999:687) posit 
that there exist ‘three alternative political responses: inaction, institutionalized political 
participation, and protest’.  
 
Khayelitsha, with a population of some half a million people, is essentially an agglomeration of 
adjacent suburbs with a token integration with the rest of the city as a result of its apartheid 
origins. Community meetings, therefore, except for large political rallies or izimbizo, operate at 
the level of geographically demarcated neighbourhoods – especially at the so-called street36 
level.  
 
Opp (2009:35) identifies four components of the numerous definitions for protest. The first 
component is that ‘protest is an action or behaviour’. The second is that ‘[t]he actors object to 
one or more decisions of a target (or several targets)’. The third essential component is that 
‘[t]he actors are unable to achieve their goals by their own efforts’. And the fourth component is 
                                                 
36 Such street organisation in fact operates at neighbourhood level. For example, in Khaya, Site B, and Site C, addresses are preceded 
by a letter A, B, C, D and so on, and all addresses preceded by the same letter then belong to the same street committee, which 
convenes meetings and is mandated with attending to community problems as they arise. Street committees are nominally under 
South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO). SANCO is allied to the ANC, coming fourth after the powerful triumvirate 
of the ANC, COSATU and the SACP, the so-called ‘tripartite alliance’. 
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that ‘[t]he behaviour is not regular’. For convenience, I adopt the definition of protest by Lipsky 
(1968) and the insightful categorisations of citizen action by Dalton (2002) discussed in Chapter 
3. Lipsky (1968:1145) defines protest as:  
 
[A] mode of political action oriented towards objection to one or more policies or 
conditions, characterized by showmanship or display of an unconventional nature, 
undertaken to obtain rewards from a political or economic system while working 
within the system. (Lipsky, 1968:1145) 
 
Outside of conventional political activity – such as voting, interest groups and lobbying, for 
example – are a broad swathe of activities used by publics as the last option to get their views 
across (Dalton, 2002). I include in the definition of protest, activities such as demonstrations, 
sloganeering, road blockades, occupations, damage to property, and violence. Moreover, the 
analysis is cognisant of the fact that most protests go unreported.  
 
I proceed by analysing the two forms of participation used by the citizenry of Khayelitsha in 
their pursuit of the agenda of service delivery and other needs. In Section 5.2 I describe 
attendance frequency statistics for both meetings and protests, to contextualise the relative 
participation propensities. Section 5.3 is a summary of a bivariate analysis of selected variables 
and each of the two participatory forms. Section 5.4 employs linear regressions in order to find 
variables with higher explanatory power to illuminate the incidence of the participatory 
phenomena.  
 
5.2 COMMUNITY MEETINGS AND PROTEST PARTICIPATION IN KHAYELITSHA 
One of the most important ways of participating in local politics and connecting with 
government in Khayelitsha is community meetings. These meetings are usually organised by 
different organisations operating in the different neighbourhoods where the meetings are held, 
sometimes with ward councillors in attendance. They are forums which provide for the 
aggregation of local demands to be channelled to elected officials and bureaucrats, as Mattes 
(2008) observes. Interviewees were asked to state if they had attended instances of either of the 
two participation forms in the past 12 months. The frequency statistics are summarised in Figure 
5.1 below. 
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Figure 5.1 Attendances at Community Meetings and Protests in Khayelitsha 
 
Question: “Here is a list of sections that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, 
personally, have done any of these during the past year. [a] attended a community meeting.[b]...[c] attended a demonstration 
or protest march [d]... 
 
It is notable that 82% of the respondents said they had attended a community meeting at least 
once in the past year (2006/7), a figure which is over 20% higher than the South African average 
obtained in the Afrobarometer survey in January/ February 2006 (see Mattes, 2008). The 
attendance at protests was 45%, which is also 20% higher than the Afrobarometer average of 
25% for South Africa in January/ February 2006 (see Mattes, 2008). The resurgence of street 
protest into the South African body politic invokes fading memories of the rolling mass action of 
the anti-apartheid era (Atkinson 2007).  
 
In 2005, for example, Vukani, a community newspaper with a wide readership in Khayelitsha, 
reported the incidents annotated in Box 5.1 below. Scanning through the box, a number of 
observations are in order. Firstly the protests occurred in informal settlements and related largely 
to some aspect of service delivery. Although these reported incidents of protest activity are 
indicative of higher levels of militant civic activity in informal settlements, it is important to test 
this further.  
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Box 5.1: Protests in Khayelitsha reported in Vukani in 2005 
 7 March 2005: Mandela Park, allocation of housing (10/3/2005), protest march 
 May 2005: Site B UT section, toilets, refuse removal, electricity and housing (5/05/2005), 
protest march 
 May 2005, SST Section, toilets and other services, (26/5/2005) throwing night soil at 
councillor house, blocking Lansdowne Road, stoning taxis  
 May 2005, QQ Section demonstrate for the release of arrested protesters 
 September 2005: SST Section, demand employment on housing construction in the area. 
(22/9/2005) protest march 
 October 2005: Harare, protest about conflict within the ANC, 20/10/2005) protest 
 15 November 2005: Lindelani Park, protest about Metro Rail unilaterally cutting 
electricity cables, (17/11/2005) burn tyres and barricading railway between Nonkqubela 
and Khayelitsha  
 
Figure 5.2 further highlights differences in protests between residents of informal settlements 
and those in formal settlements. Attendance at protests is higher, at 50% for informal settlements 
and 36% for formal houses. This indicates higher propensities towards protest in informal 
settlements than in formal settlements. In fact, place of residence is a good predictor of protest 
(Spearman correlation coefficient r=0.188, p=0.001) 
 
The difference in attendance at community meetings for informal settlements and formal 
settlements is marginal, as shown in Figure 5.3. While 84% of residents of informal settlements 
attend community meetings, 77% of residents of brick houses do so, a point reflected in the 
meagre association between dwelling type and meetings (Spearman correlation coefficient 
r=0.033, p=0.571). 
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Figure 5.2 Comparative attendance at protests in informal and formal settlements 
 
Question: “Here is a list of sections that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, 
personally, have done any of these during the past year. attended a demonstration or protest march  
 
Data presented in this section indicates that protests occur largely in informal settlements, a 
finding that supports the assertion that protest is a consequence of service delivery inadequacies. 
In addition to service delivery issues, inferior socio-economic indicators such as higher 
unemployment help to increase frustration among residents. However, community meeting 
attendance figures do not show much variability between the two settlement types; in fact, the 
high attendance at meetings for both settlement forms reflects that dialogue presents the greatest 
opportunity for engagement in both circumstances. In the next section, the analysis attempts to 
identify some of the explanatory factors for the two forms of participation, in bivariate analysis 
as a prelude to a multivariate analysis. 
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Figure 5.3 Comparative attendance at meetings in informal and formal settlements 
 
 
Question: “Here is a list of sections that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, 
personally, have done any of these during the past year. attended a community meeting 
 
 
5.3 WHO PARTICIPATES? – A BIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
5.3.1 Selecting Variables 
A key part of understanding participation in its various forms is unravelling the question of who 
participates in the different forms of engagement. The ensuing analysis attempts to expose the 
attributes that predispose residents of Khayelitsha to certain forms of participation. It has already 
been shown in Section 5.2 above that residents of informal settlements are generally more 
inclined to more militant forms of participation than formal settlement dwellers are. Table 5.1 
below outlines the variables that I use in this chapter to explain participation in protests and 
meetings. The sections where the variables are used are also indicated in the table. In Section 5.3, 
the bivariate analysis, I have illustrated the relationship between the selected variables and forms 
of participation by means of clustered column graphs. The framework chosen here to categorise 
the potential explanatory variables is discussed at length in Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi (2005). 
They propose that five families of explanations for popular participation: are (1) social structure, (2) 
culture, (3) institutional influences, (4) cognitive awareness and (5) performance evaluation, which I will 
explain briefly.  
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Table 5.1 Competing Theories and Hypotheses of Public Opinion  
Variables  Sections Theory/Hypothesis 
Age 5.3 & 5.5 
Social Structure 
Gender 5.3 & 5.5 
Residential location 5.2 & 5.5 
Duration of stay 5.3 
Marital status 5.5 
Education 5.3 & 5.5 
Cognitive Awareness 
Interest in public affairs 5.3 & 5.5 
Exposure to mass media: TV, Radio and Newspapers 5.3 & 5.5 
Engagement in political discussion  5.3 & 5.5 
Attendance at izimbizo 5.3 & 5.5 
Institutional Influences Attendance at religious services 5.5 
Contact with ward councillor 5.3 &5.5 
Employment status 5.5 
Performance 
Evaluations 
Service delivery perceptions 5.3 & 5.5 
Condition of life after apartheid 5.5 
Living conditions 5.5 
 
 
According to Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi (2005), social structure relates to demographic 
characteristics such as gender, age, residential location, duration of residence in the residential 
location, and marital status, which are believed to influence the behavioural patterns of 
individuals and communities. The effect of these variables often varies in spatial and temporal 
contexts. The position of an individual in the life cycle is an important determinant of the level 
and type of participation in which they engage (Dalton, 2002). Participation in political processes 
increases as individuals age. McAdam (1986) found that participation in protests decreases with 
increasing age, although he shows that at a particular age (18 to 19, in his study), protest 
participation is lower than at other ages. Although gender equality is often legislated, and indeed 
participation has been shown in some contexts to be independent of gender, it is often assumed 
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that males play more activist roles than women do, while marriage makes people more risk 
averse. 
 
Since human behaviour is often embedded in cultural values such as communitarian values and 
kinship, these values are expected to influence and regulate political participation. Also of 
importance here are values such as trust, risk tolerance, and the prevailing political culture 
(Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi, 2005).  
 
According to Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi (2005) the institutional values hypothesis 
attributes participation to institutional setting, i.e. rules and organisations. Identifying with 
certain organisations shapes individual values and actions. Identification with a governing 
political party, for example, will be associated with better perceptions than adherents of losing 
parties would inspire. Membership of voluntary associations shapes the beliefs and actions of 
individuals in the broader political arena, and is often the single most important determinant of 
political participation. Institutions also play a key role in managing participation in formal 
procedures such as voting.  
 
Cognitive awareness relates to the amount of information citizens have about a political system, 
and is a necessary element for engaging in debate and making political systems accountable. Key 
components of awareness relate to education, engagement in public affairs, interest in politics 
and political awareness. It has been suggested that higher levels of education stimulate higher 
levels of political participation, since education provides the means to access and process 
information (McVeigh & Smith 1999; Dalton 2002). However, Dalton (2002:22) cautions 
against the temptation to overemphasise that relationship: ‘[t]here is no direct one-to-one 
relationship between years of schooling and political sophistication.’  
 
 McVeigh and Smith (1999) propose that education on political issues and protest are linked in a 
circular fashion; while Dalton envisions that it is not educational status in itself that stimulates 
activity, but skills and orientations derived therefrom. For Galston (2004), civic education is the 
underlying explanatory variable that explains such increases in participation. Furthermore, civic 
education promotes democratic values, improves understanding of individual and group interests, 
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improves understanding of civic affairs, improves trust of public life, improves consistency of 
public opinion and reduces extremism on public issues 
 
The influence of the mass media on political behaviour has been assessed by several studies. A 
positive relationship between radio, television, and newspaper has been found in many studies. 
Dalton (2002) alludes to the expansion of the media in the past 50 years having increased access 
to political information, with television becoming the most important source of information in 
western publics. Similarly, Cormier and Tindall (2005) posit that the mass media play a crucial 
role in disseminating information about the goals and activities of social movements, especially 
in liberal democracies, while Tindall (2006) also argues that if such information is aligned to an 
individual’s own values and attitudes, then participation is more likely. This interrelationship 
between political participation and the mass media has been postulated to relate through 
intervening variables of political knowledge and political interest (Atkin et al, in Feldman and 
Kawakami, 1991). Feldman and Kawakami (1991) reveal that, in Japan at least, newspapers play 
a more significant role in increasing both current and general knowledge than television, 
paralleling similar studies in the USA by McLeod & McDonald (1985).  
 
The level of knowledge of the political system and processes has been found to be limited in 
many studies; some surveys indicate lack of respondent knowledge of public representatives, for 
example (Dalton, 2002). A number of questions were included that were aimed at testing the 
respondents’ level of interest in and knowledge of the political system in South Africa, for 
example interest in public affairs, frequency of political discussion and frequency of contact with 
ward councillor. Higher levels of interest and engagement were hypothesised to correlate with 
higher levels of participation. 
 
Performance evaluation relates to citizen assessments of a regime’s ability to fulfil campaign 
promises of prosperity – both economic and political. While it is relatively easier to deliver 
political goods which relate mainly to democratic aspirations, economic goods such as 
employment, and the provision of public goods such as infrastructural outlays in roads and water 
supply, to mention just two, may be more difficult. In South Africa, the demise of apartheid 
came with the expectations of the previously disadvantaged of forms of restorative justice.  
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Service delivery variables such as poor housing, lack of water supply and sanitation services, and 
lack of electricity and poor refuse removal policies are often mentioned as grievances in both 
meetings and protests. However, pinpointing the role of grievances in political action is 
associated with ambiguous and contradictory findings in the literature – depending on context, 
dissatisfaction may lead to stimulation or alienation of the level of action (Dalton, 2002; Opp, 
1988). Grievances are known to be held for long periods without recourse to visible forms of 
mobilisation (Tilly et al, 1975, in Tindall, 2006; Bracking, 2005; Dalton, 2002). The dominant 
view of protest action and social movement organisation holds that although grievances are an 
essential component of protest action they are not the key variable (McCarthy 1977). This view 
says that the expected association between variables often breaks down, or is non-existent. Social 
marginality theories have depicted protest as action by chronically unemployed, criminal 
elements, and other severely deprived classes, as the activists (see Mason & McVeigh, 1999). 
For the purposes of this analysis, perceptions of service delivery variables (housing, water, 
sanitation, refuse removal, and electricity) and the living condition of respondents were tested.  
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5.3.3 Bivariate Correlations 
Age 
The effect of age on participation is illustrated in Figure 5.4, showing that from the 20-29 year 
age group, participation in protests declines steadily up to the 40-49 year age group, after which 
it declines rapidly. There is a relatively strong relationship between both forms of participation 
(the Spearman’s rho r= 0.204 (p<0.0001) and r=0.146 (p= 0.013) for meetings and protests 
respectively).  
 
Figure 5.4 Age and participation  
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Figure 5.5 indicates that demonstrations and protests are the domain of the more educated 
groups, as shown by the rising mean attendance with increasing educational attainment (The 
Spearman rho r= -0.150, p=0.01). The largest leap in participation occurs between the group 
without any formal education and the subsequent group – those with only some primary 
education – after which the rate of increases diminishes somewhat.  
 
Figure 5.5 Education and participation  
 
The effect of education on attendance of meetings is less dramatic, and operates in inverse 
proportionality (the Spearman rho value of r= -0.94, p=0.108), with higher education 
‘discouraging’ attendance at public meetings. This suggests that the educated have no trust in 
public meetings as a constructive system of engagement, instead preferring to engage in protest 
marches. 
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When the individual effects of service delivery perceptions for each of water services, housing, 
electricity and refuse removal were investigated, no meaningful results could be detected except 
in the case of refuse removal. Data provided in chapter 4 indicates that informal settlements tend 
to lack most basic infrastructure. I probe the link between service delivery variables; i.e. the type 
of dwelling inhabited the source of water, and the type of toilet used through a correction 
analysis shown in Table 5.2 below.  
 
Table 5.2 Correlations of Type of Dwelling, Source of Water and Type of Toilet 
  
Type of 
dwelling 
Source of 
drinking 
water 
Type 
of 
Toilet 
Type of dwelling  
 
Pearson Correlation 1   
Sig. (2-tailed)    
Source of drinking water 
 
Pearson Correlation .757
**
 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   
Type of Toilet 
 
Pearson Correlation .828
**
 .626
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  
 
 
 An important feature of the correlation matrix shown in Table 5.2, is the high correlation 
between type of toilet and type of dwelling of r =0.828, and that of type of dwelling and source 
of water of r=0.757.The correlation of source of water and type of toilet is lower, at r=0.626. An 
important consequence of this is that type of dwelling has the strongest correlation with the other 
two variables, and thus can be used as a proxy variable for both type of toilet and source of 
drinking water.  
 
Given the relatively high correlation between levels of service delivery it is not surprising that 
the correlation between the perceptions of service delivery relating to housing delivery, water 
service delivery, sanitation delivery and refuse removal is also robust. The strongest correlation 
relates to perceptions of sanitation provision and housing provision (see Table 4.10 below), 
where the correlation coefficient r=0.557 mirrors the close relationship of sanitation and water 
supplies, where r=0.529. The lowest correlation coefficient among the five variables is r=0.248 
for water provision and electricity provision. 
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 Table 5.3 Correlations of Perceptions of Service Delivery 
 
 Housing 
Provision 
Water 
Provision 
Sanitation 
Provision 
Refuse 
Removal 
Electricity 
Provision 
Housing 
Provision 
1     
Water Provision .377(**) 1    
Sanitation 
Provision 
.557(**) .529(**) 1   
Refuse Removal .405(**) .447(**) .516(**) 1  
Electricity 
Provision 
.271(**) .248(**) .377(**) .361(**) 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (single-tailed). 
 
 
What this table highlights is that service delivery tends to be viewed as a bundle. A reliability 
analysis was conducted before the variables were added together, and a resultant Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.81 for the five items was obtained. When these variables are aggregated,
37
 the pattern 
of influence on participation is shown in Figure 5.7.  
 
Figure 5.7 Aggregate service delivery and participation 
 
                                                 
37 The aggregate service delivery variable was constructed by adding the service delivery perception variables together, i.e. aggregate 
= housing + water + sanitation + refuse + electricity.  
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Aggregate service delivery has negligible effect on attendance at meetings. The emphasis above 
is pertinent, in the first instance, as it is fundamental to answering whether water services on 
their own contribute to different forms of participation in Khayelitsha. The evidence suggests 
not. This is important also in that it suggests that it is the aggregate service delivery perception 
rather than the individual service delivery variables (mere disillusionment with a certain service) 
that is decisive in getting people into the streets to protest .  
  
 As already demonstrated, refuse removal is the only variable among the service delivery 
variables that has a meaningful relationship with either protest or meetings. Figure 5.8 shows the 
strong association between refuse removal and protest (high Spearman’s rho correlation 
coefficient of r=0.419, p<0.0001). In contrast, there is a lack of any meaningful relationship 
between attendance of meetings and refuse removal (with a Spearman’s rho coefficient value of 
r=0.055, p=0.348). 
 
Figure 5.8 Refuse removal and participation 
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The association between protest activity and perception of own living conditions depicted in 
Figure 5.9 shows a discernible decline in attendance at protests as conditions improve 
(Spearman’s rho r= -0.195, p=0.001). There is an inverse relationship between attendance at 
meetings and living conditions (Spearman’s rho r= -0.113, p=0.056). It is apparent that a self-
described improvement in living conditions is associated with a decline in attendance at both 
forms of participation; an indication that participation is seen as a means to an end: to change 
one’s living conditions. Thus, such participation diminishes as these conditions improve. 
 
 
Figure 5.9 Living conditions and participation  
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The influence of the mass media in the political behaviour illustrated in Figure 5.10 is depicted 
here through the role of radio news. There is a positive relationship between protest activity and 
frequency of use (Spearman’s rho r= 0.204, p<0.0001). For meetings, a weaker, yet still positive 
relationship is depicted (Spearman’s rho r=0.091, p=0.120). This positive association of radio 
news and the two forms of participation is suggestive of news being an important ingredient of 
popular mobilisation. The media is an important source of information, and a means for 
disseminating information; an essential component of mobilising people, be it for public 
meetings or for protest activity.  
 
Figure 5.10 Radio news and participation  
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There is a positive association between interest in public affairs and attendance at both protests 
and meetings, as illustrated in Figure 5.11. This result is fundamental in differentiating those 
individuals with higher levels of interest in public affairs from those one might call the 
‘perpetually mobilised’. Through their curiosity, they get involved in issues affecting the 
community, discussing issues, attending meetings and getting involved in protest marches. In 
summing up, it is those with an interest in public affairs that form the foundation of community 
activism. 
 
Figure 5.11 Interest in public affairs and participation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
Not at all
interested 
Not very
interested 
Somewhat
interested
Very
interested 
Level of interest in public affairs
M
e
a
n
 a
tt
e
n
d
a
n
c
e
Meetings
Protests
 
 
 
 
 128 
 
 
There is a positive association between both forms of participation and political discussion 
(Spearman’s rho r=0.173 and r=0.201, respectively), shown in Figure 5.12. These results are 
indicative of the importance of political awareness and opinions. As with interest in public 
affairs, high interest in political discussion is in itself an indicator for activism, and probably 
requires the same resources: high connectivity with information sources, and identification with 
certain political causes and organisations.  
 
Figure 5.12 Political discussion and participation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
Never Occassionally Frequently
Frequency of political discussion
M
e
a
n
 a
tt
e
n
d
a
n
c
e
Meetings
Protests
 
 
 
 
 129 
 
 
Figure 5.13 indicates that as contact with a ward councillor increases, attendance at both protests 
and meetings increases – up to the penultimate cohort, who contact the councillor ‘a few times’, 
after which level of participation declines slightly for meetings and declines more sharply for 
protests. This tapering of the graphs is significant: while contacting the ward councillor seems to 
increase the individuals’ attendance at both protests and public meetings, the groups who are 
most in contact with the councillor perhaps have less of an urge to attend either the protest or 
public meetings. Through regular contact with the ward councillor these individuals are able to 
receive information and exercise some leverage on the ward councillor, and thus may not see the 
need to participate, particularly in protest action, as shown by the sharper decline in mean 
attendance.  
 
Figure 5.13 Contact with ward councillor and participation 
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The relationship between attendance at izimbizo on one hand and attendance at protests and 
meetings on the other is depicted in Figure 5.14 below. From the figure it can be discerned that 
the association between protest and izimbizo is robust (Spearman’s rho r = 0.458, p<0.0001). As 
with protests, attendance at meetings increases with attendance at izimbizo (Spearman’s rho r= 
0.258, p<0.0001). An imbizo is a special type of public meeting; in attendance are senior leaders 
of government such as the president, cabinet ministers, provincial premiers, members of 
executive councils (provincial ministers) and councillors. The relationship between izimbizo on 
one hand and public meetings on the other is unsurprising, given that the former is a subset of the 
latter. Of interest is the higher propensity of frequent izimbizo attendees to engage in protest 
action. Two issues may be discerned from the relationship: as indicated in Chapter 3, izimbizo 
are often attended by disaffected individuals intent on airing their displeasure with issues that 
affect them, and who are already on the threshold of major action against the state; and secondly, 
izimbizo permit participants to meet with like-minded individuals and create the networks 
necessary to organise and sustain a protest action. This finding is important because it indicates 
that the introduction of izimbizo by government has failed to achieve its aim of allowing citizens 
to interact with senior government functionaries as a way of venting off their frustrations and 
reduce the possibility of disruptive protests.   
 
Figure 5.14 Attendance at izimbizo and participation 
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Figure 5.15 illustrates the relationship between attendance at protests and meetings, and 
attendance at religious services. There is a direct relationship between attendance at religious 
services and attendance at community meetings (Spearman rho r= 0.253, p<0.0001). In contrast, 
attendance at religious services has a weak and inverse relationship with attendance at protests 
(Spearman’s rho r=-0.011, p=0.866). As in America (Putnam, 1995), religious service attendance 
is the most important form of associational activity in South Africa. While such attendance 
clearly provides room to nurture social capital, such capital, understandably, is perhaps utilised 
for bridging divides rather than in a more militant form.  
 
 
Figure 5.15 Attendance at religious services and participation  
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To conclude this section, a summary of the findings is provided. It can be stated that attendance 
of meetings varies positively with age, interest in public affairs, frequency of political discussion, 
contact with ward councillor and attendance at religious services. A number of variables were 
significantly and positively associated with protests: attainment of education, radio news, interest 
in public affairs, political discussion, contact with ward councillor, and attendance at izimbizo. 
On the other hand, a number of variables had an inverse relationship with protests: age, service 
delivery aggregate, refuse removal, living conditions, and religious services. It is important to 
state that the relationships shown above are bivariate, and do not take into consideration the 
possible intervening effects of other variables. In order to consider the effect of such variables it 
is important to undertake a multivariate analysis, considered in the following section. 
 
Regarding attendance at meetings there was a positive relationship with all the variables except 
educational attainment and living conditions, which had an inverse relationship with attendance 
at meetings. It seems that higher educational attainment and improved living conditions 
discourage participation.  
 
5.4 Multivariate modelling of participation in meetings and protests 
 
5.4.1 Introduction 
While bivariate relationships are useful in exploring simple relationships, the world is made up 
of complex, interrelated phenomena operating simultaneously. Multivariate analysis procedures 
permit the modelling of such complex phenomena. Consequent to the key aim of discovering the 
main causal factors for the attendance of protests and meetings, a number of variables from the 
survey were tested. Moreover, it was essential to include variables relating to service delivery 
grievances, since many protests proclaim service delivery as their raison d’etre. In the 
construction of the regression model a number of transformations
38
 were performed on the data. 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Please refer to the questionnaire in Appendix 1 for the complete list of questions and the original coding of the answers. 
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5.4.2 Results  
Table 5.4 presents Standardised Beta values of a linear regression. In order to ascertain the 
overall ‘fit’ of each of the models, the R2 value is indicated. The R2 is a statistic indicating the 
‘goodness of fit’ of a model, i.e. how well it fits a set of observations. Generally, R2 will be 
between 0 and 1, with R
2
=1 showing perfect fit between modelled values and observed values, 
while R
2
 =0 indicates the variance is explained by other variables not in the model. The model 
explains 40% of the variance for attendance at meetings, and 26% of the variance for attendance 
at protests. However, often the question arises as to how large R
2
 ought to be for the model to be 
considered good. The answer is not simple, and depends on the context (Christensen, 1998). For 
hard-to-predict Y variables, smaller values may be ‘good’ while high values may not be good 
enough in some contexts. Since this study is largely exploratory in this area in South Africa, 
these figures can be taken to be ‘good enough’. 
 
Among the biographical variables only marital status has a significant association with protest 
participation (β =0.159, p<0.05), indicating that single individuals were more likely to be 
involved. In addition, age has a large standardised coefficient, β = -0.126. The results suggest 
that those with children, the unemployed, and males were more likely to attend meetings.  
 
Apart from dissatisfaction with refuse removal, in the case of protest, and to some extent 
dissatisfaction with sanitation delivery for both participation types, service delivery variables are 
not important predictors of attendance at meetings or attendance at protests. An important result 
from the regression is that dissatisfaction with sanitation has an inverse relationship with protest 
(β=-0.118), suggesting that improving sanitation perceptions are associated with protest. The 
other service delivery variables did not have statistically significant relationships or large 
standardised β coefficients for either of the models. This result seems to bolster the assertion that 
there is a lack of association between grievances and protest, although it serves to highlight two 
major grievances associated with service delivery inadequacies: refuse removal and sanitation, 
the presence of both of which mean people are forced to live in unsanitary conditions. The lack 
of explanatory power of the perception of personal living conditions is evidence that it is not the 
notion of poverty and helplessness per se that are essential in mobilising people. 
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Table 5.4 Multiple Regression Results 
 
Independent Variable Meetings Protest 
Age .066 -.126 
Sex (Male =1) .133* -.015 
Married (single etc =1) -.079 .159* 
Education  -.020 -.015 
Have no children (none =1) -.247** -.028 
Employed (unemployed =1) .168** -.055 
Perception of housing delivery (bad =1) -.098 .029 
Perception of water supply delivery (bad=1) -.091 .054 
Perception of sanitation delivery (bad =1) .144 -.118 
Perception of refuse removal (bad =1) -.036 .307*** 
Perception of electricity delivery (Bad=1) -.104 .032 
Type of dwelling (shack =1) .006 -.010 
Personal living conditions (bad =1) .026 -078 
Life after apartheid (worse =1) -.044 -046 
Listens to radio news (few times a week or more =1) -.090 .095 
Watches TV news (few times a week or more =1) .076 .005 
Reads newspaper (few times a week or more =1) -.034 -.075 
Interest in public affairs .192** .065 
Discusses politics .051 .168* 
Registered to vote .095 .026 
Attendance at meetings  .108 
Attendance at protests  .102*  
Attendance at izimbizo .097 247*** 
Attendance at Locate democracy, citizenship 
and participation in the post apartheid South 
African experience 
 religious services 
.283*** -.116 
Contact with ward councillor .259*** .061 
R Square .401*** .263*** 
N  250 270 
Notes: All values are Standardised Beta  
*p≤0.05, **P≤0.01, ***p≤0.001  
Additional comments in parentheses indicate how the recoding was implemented.  
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The media play a central role in disseminating information about activities and mobilisation 
around issues of civic importance. In this study, the effect of media (radio, TV and newspapers) 
is not significant, although scrutiny of the direction of the relationships reveals important detail. 
The effect of radio news, for example, occurs in opposite directions for meetings and for 
protests. Meetings are inversely associated with reliance on radio news as source of information, 
while for protest, the positive relationship indicates higher reliance is predictive of higher 
participation.  
 
There was a significant correlation between protest and political discussion, while meetings are 
associated with greater interest in public affairs. Contact with ward councillor, attendance at 
religious services, and protest are all significantly associated with attendance at meetings. 
Attendance at protests is positively associated with attendance at izimbizo and attendance at 
meetings, while being negatively associated with attendance at religious services. In the next 
section I discuss the implications of the above results. 
 
5.5 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION  
This analysis has contrasted the explanatory variables of attendance at meetings and protests, and 
has revealed that there are differences between the profiles of the participants. It emerged that 
even when explanatory variables coincided, the direction of association was sometimes different 
(direct and inverse), while for even the cases demonstrating similar direction of association, the 
strength of association was dissimilar. In discussing public participation it is often tempting to 
describe how citizens ought to participate rather than how they actually do participate. In fact, 
Putnam (1995; 2000) famously argued that citizens were receding from public involvement, 
‘bowling alone’ as it were. While such a statement may be factually accurate with respect to 
some methods of participation it needs to be weighed up against the possibility of shifts in 
methods of participation over time. The present study has demonstrated that in Khayelitsha, at 
least, similar communities mobilise themselves in different ways, each method unique to the 
profile of the participant it attracts. 
 
One of the key aims of the study was to determine how service delivery deficiencies are related 
to forms of participation. Chapter 5 provided a background of the different levels of services 
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enjoyed in different parts of Khayelitsha, and showed that there exists a strong correlation 
between type of housing, water services and of sanitation delivery. In the bivariate relationships, 
only refuse removal confirms the hypothesis that service delivery influences participation, while 
water supplies, sanitation, housing and electricity are without any systematic relationship. Given 
the anecdotal evidence pointing to the positive influence of service delivery variables – 
particularly housing, water and sanitation – this was unanticipated. Moreover, it was 
demonstrated in Chapter 4 that housing, water supply and sanitation were the least satisfactorily 
provided services in Khayelitsha.  
 
Importantly, however, when the variables were added together to form an ‘aggregate service 
delivery’ variable, substantial correlation with protest emerged, indicating that these variables 
operate in a combination and not in isolation. Inadequate refuse removal is the most important of 
the service delivery variables; although it is surprising that it needs to be interpreted in the 
context of its health implications and its visual effects on the environment. The bivariate 
relationships also revealed a considerable decline in protest participation as living conditions 
improve, while participation in meetings declined less rapidly. This indicates the importance of 
generalised quality of life grievances, such as the aggregate service delivery variable above, as 
opposed to specific grievances. The regression model’s failure to detect the importance of other 
grievances besides those to do with refuse removal indicates the lack of predictive power of 
grievances on their own.  
 
In fact it is a well-established fact that many grievances are held for a long time without protest 
(Tindall, 2007; Bracking, 2005). The major question is, to what degree is housing really a ‘catch-
all’ for dissatisfaction, including the issues of water, sanitation and other basic services? In order 
to answer that question, one needs to restate the widely-held model of protest participation. The 
dominant view of protest action and social movement organisation holds that although 
grievances are an essential component of protest action, they are not the key variable (McCarthy 
& Zald, 1977). This view postulates that the expected association between variables often breaks 
down or is non-existent, as shown in the results above. This group of scholars (McCarthy & 
Zald, 1977; Dalton, 2002) argues persuasively that mobilisation occurs through the media, 
recruitment through networks, and alignment with the objectives of the action (among other 
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factors) that bring about the action. However, it is important not to assume the weak linkage 
between direct action and grievances to be evidence of non-existent mobilisation.  
 
The fact that by and large, grievances fail to predict participation in a multivariate analysis 
suggests that there are intervening variables that are essential for distinguishing participants from 
non-participants. The biographical attributes of the participants are an obvious starting point for 
that analysis. The multivariate analysis reveals an inverse relationship between age and protest, 
which supports the results of the bivariate analysis. For meetings, a weak positive relationship is 
obtained. This is largely in line with the life cycle hypothesis that youth is a period of rebellion 
and militancy, largely driven by experimentation and free from serious responsibility.  
 
It was also more likely that males would attend meetings than females, although this effect did 
not extend to protest participation, where the sex of the respondents was inconsequential. This 
perhaps reflects the influence males have in decision-making bodies of the community, owing to 
the patriarchy ingrained in South African society.  
 
Protest participants were also more likely to be single (including divorced and separated) while 
this effect was absent from attendance at meetings; in fact a negative β indicates a reversal of the 
relationship, although this result is not significant. Unlike in the bivariate relationship where 
increases in education were associated with higher levels of protest participation, the linear 
regression did not confirm that result. 
 
People with one or more children were significantly more likely to attend meetings than those 
without children. This result is in line with the idea that children cause responsibility in people – 
children’s long-term welfare becomes an issue to be secured through meetings. In contrast, no 
significant relationship was found regarding protest. The issue of unemployment was mentioned 
by over 60% of the respondents as the biggest problem facing Khayelitsha. From the regression 
analysis it emerges that the unemployed are most likely to attend meetings, and not protests. This 
result shows that while unemployment may be an important grievance, and may actually be an 
issue discussed in meetings, it does not translate into protests.  
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Although the type of participant at either protests or meetings is beginning to emerge from the 
descriptions given above, there is still a disjuncture between participation and the supposed 
grievances and issues. In order to simplify the analysis, I describe the predictors for protest and 
meetings separately. For meetings, it emerges that interest in public affairs, attendance at 
religious services, and contact with the ward councillor are key predictors. Interest in public 
affairs is undoubtedly a necessary ingredient for involvement in community meetings. The 
importance of religious attendance and contact with ward councillor attests to these as sources of 
information; they also serve as spaces of discussion for community issues, and indeed build a 
strong sense of community among participants. In a sense these are sites and opportunities of 
mobilisation through information dissemination and recruitment. 
 
The important intervening variables for protest generation are frequent discussion of politics, 
attendance at izimbizo, and to a lesser extent, attendance at meetings and non-attendance at 
religious services. Discussing politics grows higher levels of sensitivity to ‘injustices’ 
perpetrated by various actors in the state-citizen matrix. In this milieu, it is important to draw on 
the amorphous definition of the state as a multi-scaled, complex set of processes’ (Oldfield, 
2008:495). Political discussions by citizens, similarly, span and are selective of the context and 
level of issue under consideration, which cannot be reduced to ‘resistance of state programmes’. 
However, though citizens are often willing to be partners with the state in its programmes, on 
occasion they are willing to up the ante and engage the state in ‘uncivil’ ways. Inevitably those 
citizens who partake in political talk may simultaneously or subsequently engage in protest. 
Attendance at an izimbizo, besides availing the person of an opportunity to ‘hear about 
government programmes from the President himself and to tell him about my/our situation
39’ is a 
display of strong agency in itself. And importantly, attendance at protests shows a significant 
correlation with attendance at meetings; an indication of the connection between the participation 
repertoires, and offering an explanation of the organisation of these protests. 
 
In summary this analysis has made a modest contribution towards the understanding of 
participatory protests and meetings, and identified some of the key driving factors in the 
mechanisms of the selected participatory channels. Mobilising meetings and mobilising protests, 
                                                 
39 This was a reason for attending such meetings often mentioned in the interviews with residents of Khayelitsha.  
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therefore, are largely dissimilar actions, targeting different profiles of individuals, although they 
still intersect at many levels. At a theoretical level, it is acknowledged that the measurement of 
each of the participatory phenomena is open to interpretation as to boundaries of each method of 
engagement.  
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C h a p t e r  6  
PATH LINKAGES BETWEEN SERVICE DELIVERY AND PARTICIPATION IN 
KHAYELITSHA  
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I further explore the link between service delivery and participation in 
Khayelitsha – as stated in the introductory chapter, the main aim of this study. As in the previous 
chapter I concentrate on two forms of participation as the analytical frame for understanding 
participation: protests and community meetings. I identified the key factors involved in each of 
these participatory forms in the previous chapter. The foremost question to be answered in this 
study may be restated as follows: What role does service delivery play in how citizens choose to 
mobilise and to participate in various conventional and unconventional ways? 
 
As explained in the methodology section (Section 1.3), path analysis is a valuable method for 
explaining the linkages between different variables and is an especially convenient method of 
interpreting causal analysis (Duncan, 1966; Alwin & Houser, 1975). Starting out with a simple 
model, a stepwise multistage regression is adopted in introducing more variables into the model, 
in different sections. In Section 6.2 I present a preliminary path model based on qualitative data. 
In Section 6.3 I explain the model variables used in the path model which is presented in Section 
6.4. The chapter ends with a concluding discussion in Section 6.5.  
 
6.2 INSIGHTS FROM QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS 
The path model described in this chapter is in part derived from evidence which was revealed 
from qualitative questions about participation in Khayelitsha. The relationship between service 
delivery and participation was described as a linear progression of actions by citizens in search 
of solutions for their problems. Meetings and protests are in the first instance about finding 
solutions to problems afflicting the community, as described in the quotations below: 
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I attend meetings and protests because I want to move to a better area with 
improved services, especially water and electricity. (Nobuhle* Interview, 
22/07/2007, Site B Khayelitsha) 
 
I have attended meetings and protests in order to gain access to rights to electricity, 
housing, and toilets. (Monde* Interview, 14/09/2007, Site C Khayelitsha) 
 
 
However, community meetings should not only be seen in the context of service delivery 
problems, but within a much broader vision of community commitment, and as an embodiment 
of citizenship:  
 
I attend meetings in order to know more about what is happening in the community. 
(25-year-old female, Nobantu* Interview, 20/08/2007, Endlovini, Khayelitsha) 
 
I attend community meetings in order to know about issues in the community, to air 
my own grievances and to make a contribution. (Nomzamo* Interview, 22/07/2007, 
Endlovini, Khayelitsha) 
 
 
As the second quote above indicates, attendance may include an altruistic ‘contribution’ to the 
community. This indicates a relatively highly developed sense of citizenship within the 
community, a point buttressed by the high level of attendance at such community meetings. 
Community meetings are also a way of finding out about issues in the community.  
 
Perhaps more interesting is the relationship between meetings and protests. The respondents 
indicated that their communities relied on meetings to solve problems affecting the community. 
However, it was observed that community assemblies could not always be relied upon to solve 
problems, and protests are seen as an alternative to conciliatory engagements:  
 
The first option is engagement in meetings, and if that fails then we protest. 
(Nozipho* Interview, 28/08/2007, Site B Khayelitsha) 
 
 
Here in Khayelitsha, we often hold meetings and when government fails to respond 
to us we take further steps. I think meetings come up with good solutions. (John* 
Interview, 2/09/2007, Site C Khayelitsha) 
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Meetings are better than both violence and protest, yet sometimes violence is the 
only way to guarantee officials’ attention. (Zintle* Interview, 26/07/2007, Site B 
Khayelitsha 
 
 
Figure 6.1 below summarises the discussion above and illustrates how community engagement 
escalates into protest. First, community members discuss issues among themselves and try to 
find solutions or a way to address the issue at hand. The percentages in the figure relate to the 
proportion of respondents who argued that each of these methods was the most effective method 
of dealing with grievances faced by residents of Khayelitsha. In a meeting, residents could 
resolve to approach a representative such as the ward councillor to discuss the problem. It was 
very clear that the role of the ward councillor is entrenched in the grievance handling procedures 
in Khayelitsha, as illustrated by these quotes: 
 
I prefer elected representatives, since they participate in decision-making in the 
various bodies. Also, writing the mayor a petition and meeting her (Mayor Helen 
Zille) in person would be useful. (Luba* Interview 12/08/2007, Site B, Khayelitsha) 
 
 
Relying on the councillor is more effective since the councillor is the elected 
representative. Community meetings are less effective, since they do not have a 
legal status. (Zama* Interview 24/08/2007, Khaya, Khayelitsha) 
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Figure 6.1 Connections between Meetings and Protests in Community Action 
 
 
 
When all else fails, the community may be galvanised into embarking on protest action as a last 
resort. Although only 15% of respondents were of the opinion that protests are the best method 
for tackling problems faced by residents, 45% of them actually took part in protests, indicating 
that both the ‘consultative’ community meetings as well as representation often fail to resolve 
issues, hence the use of protest as a form of agency. One respondent remarked that ‘meetings are 
better than both violence and protest, yet sometimes violence is the only way to get officials to 
listen.’ This conflation of protest and violence was heard fairly often, indicating that many of the 
protests degenerate into violent confrontation. More importantly, most statements advocating 
protest were qualified by its use as a method of last resort. This finding illustrates linearity in 
forms of actions (Dalton, 2002) in which political agency may be demarcated into dichotomous 
forms: conventional and unconventional, legal and illegal, peaceful and violent; all which 
overlap, but are not synonymous.  
 
6.3 DESCRIPTION OF PATH MODEL VARIABLES   
As a prelude to the path analysis that is presented in Section 6.4, I present variables in the model 
in this section. In developing the model I opted for simplicity while being able to capture 
information from the ‘qualitative’ model in Section 6.2 and quantitative data. The following 
variables are included in the analysis: (i) type of dwelling, (ii) perception of service delivery (iii) 
Service 
delivery 
grievances 
Consultative 
Community 
Meetings  
Protest 
Interface with elected 
representatives such as 
ward councillors 
Solution or 
positive response 
Solution 
[42%] [40%] [15%]  
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perception of condition of life, (iv) attend meetings (v) interest in public affairs and (vi) attend 
protests.  In chapter 5, I explained that attendance at meetings and attendance at protests were 
measured as a frequency of attendance at each of these forms of participation in the previous 
twelve months. 
 
While evidently the concept of ‘meeting’ is bedevilled with issues of technical aspects of what 
constitutes a meeting and what doesn’t,  I adopted definition by McComas et al (2006:673)  that 
public meetings  are ‘organised social gatherings with three or more people in attendance and 
open to anyone to attend’.  I also have allowed for the reality that public meetings can serve 
many purposes, formal and informal, and are organised by government bodies, religious 
organisations, citizen groups, neighbourhood organisations or anyone else. 
 
In section 4.7, I indicated that there is high correlation between different services in Khayelitsha, 
a point argued elsewhere (AfricaPremi 2002). The AfricaPremi research shows that in 
Johannesburg the Pearson coefficients for water supply, housing, sanitation and electricity 
service levels range between 0.637 and 0.773.  Informal settlements in Khayelitsha are similarly 
deficient in services normally associated with formal housing such as electricity connections, 
yard or internal water supplies, yard or internal toilets, individual refuse removal facilities among 
other services. In section 4.7, I showed that in the case of Khayelitsha these correlations range 
from 0.626 to 0.828.  While my main focus was on provision of water services: water supply and 
sanitation, it is difficult to isolate the effects of one service delivery variable from the others 
when these variables are highly correlated and yield a high Cronbach alpha α= 0.894. For this 
reason, type of housing was selected as the proxy variable for understanding generall service 
delivery issues.   
 
This analysis identifies type of dwelling as the core grievance. As already indicated, the type of 
dwelling occupied by respondents (formal brick housing or informal dwellings) is the most 
important predictor of the type of services  to which each respondent  has access. It is further 
assumed that perceptions of services delivery relating to all the services would be an intervening 
variable to forms of participation.  
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The variable ‘perception of service delivery’ is a sum of the measured perceptions of different 
services that is perception of housing service delivery, perception of water supplies, perception 
of sanitation, perception of electricity and refuse removal as indicated in section 4.7. As already 
indicated there exists a high correlation in the delivery of these services and consequently the 
perceptions about these services also correspond highly. The Cronbach alpha α = 0.80 shows 
high internal consistency. 
 
In this fashion the perceptions of service delivery have a more direct influence on forms of 
participation. I used a combination variable since it likely to be more stable and reflect 
underlying trend of service delivery perceptions. While the formation of perceptions of 
satisfaction or the lack thereof is a rather complicated process as shown by Ghobadian et al 
(1994), I assume that actual service delivery outcomes play an important role in the formation of 
such perceptions. Ghobadian et al (1994) specify that customer satisfaction is the difference 
between prior expectations (PE) and perceptions actual service outcomes (PAO).  If PAO>PE is 
the ideal, while if PAO<PE then dissatisfaction obtains while PAO=PE results in satisfaction. 
 
 Another compound variable used in the analysis is political engagement which is a sum of two 
questionnaire variables relating to interest in public affairs and frequency of political discussion.  
We define interest in public affairs as the curiosity in, and the inquisitiveness to exercise some 
control over those matters that effect members of a community. We measured the variable 
interest in public affairs by asking the question: How interested are you in public affairs? The 
question relating to political discussion was asked as follows: When you get together with your 
friends or family, would you say you discuss politics? Reliability analysis showed that these two 
variables could be combined with a Cronbach alpha of α = 0.798, which is in the acceptable 
range. 
 
The question on living conditions was asked in order to elicit subjective perceptions of 
respondent’s conditions of life. Conditions of life are expected to vary with economic aspects 
such as financial situation; their employment situation; relational aspects such as family life; 
social life; their neighbourhood; their home and personal safety;  their own health; their 
country’s health care system.   In general satisfaction hinges most on the degree of satisfaction 
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with the individual’s financial situation (Alber  & Fahey 2004). We postulate that the level and 
quality of service delivery would be an important determinant of quality of life, especially in 
informal settlements.  
 
6.4 PATH MODEL FOR PARTICIPATION IN KHAYELITSHA 
In Figure 6.3 below is a path diagram showing the link between service delivery and protest. A 
number of observations from the figure can be made. The analysis was done of SPSS Amos 18. 
The path model distinguishes direct and indirect effects of variables as well as the sequencing of 
the variables in the generation of participation. The bold arrows relate to path coefficients of 
greater than 0.20 
 
The level of civic engagement as indicated by political engagement and attendance of 
community meetings are relatively better at predicting protest activity than is service delivery 
issues.  The effect of service delivery in the model operates through both direct and indirect 
effects. The direct effect has a standardised β coefficient of -0.12 (much less when compared to 
direct the effect of interest in public affairs, β=0.22).  The total indirect effects of service 
delivery on protest is β=-0.10, thus the total effect of service delivery is β=-0.22. As service 
delivery improves, protest declines.  
 
It is clear from the diagram that the degree of communing as represented by attendance of 
community meetings plays a more important role in generation of protest activity, β=0.22. 
Similarly, interest in public affairs plays an important role in generation of protest than service 
delivery grievances, β=0.20 in the direct path and β=0.05 in the indirect path through meetings, 
meaning that it is the most important determining variable in this model with a total effect of 
0.25 standard deviations.  These variables relate to cognitive awareness, which is, how well 
informed the respondents are about issues. Those who participate in protests are the well 
informed and are involved in considerable communing. 
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Figure 6.2 Simple Path Model Specifying the Link between Service Delivery and Protest 
 
What is also important to describe in that relationship are intermediate relationships. For 
example, there is a very strong relationship between the level of service delivery experienced 
typified by type of housing and service delivery perceptions, β=0.44.  Similarly there is a strong 
relationship between service delivery and perception of living conditions. Both perception of 
service delivery and perception of condition of life affect decision to protest β=-0.16 and β=-0.11 
respectively. This means that as perception of service deliveries improve and when conditions of 
life improve, protest declines. However, both the direct impact of service delivery on protest is 
relatively low β=0.12. 
 
6.6 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has explored the link between service delivery and participation in Khayelitsha. The 
path analysis methodology was employed to analyse this relationship. Path analysis is a useful 
method for discovering how a series of variables are interrelated, by developing a model that 
specifies causal linkages between variables. Although the models presented in this chapter are 
presented in logical fashion, the actual analysis required an iterative process to discover links 
between systems of variables. Furthermore, the development of the model was informed by the 
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service delivery 
 
Perception of 
life condition  
Political engagement 
Attend meeting 
Attend protests 
e1 
e2 
e3 
e4 0.08 
-0.12 
0.22*** 
0.22*** 
0.20*** 
0.36**** 
-0.16** 
-0.11 
0.44*** 
0.08 
0.09 
0.19 
0.22 
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literature analysis of Chapter 3, as well by insights from the fieldwork. I summarise the findings 
in the analysis below. 
 
In the case of the majority of residents of Khayelitsha, relative deprivation manifests itself in 
many ways: lack of housing, access to water only through public taps, distant, communal toilets 
or a lack thereof, lack of electricity connection, poor road infrastructure, or inadequate refuse 
removal and cleansing. An important point is that service delivery is part of a wider set of 
grievances affecting people in Khayelitsha, such as above-average unemployment levels 
compared to the rest of Cape Town, higher levels of crime, and low satisfaction with health and 
education facilities available for the community. Although a significant linkage between service 
delivery and protest was discerned, the high level of correlation between service delivery and 
other ills such as unemployment means it is difficult to isolate the effect of service delivery from 
the rest of the grievances. Moreover, the high correlation between service delivery variables 
prevents meaningful separation of the individual effects of each of the service delivery variables. 
These methodological issues above notwithstanding, the evidence in this chapter indicates that 
grievances play an important and direct role in protest mobilisation, and have negligible effect on 
attendance at meetings.  
 
The importance of attitudes or perceptions towards service delivery plays a crucial role in the 
transmission mechanism that links service delivery and participatory forms. The study results 
show that negative sentiment was certainly associated with higher levels of protest, while 
positive sentiment was associated with attendance at meetings. An important point here is that 
positive and negative sentiment on service delivery cannot be demarcated solely on the basis of 
whether respondents live in formal or informal settlements, although higher levels of 
dissatisfaction were indeed detected in the informal settlements of Khayelitsha. An important 
feature here is that while attendance at meetings is not sensitive to service delivery directly, the 
indirect linkage through perceptions is strong. 
 
As stated above, attendance at community meetings was seen to derive partly from positive 
sentiments regarding service delivery. A number of important conclusions may be drawn: for 
example, meetings should be seen as a method of consolidating service delivery gains, running 
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counter to the belief that in seeking service delivery changes, communities would rely on 
meetings as a first method of engagement. On closer scrutiny, however – and especially in 
considering the differences in the participant profiles for protests and those for meetings – it 
becomes clear that older groups are more likely to be satisfied with delivery than younger 
cohorts.  
 
The indirect link involving attendance at meetings incorporates the role of personal networks, 
degree of political involvement, and media usage as co-determinants of attendance at meetings, 
contact with officials, and indeed, participation in protests. It was found that the higher density of 
networks such as those of organisational involvement predisposed residents to higher levels of 
meeting attendance. Attendance at religious meetings, in particular (which was the organisational 
activity most frequently engaged in), is associated with higher levels of attendance at meetings. 
The more politically engaged citizens were also more likely to be involved in meetings, as were 
those who read newspapers. The importance of networks in mobilisation for meetings is 
explained in resource mobilisation literature (McAdam, 1986; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; 
Schusman & Soule, 2005; Tindall, 2006). However, as Schusman and Soule (2005) put it, it is 
important to add that for some, participant recruitment is unnecessary, as they are ‘hyper 
engaged’.  
 
The indirect link also shows an interesting relationship: that matters operating in the political 
sphere and reported in the media can themselves provoke increases in participation. Viewed in 
this fashion, issues that are reported in the media become catalysts or triggers of intense 
mobilisation. This could explain, for example, how the xenophobic uprisings of 2008 spread 
throughout South Africa. Starting in Alexandra, Johannesburg, the flare-up of violence directed 
at foreigners spread rapidly across the whole country. In a similar fashion, the 2005 service 
delivery protests started at a single point and then spread outwards, aided by the media – 
especially television reportage, with its graphic representations of goings-on in other areas.  
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C h a p t e r  7  
CONCLUSION 
  
7.1 Introduction 
This study addresses the relationship between the experience of service delivery and forms of 
citizen engagement with the state. Several issues that are instrumental to this relationship may be 
identified. The democratic era ushered in 1994 has created the necessary conditions for the 
development of inclusive participatory citizenship. In addition, government has carried out a 
vigorous programme of service delivery improvements in poor communities, particularly the 
hitherto marginalised informal urban settlements and rural settlements. For example, 2.3 million 
houses had been completed by 2008, providing homes for 9.9 million people. In addition, 18.7 
million and 10.7 million people respectively have benefited from new water supplies and basic 
sanitation.  
 
But almost paradoxically, people have taken to the streets. Neither participatory institutions nor 
service delivery have been as successful as they ought to have been; hence the citizens protesting 
against the state – in particular, against local government. The local government sphere is widely 
regarded as being the weakest link in the South African state structure. As its predecessor did in 
the apartheid era, the democratic state has relied overly on high-handed security force action to 
quell unrest, a point that Atkinson (2006) laments. Essentially, the study attempts to relate the 
variation of participation repertoires observed with service delivery intensity. The following are 
summarised objectives of the study in the order in which they are addressed: 
 
 provide a theoretical review of literature (Chapter 2 and 3), 
 describe the level of service delivery in Khayelitsha (Chapter 4),  
 determine the key causes of participation (Chapter 5), 
 determine the relationship between service delivery and participation, and derive the 
causal paths of participation, depicting the interaction of the key determinants (Chapter 
6). 
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Since this study relates to how different levels of service delivery impact on choice of methods 
of engagement with the local state on the individual level, the method selected needed to be able 
to relate differing levels of delivery with different forms of engagement. While previous studies 
done under the auspices of ACCEDE had concentrated on poorer sections of Khayelitsha, to the 
exclusion of (relatively) more well-to-do areas, deliberate effort was made to produce a more 
representative sample of Khayelitsha in the study. The five sites selected therefore include the 
diversity of settlement in Khayelitsha to a large extent. For simplicity, the different settlement 
types were abridged into formal settlements and informal settlements, based on type of dwelling: 
formal brick and mortar houses, or informal ‘shack’-type structures made of improvised building 
materials – corrugated iron, wood, and plastic, to mention a few. In addition to establishing the 
type of dwelling in which the respondent lived and, objectively, what access to services they 
enjoyed, several perceptional questions were asked on the degree of (dis)satisfaction with service 
delivery variables such as housing, water supply, sanitation, electricity and refuse removal. Also, 
several questions were asked on forms of participation in which in which the respondents had 
engaged in the past year. It was then possible to use different quantitative techniques to relate the 
different forms of service delivery and repertoires of participation.  
 
I began Chapter 2 by reflecting on ‘the Political Economy of Water in South Africa’. In that 
chapter my main aim had been to provide a broad understanding of issues in water services 
delivery, which is a key component of the malfunctioning system of delivery of basic services. 
While service delivery combines several services – housing, water supply and sanitation, refuse 
removal and electricity, to mention the key components – water service delivery problems facing 
the country today are largely due to colonial and apartheid policies which bequeathed the nation 
a racially defined services infrastructure. Considered to be at the bottom of the social structure 
during apartheid, fewer than half of all black South Africans had access to running water in 
1996, while the other race groups had access rates over 95%. Since the post-apartheid 
government has prioritised water service delivery as part of its social transformation 
programmes, water services was a suitable programme by which government performance could 
be evaluated.  
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The legislative framework for water in South Africa was reviewed; in particular, how the right to 
water in Section 27 of the Constitution could be operationalised. Three key judgements relating 
to the legal interpretation of the right of access to water were passed during the final stages of 
this study. This matter relates to an application by residents of Phiri in Johannesburg, who 
approached the High Court seeking relief from the City of Johannesburg’s policy of installing 
prepaid meters on their properties. They contended that these meters infringed their right to 
sufficient water, and contended further that the installation of prepaid meters was illegal. The 
Witwatersrand High Court doubled allocations of water to 50 litres per person per day and 
declared the forced installation of prepaid water systems unconstitutional. This decision was 
overturned on appeal by the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA). The SCA replaced the High Court 
order with an allocation of 42 litres per person per day. Furthermore, the City of Johannesburg 
was ordered to reformulate their free water policy in light of this new amount. Although the SCA 
ruled that the prepaid meters were illegal, it suspended that order for two years to allow the city 
to legalise the use of prepaid meters in so far as it may be possible for them to do so. However, 
these rulings were superseded by the Constitutional Court, which ruled that prepaid meters were 
legal. In addition, the court declared that it was outside the judicial ambit to determine the 
amount of free water that could be regarded as sufficient.  
 
In Chapter 3 discussed the concept of citizenship and how citizens mobilise when issues that are 
close to them do not conform to their expectations. The significance of citizenship in the wider 
issues of governance and development has attracted increasing interest in at least the past 30 
years. Within this debate, citizen participation has been viewed as a key strategy for addressing 
social ills, and often it has come to be viewed as a panacea for all development problems. While 
the citizenship agenda as a means of empowering citizens has suffered from elite capture and co-
option into the state agenda, protest action has remained an option for circumventing these 
depredations. Social movements and protest action, however, should not be disassociated from 
citizenship; it should be seen as an alternative to conventional participation. In that light I briefly 
scan the theory of social movement mobilisation, with a view to explaining how the process of 
mobilisation occurs.  
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7.2 EMPIRICAL REFLECTIONS 
Chapter 4 highlighted the variations in service delivery in Khayelitsha between and within each 
of the selected study sites. As expected, the informal areas receive poorer service delivery than 
the formal areas. Although the chapter focused mainly on water services delivery, I demonstrated 
that informal areas also lack other forms of services, such as housing and electricity. Invariably, 
there is a strong correlation between type of dwelling and quantity and quality of service 
delivery, including water and sanitation. Such service delivery attainments form the foundation 
on which the levels of service delivery satisfaction are based. Reinforcing this relationship is the 
high degree of correlation between service delivery attainment by individuals and other 
indicators of level of socio-economic well-being, such as unemployment and educational level. 
In fact, some of these factors operate in direct causation with the type of dwelling in which each 
respondent lives. For example, those with lower educational attainments invariably lack 
employment opportunities and are therefore more likely to live in informal settlements, and vice 
versa.  
 
The study was able to pinpoint issues that affect participation regarding service delivery in South 
Africa. While certainly water services are indispensable in sustaining human activity, as the 
study progressed it became clear that water in itself was not necessarily the key determinant of 
such participation. Moreover, there exists a high correlation between the service delivery 
attainments for water, sanitation, refuse removal, electricity and type of house. The explanation 
is relatively simple, as argued above – informal settlements lack adequate service provision, 
while formal settlements are adequately provisioned. When considered together, these variables 
showed that there was a higher propensity for poorer communities living in informal settlements 
to engage in protests than for those living in formal houses.  
 
In one sense, what the study did was to prove the understandable – that service delivery 
problems increase citizens’ propensity for protest. (I say ‘understandable’, because the link has 
been a matter of conjecture for a long time; in fact, many protests have been so-called ‘service 
delivery’ protests.) This link was tested using quantitative data. A number of linkages between 
‘poor service delivery’ and protests could be discerned:  
 The direct linkage between service delivery and protests. 
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 The indirect linkage, through negative service delivery perceptions and other variables. 
 
Each of these linkages is discussed further on in Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 respectively. 
 
In addition to the direct and indirect linkages between level of service delivery (water included), 
and participation it was revealed that cognitive awareness plays a vital role in participation. 
Political engagement, measured as a combination of frequency of political discussion and 
interest in public affairs. Higher levels of cognitive awareness were found to be a critical element 
for engaging in debate and protest. 
 
7.3.1 The direct link between protests and service delivery 
The role of grievances in social mobilisation has been the subject of intense study, with mixed 
results (see Opp, 1988; McCathy & Zald, 1977; Klandermans, 1984) which led to the search for 
alternative theories such as the resource mobilisation theories (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Tindall, 
2006; McAdam, 1986; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Schusman & Soule, 2005). The grievance 
approaches such as the relative deprivation models posit that the frustrations of relatively 
underprivileged groups are the source of intense mobilisation, culminating in protests, extreme 
armed insurrection, and revolution.  
 
In the case of the majority of residents of Khayelitsha, relative deprivation manifests itself in 
many ways: lack of formal housing, access of water only through public taps, distant communal 
toilets or no toilets at all, lack of electricity connection, poor road infrastructure, or inadequate 
refuse removal and cleansing. Since type of housing largely determines type of other services, it 
was used here as a proxy of service delivery. In Figure 7.1 below it is shown that attendance at 
meetings is marginally correlated with improvement of house status from informal to formal (β= 
0.08). In essence, this result indicates that there is hardly any difference in attendance likelihood 
that can be attributed to staying in either of the two different settlement forms. However, in the 
case of protests the there is a discernible link that can be detected, as indicated by a relatively 
large coefficient (β= 0.12). This means that a change from formal to informal housing increases 
participation in protest.  
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Figure 7.1 Direct Link between service delivery and participation 
 
 
 
Service delivery is not the only grievance in Khayelitsha; the area experiences above-average 
unemployment levels compared to the rest of Cape Town, high fear of crime, and low 
satisfaction with the health and education facilities available to the community. Although a 
significant linkage between service delivery and protest was discerned, the high level of 
correlation between service delivery and other ills such as unemployment means it is difficult to 
isolate the effect of service delivery from the rest of the grievances. Moreover, the high 
correlation between service delivery variables prevents meaningful separation of the individual 
effects of each of the service delivery variables.  
 
Notwithstanding the above, the evidence presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 indicates that 
grievances play an important role in social mobilisation. Although service delivery deficiencies 
are linked to higher propensities for protest, the same could not be said for the direct link 
between attendance of meetings and service delivery. It seems that attendance at public meetings 
in Khayelitsha is very high in both the informal settlements and the formal housing, indicating 
high social capital within the community. Although public meetings are called to address one 
form of community issue or another, demobilisation of communities has become commonplace 
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in post apartheid South Africa, akin to America’s ‘bowling alone’ articulated by Robert Putnam 
(1995).  During the anti-apartheid struggle active mobilisation of communities was necessary to 
overcome the system, but communities gradually demobilised in the euphoric aftermath of the 
1994 elections and the swearing-in of the ANC-led government. As indicated in Section 3.4, this 
relationship was destined to shift from subversion to patriotism. But this would not be the only 
change: in addition, in the period immediately after 1994 the ANC managed to demobilise large 
parts of civil society through assimilation, and the deployment of social movement leadership 
into the civil service.  
 
7.2.2 The indirect link between service delivery and participation 
In addition to the discovery of the link between service delivery and participation forms, one of 
the key aims of this study has been to clarify how such a linkage works in practice. It was 
hypothesised that attitudes or perceptions towards particular grievances play a crucial role in the 
transmission mechanisms that link service delivery and participatory forms. For example, it was 
hypothesised that negative attitudes towards service delivery would be associated with higher 
levels of militant participatory engagement, while positive attitudes would be associated with 
acquiescent forms of participation. The results showed that negative sentiment was indeed 
associated with higher levels of protest, while positive sentiment was associated with attendance 
of meetings. An important point here is that positive and negative sentiment on service delivery 
cannot be demarcated solely on the basis of respondents living in informal or formal settlements. 
Importantly, while attendance at meetings is not sensitive to service delivery directly, the indirect 
linkage through perceptions is strong. Figure 7.2 below provides a summary model of the link 
between service delivery on one hand and participation on the other, as exemplified by 
attendances at public meetings and protests. 
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Figure 7.2 Summary Model of Participation in Khayelitsha 
 
 
As I have shown, attendance at community meetings was seen to derive partly from positive 
sentiment towards service delivery. There is an important conclusion to be drawn from this: 
meetings should be seen as a method of consolidating service delivery gains. This result runs 
counter to the belief that in seeking service delivery changes, communities would rely on 
meetings as a first method of engagement. On closer scrutiny, however – especially in 
considering the differences in the participant profiles for protests and meetings – it becomes clear 
that older groups are more likely to be satisfied with delivery than younger cohorts are.  
 
The indirect link involving attendance at meetings incorporates the role of personal networks, 
degree of political involvement, and media usage as co-determinants of attendance of meetings, 
contact with officials and, indeed, participation in protests. It was found that a higher density of 
networks such as organisational involvement predisposed residents to higher levels of meeting 
attendance. Attendance at religious meetings (which was the organisational activity most 
frequently engaged in), in particular, is associated with higher levels of attendance at meetings. 
The more politically engaged citizens were also more likely to be involved in meetings, as were 
Type of dwelling 
Perception of 
service delivery 
 
Perception of 
life condition  
Political engagement 
Attend meeting 
Attend protests 
e1 
e2 
e3 
e4 0.08 
-0.12 
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0.36**** 
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those who read newspapers. The importance of networks in mobilisation for meetings is 
explained in the resource mobilisation literature, which posits that beyond grievances (many of 
which are held without any mobilisation) is recruitment into the mobilisation network (McAdam, 
1986; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Schusman & Soule, 2005; Tindall, 2006). However, as 
Schusman and Soule (2005) point out, it is important to add that for some people participant 
recruitment is unnecessary, as they are ‘hyper engaged’.  
 
The indirect link also demonstrates a point of interest: matters operating in the political sphere 
and reported in the media can themselves provoke increases in participation. Viewed this way, 
issues that are reported in the media become catalysts of or triggers for intense mobilisation. This 
could be how the xenophobic uprisings of 2008 spread throughout South Africa. Starting in 
Alexandra, Johannesburg, the flare-up of violence directed at foreigners spread rapidly across the 
whole country. In a similar fashion, the 2004/2005, 2007, and 2009/2010 service delivery 
protests started at a single point and then spread outwards, aided by the media – especially 
television reportage, with its graphic representations of goings-on in other areas. 
 
7.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
At the beginning of the dissertation, I stated that I wanted to understand the link between service 
delivery (in particular, water service delivery) and citizen participation. I was encouraged to 
probe this link by the now-entrenched, so-called ‘service delivery’ protests of 2005. The 2005 
protests reportedly attracted scrutiny by intelligence organs (ISS, 2007). The alleged existence of 
a ‘Third Force’ clearly signalled it was not business as usual. (During the anti-apartheid struggle, 
the ‘Third Force’ comprised elements of the apartheid security apparatus that covertly infiltrated 
the ANC and other anti-apartheid groups). Government had been caught unprepared, if the 
alleged activation of intelligence agencies to probe these protests is true. Moreover, statements in 
response from politicians in government and from the ANC were combative. Government was 
looking in the wrong direction. As S’bu Zikode, the chairperson of Abahlali Base Mjondolo 
would respond sardonically: 
 
There definitely is a Third Force. The question is what is and who is part of the 
Third Force? Well, I am the Third Force myself. The Third Force is all the pain 
and the suffering that the poor are subjected to every second of our lives. The 
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shack dwellers have many things to say about the Third Force. It is time for us to 
speak out and to say this is who we are, this is where we are and this is how we 
live. The life that we are living makes our communities the Third Force (Zikode, 
2005) 
 
In fact, if Zikode’s statement is accurate, what links protests in South Africa is not an amorphous 
entity or some shadowy group, but similar conditions of deprivation that all the poor in South 
Africa face. The findings of this study support Zikode’s conclusion. What drives people towards 
protest relates to their material conditions. In a sense, this finding is largely expected. It has been 
printed in the newspapers. Everyone can see it, yet not everyone acknowledges it. Perhaps what 
is more perplexing is why certain communities rise up when similarly- placed communities do 
nothing.  
 
So do water services delivery inadequacies lead to protest? The answer to that question is 
complex. First, there are many cases in which water services have been stated as one of the key 
drivers of protest, rather than the sole reason. The Phiri Case, which took the residents of Phiri in 
Johannesburg to the High Court, and subsequently right up to the Constitutional Court, is 
acknowledged as one of the few in the country that have focused solely on water. My analysis in 
this study reveals that problems relating to service delivery issues, almost always occur 
simultaneously across different services. As described above, there is high correlation between 
service delivery and settlement type. In most instances, informal settlements lack facilities. In 
fact, the peculiarity of the Phiri case becomes clearer when one notes that it did not deal with 
failure to provide services. Instead, the case focused on changes in attributes of a service already 
being provided – from limitless consumption at a fixed charge, to prepaid meters dispensing only 
6 000 litres per household connection per month, provided through the Free Basic Water policy.  
 
 Given the high correlation between different services, it is difficult to separate the effect of lack 
of water services from other services that are lacking, and indeed other extraneous issues such as 
unemployment and poverty, which are commonplace in the areas that lack services. There is a 
clear, direct connection between the want for services in general (as opposed to a want for water 
alone) and protest. There seems to be no direct connection between service delivery and 
attendance at public meetings, as attendance rates are high throughout Khayelitsha, regardless of 
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the state of service delivery. However, there is an indirect connection between the state of 
service delivery and public meetings intermediated by service delivery perceptions. This in fact 
points to the importance of perceptions as a crucial intervening variable for both protest and 
public meeting attendance. 
 
Several other intervening variables such as the mass media, political involvement, organisational 
affiliations, and others have a fundamental involvement in the generation of protests and public 
meetings. In fact, attendance at public meetings of itself is an important intervening variable in 
the generation of protest. I have been able to pin down (at some level of abstraction) a 
mechanism of generation of protest; and I must state that this is specific to Khayelitsha. The state 
may well need to heed the message of the various protestors: though these protests do not as yet 
threaten the foundations of the democratic system, they are expression of betrayal.  
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A p p e n d i x  1  
CENTRE FOR SOUTHERN AFRICAN STUDIES KHAYELITSHA QUESTIONNAIRE  
Respondent No.    
Interviewer No.    
Data Entry No.    
 
Interviewer: select appropriate code for Town/Village 
 
Site  
Khayelitsha Site C 100 
Khayelitsha T1 V1 101 
Khayelitsha T1 V4 102 
Khayelitsha T2 V4 104 
 
Household Selection Procedure 
Interviewer: it is your job to select a random household. This means any household. A household 
is a group of people who presently eat together from the same pot.  
 
Start your walk pattern from a point that has been randomly chosen by your Field Supervisor. 
Team members must walk in opposite directions to each other. If A walks towards the sun, B 
must walk away from the sun. C and D must walk at right angles to A and B. 
 
Use the day code to determine the sampling interval. For example, on the 5
th
, 14
th
, and 23
rd
 of 
the month, the day code (and sampling interval) is five. So you choose the fifth dwelling structure 
on the right. On the 6
th
, 15
th
 and 24
th
 of the month, sampling interval is six. So you choose the 
sixth dwelling on the right and so on. 
 
Interviewer: If a call is unsuccessful, use the table below to record your progress until you make 
a successful call. Circle a code number for unsuccessful calls only.  
 
 
Reasons For Unsuccessful calls Hous
e 
hold 
1 
Hous
e 
Hold 
2  
Hous
e 
Hold 
3 
Hous
e 
Hold 
4 
Hous
e 
Hold 
5 
Hous
e 
Hold 
6 
Hous
e 
Hold 
7 
Refused to be interviewed 001 001 001 001 001 001 001 
Person selected was not at home 002 002 002 002 002 002 002 
Household premises empty at 003 003 003 003 003 003 003 
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the time of survey 
Not a citizen/ spoke only a 
foreign language 
004 004 004 004 004 004 004 
Deaf/ did not speak a language 005 005 005 005 005 005 005 
Did not fit gender quota 006 006 006 006 006 006 006 
No adults in household 007 007 007 007 007 007 007 
Other (specify) 008 008 008 008 008 008 008 
Not applicable 997 997 997 997 997 997 997 
 
If no- one is at home (i.e. premises empty) substitute with the very next household to the right. If 
interview is refused, use the day code to select substitute household (i.e. after a sampling 
interval) 
 
When you find a household with someone home, introduce yourself using the following script. 
You must learn this introduction so that you can say it exactly as it is written below:  
 
Good day. My name is ________________________. I am from the University of the 
Western Cape, a university located in Bellville. I do not represent the government or 
any political party. We are studying views of residents of Khayelitsha about water 
service delivery. We would like to discuss these with a member of your household. 
Every person in Khayelitsha has an equal chance of being included in this study. 
Your personal information will be kept confidential. Your household has been 
chosen by chance. We would like to choose an adult from your household. Would 
you help us pick one? Note: the person must give their consent by answering positively. 
If participation is refused, walk away from the household. Use the day code to substitute 
household. If consent is secured, proceed as follows: 
 
 
Respondent selection procedure. 
Interviewer: within the household, it is your job to select a random (this means any) individual. 
This individual becomes the interview respondent. In addition, you are responsible for 
alternating between men and women. Circle correct code number below 
 First Interview Male Female 
Previous interview was with a : 0 1 2 
This interview must be with a:  1 2 
 
Please tell me all the names of all males/females [select correct gender] who presently live in 
this household. I only want names of males/females [select correct gender] who are citizens of 
South Africa and who are 18 years old and older. If this interview must be with a female, list 
only women’s names. If this interview is to be with a male, list men’s names. List all eligible 
household members of this gender who are 18 years or older, even those who not presently at 
home but will return to the house at any time of the day. Include only citizens of South Africa. 
 
Women’s names Men’s names 
1. 1. 
2. 2. 
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3. 3. 
4. 4. 
5. 5. 
6. 6. 
7. 7. 
8. 8. 
9. 9. 
10. 10. 
 Take out a deck of numbered cards. Present them face down so that the numbers cannot be seen. 
Ask the person who is selecting respondents to pick any card, by saying:  
 
Please choose a card. The person who corresponds to the number chosen will be the person 
interviewed. Interviewer: remember to circle the code number of person selected on the table 
above. 
 
The person I need to speak to is: [insert name] ______________________. Is this person 
presently at home? 
 
If yes:  May I please interview this person now? 
If no:  Will this person return here any time today? 
If no:  Thank you very much. I will select another household. Substitute with the next 
household to the right and repeat the respondent selection procedure.[NOTE: You can 
only substitute households, not individuals] 
If yes:   Please tell this person that I will return for an interview at [insert convenient time]. 
If this person is not present when you call back, replace this household with the next one] 
 
If the selected respondent is not the same person that you first met, repeat introduction. 
 
 
Good day. My name is ________________________. I am from the University of the 
Western Cape, a university located in Bellville. I do not represent the government or 
any political party. We are studying views of residents of Khayelitsha about how 
they in. We would like to discuss these with a member of your household.  
 
Your answers will be confidential. They will be put together with 300 other people 
we are talking to, to get an overall picture. It will be impossible to pick you out from 
what you say, so please feel free to tell us what you think. This interview will take 
about 30 minutes. There is no penalty for refusing to participate. Do you wish to 
proceed? [Proceed with interview only if the answer is positive] 
 
If the interviewee refuses to answer any question, write ‘refused’ in the answer space and 
continue to the next section. 
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BEGIN INTERVIEW 
 
1. Let’s begin by recording a few facts about you. 
How old are you? 
[Interviewer: enter 3-digit number. Don’t know = 999] 
[Interviewer: if respondent is aged less than 18, stop interview and 
use cards to randomly draw another respondent in the same 
household] 
   
 
 
2. Are you a head of household? Interviewer: circle one 
correct answer 
No Yes Don’t 
Know 
 0 1 9 
 
 
3. What is your marital status 
1. Married-civil/religious 1 
Married-customary/traditional 2 
Living together as married 3 
Single - Never married 4 
Widow/Widower 5 
Separated 6 
Divorced 7 
 
4. Which South African language do you speak at home? 
English 001 SeTswana 105 
Afrikaans 100 Shangaan / SeTshangane 106 
Ndebele 101 Swazi / Swati 107 
Xhosa 102 Venda 108 
SiPedi / North Sotho 103 Zulu 109 
SeSotho / South Sotho 104 Other (Specify) Post 
Code 
 
 
 5. Number of Children: what is the … 
Total number of 
children  
001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 010 011 012 
B. Number of 
children living with 
you 
001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 010 011 012 
C. Number of 
children living 
elsewhere 
001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 010 011 012 
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LET’S TURN TO ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
 
6. In general how would you describe:  
 Very 
good 
Fairly 
good 
Neither 
good 
nor 
bad 
Fairly 
bad 
Very 
bad 
Don’t 
know 
A. The present economic condition of this 
country 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
B. Your own present living conditions 1 2 3 4 5 9 
 
7. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A 
or Statement B 
A. The government’s economic policies 
have helped most people; only a few have 
suffered. 
B. The government’s economic 
policies have hurt most people; only 
a few have benefited.  
Agree very strongly 
with A 
Agree with A Agree with B Agree very 
strongly with B 
Agree with neither [do not read] 5 
Don’t know [do not read] 9 
 
 
8. Is your life better, about the same or worse than under apartheid? [read out 
responses]  
Much worse  
Worse+  
Same  
Better  
Much better  
Don’t know [do not read]  
Too young to remember [do not read]  
Don’t know [do not read]  
 
PROBLEMS FACING KHAYELITSHA 
 
9. In your opinion, what are the three most important problems facing Khayelitsha 
that the municipality and government should address? [do not read –code from 
answer] 
 
 1
st
 2
nd
 3rd 
Unemployment    
Rates and taxes    
Transportation    
Education    
Housing    
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Electricity    
Water supply    
Sanitation    
Refuse Removal & Cleansing    
Storm water/ Drainage    
Health    
HIV/Aids    
Crime & security    
Nothing    
Don’t Know    
Other 1    
Other 2    
Other 3    
 
10. How well do you think the CITY OF CAPE TOWN is handling the following 
matters? [Probe strength of opinion] 
 
 Very 
badly 
Fairly 
badly  
Fairly 
Well 
Very  
well 
Don’t 
know 
A. Housing      
B. Water supply      
C. Sanitation      
D Refuse Removal & Cleansing      
E. Electricity      
 
11. How well do you think NATIONAL GOVERNMENT is handling the following 
matters [Probe strength of opinion] 
 
 Very 
badly 
Fairly 
badly  
Fairly 
Well 
Very  
well 
Don’t 
know 
A. Managing the economy      
B. Narrowing gap between rich and poor      
C. Education      
D HIV /Aids      
E. Housing      
 
12a. How do you get your drinking water? 
 001 
Piped – internal with meter 002 
Piped – internal with prepaid meter 003 
Piped – yard tap with meter 004 
Piped – yard tap with prepaid meter 005 
Piped – paid communal tap 006 
Piped – yard tap with no meter 007 
Piped – free communal tap 008 
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Other (specify)  Code  
 
12b. [Interviewer: ask only if water is paid for (i.e. code 001-006 in 12a)] What do 
you think of the amount you pay? 
 Too 
high 
High About 
right 
Low Too 
low 
Don’t 
know 
 5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
12c. [Interviewer: ask only if water is paid for (i.e. code 001& 003 in 12a)] Have you 
ever had your water disconnected? 
 Yes No Not 
Sure 
 1 2 9 
 
13. What type of toilet do you use?  
Flush – internal 001 
Flush – yard 002 
Flush – communal 003 
Improved/VIP latrine – yard 004 
Improved/VIP latrine – communal 005 
Ordinary pit latrine – yard 006 
Ordinary pit latrine 007 
Chemical toilet – yard 009 
Chemical toilet – communal 010 
Bucket toilet 011 
No toilet access 012 
Other (specify)  Code  
 
14.  
A. Water should be provided for free 
because it’s a right. 
B. It is costly to provide water, people 
must pay for it. 
Agree very strongly 
with A 
Agree with A Agree with B Agree very 
strongly with B 
Agree with neither [do not read] 5 
Don’t know [do not read] 9 
 
LET’S NOW TURN TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND REPRESENTATION 
 
15. How often do you get news from the following sources? 
 Every 
Day 
A few 
times 
a week 
A few 
times 
a 
month 
Less 
than 
once a 
month 
Never Don’t 
know 
Radio 4 3 2 1 0 9 
Television 4 3 2 1 0 9 
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Newspaper 4 3 2 1 0 9 
 
 
16. How interested are you in public affairs? 
Very interested  3 
Somewhat interested 2 
Not very interested 1 
Not at all interested 0 
Don’t know [do not read] 9 
 
17. When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss 
politics? 
Frequently  3 
Occasionally 2 
Never 1 
Don’t know [do not read] 9 
 
18. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 
A or Statement B 
A. In our country women should 
have equal rights to and receive the 
same treatment as men. 
B. Women have always been subject to 
traditional laws and customs and should 
remain so. 
Agree very strongly 
with A 
Agree with A Agree with B Agree very strongly 
with B 
Agree with neither [do not read] 5 
Don’t know [do not read] 9 
 
19. 15. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose 
Statement A or Statement B 
A. Government should be able to ban any 
organisation that goes against its policies. 
B. We should be able to join any 
organisation, whether or not 
government approves of it. 
Agree very strongly 
with A 
Agree with A Agree with B Agree very 
strongly with B 
Agree with neither [do not read] 5 
Don’t know [do not read] 9 
 
20. Can you tell me the name of: [interviewer: write down the respondent’s answer. Then 
circle correct code. If you do not know correct name, consult your supervisor, fill in correct 
name, and circle relevant code before leaving PSU. 
  Don’t 
know 
Know but 
cant 
remember 
Incorrect 
guess 
Correct 
name 
Your 
representative 
Name:_____________________ 
Correct Answer:  
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in National 
Assembly 
(MP) 
Your elected 
Ward 
councillor 
Name:_____________________ 
Correct Answer:  
    
 
  Don’t 
know 
Know 
but 
can’t 
rememb
er 
Incorrec
t guess 
Correct 
name 
President Name:________________
_____ 
Correct Answer: Thabo 
Mbeki 
    
Premier Name:________________
_____ 
Correct Answer: Ibrahim 
Rasool 
    
Mayor Name:________________
_____ 
Correct Answer: Helen 
Zille 
    
 
 
22. Who should be responsible for; [read out options]  
 President 
and 
executive 
National 
assembly/ 
local 
council 
Their 
political 
party 
Voters  Don’t 
know 
A. Making sure that, once elected, 
members of National Assembly do 
their jobs  
0 1 2 3 9 
B. Making sure that, once elected, 
members of local councils do their 
jobs 
0 1 2 3 9 
 
23.  
How much time do you think the following try their best to listen to what people 
have to say [read out options]  
 Never Only 
sometimes 
Often Always Don’t 
know 
Members of National Assembly 0 1 2 3 9 
Elected Local Government Councillors 0 1 2 3 9 
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24. Understanding that some South Africans were not able to register as voters 
for the 2004 elections, which statement is true for you [read out options] 
You were registered to vote 1 
You did not want to register 2 
You could not find a place to register 3 
You were prevented from registering 4 
You were too young to register 5 
You were not registered for some other reason 6 
Don’t know/Can’t remember 9 
 
25. If response above was 2-6, circle 7. If response above was that they registered to 
vote or don’t know/can’t remember code 9), ask] With regard to the most recent, 
(2004) elections, which statement is true for you? [read out options] 
You voted in last election 1 
You decided not to vote 2 
You could not find the polling station 3 
You were prevented from voting 4 
You did not have time to vote 5 
You did not vote for some other reason 6 
You were not registered  7 
Don’t know/Can’t remember 9 
 
LET’S TURN TO YOUR ROLE IN THE COMMUNITY/CITIZENHIP 
 
26. Do you belong to any of the following; and what is your level of engagement 
 Offici
al 
Active 
Memb
er 
Inacti
ve 
memb
er 
Not a 
memb
er 
Don’t 
know 
A. A Religious Group e.g. church 3 2 1 0 9 
B. A trade union  3 2 1 0 9 
C. A professional or business association 3 2 1 0 9 
D. community development or self-help 
association 
3 2 1 0 9 
E. A political party 3 2 1 0 9 
F. A social movement/activist group 3 2 1 0 9 
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27. Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of 
these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these during the 
past year. [If yes read out options 2-4] If not, would you do this if you had a 
chance?[For no read out options 0-1] 
 Definitely Might 
 
Would 
never 
do this 
Don’t 
Know 
A. skipped paying for electricity     
B. skipped paying for water     
C. skipped paying for sewage     
 
********Interviewer switch on recorder*************** 
28. In the past year, do you think you have received a fair share of what you need 
of the following?  
 Yes No 
A. Electricity   
B. Water   
C. Education   
D. Health delivery   
 
28b. If no, tell us why you think this is so? 
 
29. Which one of the statements is closest to your view? Choose statement A or 
Statement B 
A. People should look after themselves and 
be responsible for their own success in life. 
B. Government has the main 
responsibility for the well-being of 
people. 
Agree very strongly 
with A 
Agree with A Agree with B Agree very 
strongly with B 
Agree with neither [do not read] 5 
Don’t know [do not read] 9 
 
 30. During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following 
persons about some important problem or to give them your views? [read out 
options]] 
 never once Few 
times 
often Don’t 
Know 
A. Local Government Councillor      
B. Local MP      
C. Official of Government department      
D. Political party official      
E. Religious leader      
F. Some other influential person (prompt 
if necessary: You know, someone with 
more money or power who you know can 
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speak on your behalf) 
 
31. Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of 
these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these during the 
past year. [If yes read out options 2-4] If not, would you do this if you had a 
chance?[For no read out options 0-1] 
 Yes No  
 Often Several 
times 
Once or 
twice 
Would 
do if 
had a 
chance 
Would 
never 
do this 
Don’t 
Know 
A. Attended a community 
meeting 
      
B. Got together with others 
to raise an issue 
      
C. Attended a 
demonstration or protest 
march 
      
D. attended an ‘imbizo’ 
held by the President or 
Cabinet Minister 
      
 
 
 
31b. Interviewer: probe each of the responses above e.g. you say you would never attend an 
imbizo, why is this so? 
 
32. Have any of the following people ever actively encouraged you to participate 
in community meetings? 
 Yes  No Don’t 
know 
A. Family member/relative 1 2 9 
B. Friend 1 2 9 
C. Neighbour 1 2 9 
D. Political party representative 1 2 9 
E. Work/school/classmate 1 2 9 
F. Speaker at a community meeting 1 2 9 
G. Activist at a trade union/associational gathering 1 2 9 
H. Other 1 1 2 9 
I. Other 2 1 2 9 
 
32b. Who do you think has had (or is likely to have) the most profound impact on you in 
this regard? 
 
34. Which of the following two actions would you consider as the more effective 
method of engaging with authorities, with regards to getting better services in 
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general & water in particular? 
Community participatory forums 001 
Protests and demonstrations 002 
Contacting an elected leader e.g. ward councillor or MP 003 
Doing nothing – it never works 004 
Other[specify] Post Code  
34b. Tell me why you think the method you have selected is the most effective. 
34c. What other alternatives would you suggest? 
 
35. Which one of the statements is closest to your view? Choose statement A or 
Statement B 
A. Protest action is a useful alternative to 
make municipal and government officials 
listen. 
B. Engaging/meeting with officials is 
always the most effective method. 
Agree very strongly 
with A 
Agree with A Agree with B Agree very 
strongly with B 
Agree with neither [do not read] 5 
Don’t know[do not read] 9 
 
36. Which one of the statements is closest to your view? Choose statement A or 
Statement B 
A. It’s better to find lawful solutions to 
problems even if it takes longer.  
B. It is sometimes necessary to 
disobey the law to solve problems 
immediately using other means 
Agree very strongly 
with A 
Agree with A Agree with B Agree very 
strongly with B 
Agree with neither [do not read] 5 
Don’t know[do not read] 9 
 
36b. Why do you think so? 
 
37. Which one of the statements is closest to your view? Choose statement A or 
Statement B 
A. The use of violence is never justified in 
South African politics today.  
B. In this country, it is sometimes 
necessary to use violence in support 
of a just cause. 
Agree very strongly 
with A 
Agree with A Agree with B Agree very 
strongly with B 
Agree with neither [do not read] 5 
Don’t know [do not read] 9 
 
37b. Why do you think so? 
33. What do you think about living in Khayelitsha in general? 
 
*************Switch off recorder ****************** 
LET’S RETURN TO QUESTIONS ABOUT YOU 
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38. What is the highest level of education completed? [code from answer: do not read 
options] 
No formal schooling 100 
Informal schooling 101 
Some primary  102 
Completed primary 103 
Some secondary 104 
Completed secondary 105 
Post secondary 106 
Some University 107 
University completed 108 
Post-graduate 109 
Don’t know  999 
 
39. What is your religion, if any? [code from answer: do not read options] 
None 100 
Catholic 101 
Protestant (Mainstream) 102 
Protestant (Evangelical/Pentecostal) 103 
African Independent Church 104 
Traditional religion 105 
Hindu 106 
Agnostic (Do not know if there is a God) 107 
Atheist (Do not believe in God) 108 
Christian (general) 109 
Muslim –Sunni 110 
Muslim – Shiite 111 
Jehovah’s Witness 112 
Seventh Day Adventist 113 
Other [Specify] Post Code  
Don’t Know 999 
 
 
40 Excluding weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?  
Never 1 
About once a year or less 2 
About once every several months 3 
About once a month 4 
About once a week 5 
More than once a week 6 
Don’t know 9 
 
41. What is your main occupation? [code from answer: do not read options] 
unemployed 001 
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Informal trader/vendor/hawker 002 
Domestic worker/maid/char 003 
Army/police/security 004 
Artisan/skilled manual 005 
Unskilled manual 005 
Clerical Worker 006 
Business person – less than 10 employees 007 
Business person – more than 10 employees 008 
Professional worker e.g. lawyer, accountant, nurse, engineer 009 
Retail worker 010 
Student 011 
Housewife 012 
 
 
 
ALL SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ANSWERED BY INTERVIEWER AFTER 
THE INTERVIEW IS CONCLUDED 
 
42. Respondent’s Gender  
Male 1 
Female 2 
 
43. Respondents race  
Black/African 01 South Asian (Pakistan, India etc 05 
White 02 East Asian (Chinese, Korean, 
Indonesian etc) 
06 
Coloured 03 Other 95 
Arab/Lebanese/North African 04   
 
44. Which of the following types best describes the main dwelling unit that this 
household occupies? 
 
House, brick structure 001 
Flat in block of flats 002 
Town/cluster/semi- detached 003 
House/flat in back yard 004 
Informal dwelling in back yard 005 
Informal dwelling not in back yard e.g. informal settlement 006 
Room/flat let not in backyard - shared property 007 
Caravan/tent 008 
Workers’ hostel 009 
Other-specify Post 
code 
 
 
45. Which language was the interview conducted in? 
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46. Were there any people immediately present who might have been listening 
during the interview? 
No- one 1 
Spouse only 2 
Children only 3 
A few others 4 
Small crowd 5 
 
47. Yes No 
A. Did the respondent check with others for information to answer a 
question? 
  
B. Do you think anyone influenced the respondent’s answers during 
the interview? 
  
C. Were you approached by community and or political party 
representatives? 
  
D. Did you feel threatened during the interview?   
E. Were you physically threatened during the interview?   
 
48. What proportion of the questions did the respondent haved difficulty 
answering? 
All 4 
Most 3 
Some 2 
Few 1 
None 0 
 
 
 
 
 
49. What was the respondent’s attitude toward you during the interview? 
S/he was  Friendly In between Hostile 
S/he was  Interested In between Bored 
S/he was  Cooperative In between Uncooperative 
S/he was  Patient In between Impatient 
S/he was  At ease In between Suspicious 
S/he was  Honest In between Misleading 
 
 
Signature Page 
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Interviewer’s comments, if any: 
 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
________________________ 
 
 
Interviewer: I hereby certify that this interview was conducted in accordance with instructions 
received during training. All responses recorded here are those of the respondent, who was 
chosen by the appropriate selection method. 
 
 
Interviewer Signature______________________ 
 
 
 
Supervisor’s Comments: (if any) 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________ 
 
 
 
Supervisor’s Signature: _______________________ 
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A p p e n d i x  2  
DATA RECODING FOR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
1. Age 
The variable age was not changed, and captures each respondent’s stated age at the time of the 
interview. Most other variables were changed into binary variables in which the expected more 
militant group was coded ‘1’ while the one expected to be less militant was coded ‘0’, as 
explained below. Mean age was 36.17 years. 
 
2. Sex of respondent 
The males were recoded 1 while the females were recoded 0. The sample consisted of 47.3% 
males. 
 
3. Marital Status 
Marital status was changed into a binary variable in which all those who are married or were 
living together as married were coded ‘0’ while the single, widowed, separated, or divorced were 
collectively coded ‘1’. Married or marriage-like relationship: 43.3%. 
 
4. Education 
The variable education was recorded into six categories: the first category collapsing ‘no formal 
schooling’ and ‘informal schooling’ into ‘no formal schooling and informal schooling’, while 
‘some primary education’, ‘finished primary education’, ‘some secondary’, and ‘finished 
secondary’ were not changed. The categories after secondary education were recoded to ‘post 
secondary’ education. Only 26% and 14% had completed high school or had post-secondary 
education respectively. 
 
 
5. Number of Children 
The variable children was recorded from number of children; respondents with one child or more 
were coded ‘0’ while those with none were coded ‘1’. In terms of employment status, those 
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saying they were ‘unemployed’, ‘housewives’ ‘pensioner’ or ‘informal trader’ were coded 1, 
while those in gainful employment were coded ‘0’. The percentage of respondents with no 
children was 21.6%. 
 
 
6. Perceptions of service delivery  
Service delivery perceptions, i.e. housing, water supplies, sanitation, refuse removal and 
electricity, were recorded in the following manner: ‘very bad’ and ‘fairly bad’ were recoded ‘1’, 
while ‘fairly good’ and ‘very good’ were recoded ‘0’. The proportions of those coded 1 (i.e. 
‘bad’) for each of service delivery variable were as follows:  
 Housing 75.8% 
 Water 47.2% 
 Sanitation 69.4% 
 Refuse removal 46.6 
 Electricity 37.7% 
 
7. Type of dwelling 
Type of dwelling was recoded in the following manner: informal settlement was coded ‘1’, while 
brick houses were coded ‘0’. Informal settlement dwellers consisted of 73.3% of the sample. 
 
8. Interest in public affairs 
Interest in public affairs was transformed by recoding ‘somewhat interested’ and ‘very 
interested’ to ‘1’, while ‘not very interested’ and ‘not at all interested’ were recoded ‘0’.  
 
9. Discuss politics 
Discusses politics was recoded as follows: ‘never’ and ‘occasionally’ discuss politics were coded 
‘0’; while ‘frequently’ discuss politics was recoded ‘1’.  
 
10. Voter registration 
Voter registration was also reduced from the multiple responses to a binary variable, ‘registered’ 
=1, while different categories of ‘unregistered’ were coded ‘0’.  
 
11. News from mass media sources 
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The use of various forms of mass media to receive news was also recorded in the following 
manner: ‘never’, ‘less than once a month’, and ‘few times a month’ were recoded ‘0’, while ‘few 
times a week’ and ‘every day’ were coded ‘1’.  
 
 
 
 
 
